US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1554

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US-INDIA PEACEKEEPING JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETING

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI1554
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI1554 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-03-01 12:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM KPKO XA IN External Political Relations
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001554 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PHUM, KPKO, XA, IN, External Political Relations 
SUBJECT: US-INDIA PEACEKEEPING JOINT WORKING GROUP MEETING 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  At the fourth US-India Joint Working Group 
on Peacekeeping on February 14, IO PDAS Swigert underscored 
US concerns about sexual exploitation committed within UN 
peacekeeping ranks and asked India, a main troop contributor, 
to play a leading role to ensure that the problem is dealt 
with forcefully and effectively.  The US delegation 
encouraged India to consider the merits of the "Peacebuilding 
Commission" recommended in the UN High-Level Panel (HLP) 
report, but India reacted coolly to the notion that a new 
body be created as a Committee of the Security Council.  Both 
countries agreed that the increasing number and complexity of 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and the difficulty of 
transitioning from peacekeeping efforts to economic 
development are growing burdens on the international 
peacekeeping system.  A "menu approach," "hybrid 
interventions," and regional approaches to peacekeeping were 
discussed as options to alleviate some of the burden on 
troop-contributing countries (TCCs).  India raised UNSC 
reform in several contexts, asserting that current Security 
Council procedures lack transparency and that the UNSC is not 
representative of the developing world.  The group agreed to 
convene a meeting of working-level experts to discuss 
operational issues and construct a framework for the next 
meeting, but did not specify a timeframe.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) In opening remarks, both delegation heads expressed 
confidence that growing Indo-US relations would also enhance 
collaboration in peacekeeping efforts.  MEA Joint Secretary 
Prakash specifically cited the US Enhanced International 
Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) Initiative funding and joint 
exercises with the US Pacific Command as bringing the two 
governments even closer.  Prakash hailed the timely and close 
cooperation between the two militaries in the aftermath of 
the Tsunami as further evidence of an expanding military 
relationship.  IO PDAS Swigert emphasized the increasing 
strain expanded peacekeeping activity places on the UN, and 
explained the challenge for the USG as it responds to growing 
demands while maintaining troop levels in Iraq and cutting 
domestic spending at home.  Summaries of agenda items follow. 
 
 
Sexual Exploitation in Peacekeeping Operations 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3.  (C) Swigert stressed that the large-scale "sex for food" 
scandal in the DRC PKO will severely undermine the UN's 
ability to carry out UNSC resolutions.  He made three 
recommendations to enforce the Secretary General's "zero 
tolerance" policy for abuse and exploitation: 
 
-- All civil and military PKO personnel should receive 
training in the UN Code of Conduct and human trafficking; 
 
-- Professional investigators, not UN human rights workers, 
should investigate allegations so that evidence can be used 
in civil or military trials; 
 
-- Since the UN lacks prosecution authority, Special 
Representatives of the Secretary General for PKOs should have 
appropriate disciplinary and administrative tools to deal 
decisively with offenders. 
 
4.  (C) Swigert noted that India's standing as a leading 
contributor to UN PKOs puts it in an ideal position to 
propose corrective action to the UN, e.g., that all PKO 
participant nations be required to sign an agreement to 
uphold the UN "zero tolerance" policy and take appropriate 
disciplinary and administrative measures against violators. 
The Indian delegate responded that because this issue had 
only recently come to light, the GOI was not yet in a 
position to endorse such a recommendation and was still 
evaluating the problem and proposed solutions.  Swigert 
reiterated the world must see the UN taking serious action on 
its own policy, not becoming mired in extended debate. 
 
Indian Views on Multidimensional Peace Operations 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5.  (C) Prakash highlighted India's support of the UN system 
overall and its significant contributions to UN PKOs 
specifically.  He enumerated several changes which add to the 
complexity of contemporary PKOs, including: 
 
-- Nature of conflict:  Non-state and intra-state actors are 
becoming more prevalent, as are "spoilers" and terrorists; 
 
-- Number of PKO participants:  What was once a strictly 
military operation now includes civil police, human rights 
and election monitors, jailers, constitution writers, etc.; 
 
-- Mandates:  "Hybrid" mandates, i.e., where the UN takes 
over from a non-UN regional or national force, non-UN PKOs, 
and UN-mandated, but coalition-run PKOs.  Prakash noted, 
however, that the regional approach to PKOs is not a 
universal model since there is no regional security 
organization in South Asia similar to NATO or the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS); 
 
6.  (C) Prakash then raised UNSC reform, a recurring theme 
from the Indian side during the meeting.  Recognizing that 
most conflicts are in developing countries, he argued that 
the UNSC as presently constituted was not representative of 
the developing world and lacks transparency.  Further, the 
"CNN/BBC factor" is creating more demand for intervention in 
areas where there is little capacity for an effective 
response by either the UN or regional entities. 
 
7.  (C) Swigert acknowledged that a regional approach to PKOs 
could raise questions about the legitimacy of such 
interventions, but added that it had great potential as well, 
pointing to the African Union (AU) mission for Darfur as an 
important example where a regional organization could do more 
than the UN to encourage a cease-fire by deploying monitors. 
On UNSC reform, Swigert stated that the US is seriously 
considering the recommendations presented in the UNSC's High 
Level Panel report, and is open to proposals for improving 
the organization, including the possible expansion of the 
Security Council, and stressing the importance of broad 
international consensus before adopting any structural 
reforms. 
 
Peacekeeping Lessons Learned 
---------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Identifying common ideas about how PKOs can be more 
effective in the future, US and Indian officials shared 
lessons learned from their experiences in Haiti, Liberia, and 
the DRC.  Col. (ret) Brown presented a non-paper outlining US 
lessons learned in PKOs in Haiti and Liberia, including: 
 
-- Military action should only be an interim measure until 
other options are available, such as intervention by a 
regional coalition or the UN; 
 
--  Selecting a PKO leader with experience and credibility is 
critical for earning respect within the affected country and 
among the international community; 
 
-- The UNSC must give UN planners authority to procure 
materiel and deploy staff rapidly; and 
 
-- Root causes of instability must be addressed over the 
long-term by appropriate international, regional, and 
national entities, not by the military. 
 
9.  (C) Group Capt Gill, a Senior India Air Staff Officer 
recently returned from a command in MONUC in the DRC, 
reviewed positive factors in the Indian deployment in and 
around Bunia, beginning in July 2003.  Among the factors Gill 
noted for the Indian units' success there: 
 
-- Broad authority for Force Commanders; 
 
-- Formation of a quick response team with airlift 
capability; 
 
-- Active search for intelligence inputs; 
 
-- Relative success sealing the border (he admitted the 
border was only about 60 percent "sealed"); 
 
-- Community involvement and immediate impact projects to 
improve infrastructure in their AOR; 
 
-- A specific MOU detailing scope of work, vice standard MOU 
language; and 
 
-- Committed troops with a high level of discipline. 
 
10.  (C) On the oft-discussed need for more robust mandates, 
Army Col Pithawala asserted that even "Chapter Six" missions, 
i.e., pure peacekeeping operations, must have the means and 
training to be more assertive so "spoilers do not get the 
upper hand" and endanger troops.  Implementing a more robust 
mandate, however, takes additional time for training and 
"unlearning habits and mind-sets from previous missions." 
Underscoring the need for resources for intelligence 
gathering for both Chapter Six and Seven operations, 
Pithawala stressed the "need to spend resources to cultivate 
sources." 
 
Role of Police in Peacekeeping 
------------------------------ 
 
11.  (C) Moran emphasized the necessity of civilian police 
(CIVPOL) units, along with functioning legal, justice, and 
prison systems to restore stability.  He also discussed the 
challenge of coordinating the efforts of peacekeeping 
missions, including uniformed troops and CIVPOL, with those 
of UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs, noting that 
coordination problems are particularly acute in the case of 
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration campaigns.  He 
outlined recent efforts to tackle complex crisis coordination 
issues within the USG through the creation of the State 
Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS).  Noting that the HLP had taken note of 
some of these same difficult coordination issues and 
recommended the creation of a "Peacebuilding Commission," he 
distributed a paper describing the USG position to support 
the establishment of such a body under the Security Council. 
 
 
12.  (C) In the discussion that followed, the Indians 
responded that their national police and paramilitary forces 
have much to offer PKOs due to cultural diversity, IT skills, 
English language ability, and experience with numerous 
low-intensity conflicts at home.  The Indian delegation also 
stated their police are better suited to conduct CIVPOL 
training than their European counterparts because of this 
real-world experience, and have set up a training facility 
using UN PK models. 
 
Peacebuilding Commission 
------------------------ 
 
13.  (C) In the following discussion on the UN HLP proposal 
to create a Peacebuilding Commission, Swigert explained that 
such a commission should be a subsidiary of the UNSC with 
observer participants from IFI's and ECOSOC, among others. 
Swigert stressed that this did not represent encroachment by 
the Security Council on General Assembly or ECOSOC issues. 
While the GOI has not taken an official position, Prakash 
expressed reservations that the proposed Peacebuilding 
Commission should be a Security Council Committee.  Other GOI 
officials were concerned about how "failing" states would be 
identified, and felt the Security Council should stick to 
handling breaches of security and  not have its authority 
extended to include failing states. 
 
Emerging Challenges in Contemporary Peacekeeping 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
14.  (U) The MEA's Nandini outlined overarching and 
operational challenges facing future PKOs, including: 
 
-- Increasing number, complexity, and expense of PKOs; 
 
-- The "CNN/BBC factor" which generates attention and demand 
for action around the world; 
 
-- Formalizing more flexible means of engagement, e.g., 
"hybrid interventions" of regional forces or other entities, 
followed by the UN; 
 
-- The need for rapid deployment in the face of perennial 
resource constraints; 
 
-- Safety and security of troops; 
 
-- Ensuring integration of all actors and effective 
transition at the right time; and 
 
-- "Soft challenges," such as increasing women's 
participation in PKOs, preventing sexual exploitation, etc. 
 
15.  (C) Nandini asserted that "hybrid interventions" in 
which regional or national troops would be deployed rapidly 
to critical situations in the  months before a UNPKO can 
deploy should be standard  operations.  Formalizing this 
arrangement would ensure rapid crisis stabilization and give 
a UNPKO time to deploy.  Discussion turned to the transition 
between "green helmets" and "blue helmets."  The Indian 
delegation expressed concern that UN missions are often 
perceived as "less robust" following a peacekeeping 
intervention by US or other regional forces.  Prakash asked 
if the US would consider joining the "blue helmets" during 
the transition period or extending their stay as "green 
helmets" after the "blue helmets" have arrived.  Swigert 
noted a variety of ways the Security Council had acted to 
allay concerns about capabilities of UN missions, for 
instance by providing a strong Chapter Seven mandate and by 
recruiting capable, well-trained forces to follow the 
multinational forces, as India had done in following the EU 
"green helmets" in Eastern DRC.  Swigert added that the US 
saw its contribution as most effective in providing "green 
helmets" in select circumstances, as the US had done in Haiti 
and in off-shore forces in Liberia before UN blue helmets 
took over.  The US evaluates each case individually, he 
stressed. 
 
16.  (C) Citing the recent downturn in events in Bangladesh 
and Nepal -- the first and fourth largest TCCs, respectively 
-- MEA's Prakash asked whether "democracy-deficient" 
countries should be allowed to participate as peacekeepers. 
Rather than trying to formalize a "democracy test," Swigert 
proposed that all TCCs should commit to uphold the UN Code of 
Conduct. 
 
17.  (C) As the destination of 80 percent of the UN's 
peacekeeping troops, including the two largest PKOs in the 
world (DRC and Liberia), Africa presents a special challenge 
to PKOs, according to Nandini.  The question is how to 
support efforts to find "African solutions to African 
problems," be it through the African Union (AU) or regional 
configurations like ECOWAS.  Prakash questioned the AU's 
capacity to respond effectively to current peacekeeping 
demands on the continent, adding that India would watch 
closely how the G8 responds to these needs.  "Will the UN 
always be the first call and the last hope for Africa?" he 
asked. 
 
Indo-US Cooperation in Peacekeeping 
----------------------------------- 
18.  (C) Col Rajput presented an overview of the United 
Services Institutions' Center for UN Peacekeeping 
(USI/CUNPK).  CUNPK offers training capsules for junior and 
senior officers, military observers and logistics officers, 
and conducts an outdoor military/CIVPOL field exercise that 
the UN has taken as a model for PK training.  Indo-US 
cooperation has included a command post exercise, a lessons 
learned seminar with USPACOM, and $800,000 in EIPC funds used 
to enhance capabilities of the Center. 
 
19.  (C) Concluding, Moran presented an overview of the new 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the successor of 
EIPC.  The five-year, $660 million program, with immediate 
focus on capacity building in Africa, would provide training 
and equipment for 75,000 peacekeeping personnel as well as 
deployment support and enhancement of gendarme-like 
capabilities.  Moran stated that the US had found past 
cooperation with India under the EIPC program very fruitful, 
that the US had taken note of India's expertise in 
gendarme-like training in particular, and that the US 
welcomes India's interest in continued cooperation with the 
US in the peacekeeping training field. 
 
Participants 
------------ 
 
20.  (U) USG Participants: 
 
Jim Swigert, PDAS, State/IO 
Roger Moran, Dpty Dir, State/IO/Peacekeeping 
LtCol James Thomas, Military Advisor, State/IO 
Col (ret) Dallas Brown, Director of Peacekeeping, DOD/OSD 
Maj Greg Winston, ODC, Embassy New Delhi 
Stacy Gilbert, Pol-MilOff, Embassy New Delhi (notetaker) 
MAJ Richard Bairett, PolOff, Embassy New Delhi (notetaker) 
 
GOI Participants: 
 
B.S. Prakash, MEA Joint Secretary, UN Political (UNP) 
Bimal Julka, MOD Joint Secretary, Ground & Air 
Hamid Ali Rao, MEA Joint Secretary, UN Economic & Social 
Brig B.V. Nair, Army Deputy DG, Staff Duties Directorate 
Saleem Ali, Inspector General (HQ), Indo-Tibetan Border 
Police 
Col Cyrus A. Pithawala, Director, SD 3 UN Cell, Army HQ 
Col R.K. Rajput, Secretary, Centre for UN Peacekeeping 
Gp. Capt K.S. Gill, Senior Air Staff Officer, Advance HQ 
K. Nandini, MEA Under Secretary, UNP 
Raj Srivastava, MEA Under Secretary, W. Asia & North Africa 
Siddhartha Nath, MEA Attache, UNP 
 
21.  (U) IO PDAS Swigert cleared this cable. 
MULFORD 

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