US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1551

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001551 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, KDEM, IN, PK, Kashmir 
SUBJECT: TERRORIST THREATS MARR SUCCESSFUL KASHMIR POLLS 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 749 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The February J&K municipal elections 
produced largely positive results.  Participation, among the 
most important criteria for defining a "successful" election 
in the state, greatly exceeded expectations (even in areas 
with a history of alienation from New Delhi), proving again 
that Kashmiris will defy terrorist threats and separatist 
boycott calls to shape how they are governed, even if they do 
not consider their votes necessarily as "a vote for India." 
Compared with other J&K polls since 2002, there were few 
casualties.  There were also few reports of irregularities. 
However, during the campaign, many candidates withdrew, and 
many newly-elected councillors from the Valley have since 
resigned, gone into hiding, or fled to Jammu following 
insurgents' threats, depriving the exercise of some of its 
shine.  How these local bodies will function remains unclear. 
 End Summary. 
 
Another Solid Electoral Exercise 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Observers continue to watch elections in J&K more 
closely than in many other Indian states for a number of 
reasons, including: to gauge the credibility of an electoral 
process that has often been flawed in the past; to take stock 
of voter enthusiasm and participation as indications of 
Kashmiri alienation and attitudes towards India; to monitor 
popular attitudes towards the separatists; and to assess 
insurgent behavior.  While budgetary restrictions prevented 
us from observing the three week February municipal polls 
firsthand, we have spoken with many who did.  These were the 
first elections at this level in 27 years, and as such 
represented the best barometer of grassroots voter behavior 
in the Valley since the insurgency began in 1989.  Among the 
more significant observations from this exercise: 
 
-- In the third major electoral exercise since the 
Legislative Assembly elections in 2002, the voting process 
was again credible.  There were few reports of 
irregularities, and those that were noted paralleled those 
present elsewhere in India (such as names missing on voters' 
lists, while some "mobile voters" voted early and often). 
Even National Conference (NC) President Omar Abdullah, who 
had complained to the press of "rigging," recently played 
these allegations down to D/Polcouns.  We have also seen no 
further support for JKLF leader Yasin Malik's allegations 
that coercion by the security forces was behind high turnout 
rates. 
 
-- Voter participation was higher than at any time since 
1989.  This was not a result of greatly increased pro-India 
sentiment in the Valley, although there is much anecdotal 
evidence that Kashmiris increasingly yearn for normalcy. 
With each successful election, Kashmiris have fewer reasons 
to reject the electoral process as illegitimate, as they see 
their influence over who governs them.  As a journalist from 
the "Daily Excelsior" put it to us, Kashmiris for the most 
part treated the elections not as a political exercise 
related to the status of Kashmir, but as a developmental 
issue, which "provided the silent majority the justification 
it needed to take part," and put those who opposed it on the 
wrong side of democracy.  After seeing the size of the 
turnout in the first round, All-Parties Hurriyat Conference 
(APHC) hardliner SAS Geelani adopted a variant of this view, 
maintaining that the elections were about "developing civic 
amenities." 
 
-- Polling ranged from the low teens to mid-20 percent even 
in separatist bastions such as Shopian, "Srinagar's "Gaza" 
(Maisuma), and the areas around the Hazratbal shrine and the 
APHC HQ, where turnout has been in the low single digits 
since 1989.  One Srinagar-based correspondent called these 
turnout rates "a vote against the separatist leadership," 
which had tried to make the election into a "plebiscite on 
attitudes towards India, and the people did not buy it." 
 
-- Journalists in the Valley tell us that threats and 
intimidation from insurgents were much more responsible for 
keeping Kashmiri voters away from polling stations than the 
calls by Hurriyat leaders for a boycott, although only 
Geelani, the two JKLF factions, and Shabir Shah really were 
active in urging a boycott (the moderate Hurriyat issued 
several calls, but little more).  As "Pioneer" Srinagar 
correspondent Kurshid Wani put it, "whatever boycott there 
was was not under the influence of the APHC but rather due to 
the insurgents."  Hurriyat leader Prof AG Bhat conceded that 
the 2003 split in the APHC contributed to the high turnout, 
as voters would not listen to a divided leadership. 
 
-- The governing PDP did fairly well in South Kashmir, while 
the NC did well in Srinagar and parts of Central and North 
Kashmir, but neither party emerged from the fray much 
stronger vis-a-vis the other.  As usual, Congress did poorly 
in the Valley.  PDP and Congress together did very well in 
Poonch/Rajouri (where turnout was 79 percent).  The BJP did 
well in the Jammu region. 
-- Large numbers of women (30 percent of total turnout was 
female) and young people participated, both as candidates and 
voters. 
 
Security Dominates the Aftermath 
-------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Terrorist intimidation, however, has taken some of 
the shine from the results: 
 
-- During the campaign, large numbers of candidates withdrew 
their names from consideration, and many newly-elected 
councillors from the Valley have reportedly resigned, gone 
into hiding, or fled to Jammu as a result of threats from 
insurgents.  Reliable data are difficult to obtain, but a 
well-connected journalist in Jammu told us that "scores" of 
candidates resigned during the campaign, resulting in 
unopposed contests, particularly in terrorist-infested areas 
in South Kashmir, that 91 persons were elected unopposed, and 
that there were no candidates at all in 35 wards (of 890 
total statewide).  Many of these resignations took the form 
of advertisements in the vernacular press, in which 
candidates apologized for running for office.  Since the 
results were declared, 10-15 more councillors have resigned, 
but initial reports of mass resignations appear to have been 
overblown. 
 
-- Terrorists killed relatively few (five) candidates, 
political workers (five), and their relatives and friends, 
and few injuries were reported.  However, the assassination 
of a 75-year old councillor expected to be elected the Mayor 
of Srinagar cast a pall over the relatively high (by 
post-1989 standards) turnout in Srinagar (some 20 percent) 
and led to an uptick in resignations from successful 
candidates.  Many unsuccessful candidates are reportedly also 
lying low or have gone into hiding. 
 
-- The J&K government has gone to some lengths to address 
these security concerns after Omar Abdullah threatened to 
withdraw all NC representatives from municipal bodies to 
protest their vulnerability.  Since then, at least one 
Personal Security Officer (PSO) has reportedly been assigned 
to each elected councillor.  Many observers predict that 
security will be a major factor in how well the local 
councils function, because so many councillors (444 in the 
Valley alone) will potentially be exposed.  Fears are 
reportedly most pronounced in Srinagar, Anantnag, and 
Pulwama, but are present elsewhere as well.  PDP General 
Secretary Sadiq Ali told us the assignment of PSOs has 
 
SIPDIS 
assuaged concerns somewhat, while unusually harsh winter 
conditions in the state have diverted attention.  He expected 
concerns to resurface with warmer weather. 
 
-- Journalists speculate that councillors from the Valley who 
have fled to Jammu are likely to trickle back by the end of 
the Winter Session of the Legislative Assembly when the 
Durbar moves to Srinagar in May.  Press reports of 400 
departures for Jammu have not been corroborated. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
4.  (C) These elections are another important success for the 
J&K government.  Although likely to try to reduce the 
effectiveness of these elected bodies, the terrorists cannot 
be unaware of the strong popular support Kashmiris in 
particular showed for these polls.  The relatively small 
number of casualties during the process is very positive, but 
it is unclear what this means.  The optimistic reading is 
that jihadi commanders in the Valley received and heeded 
instructions from Pakistan not to disrupt the polls, but it 
is also possible that the terrorists merely altered their 
strategy -- and seek to disrupt the democratic process in an 
ex post facto manner via intimidation, rather than widespread 
and indiscriminate murder as was the case in the fall 2002 
state elections, during which some 800 politicians, election 
workers, and civilians were killed. 
 
5.  (C) It will not be clear until later in the year whether 
councillors' security will be as much of an issue as appears 
to be the case at present, and whether these civic bodies 
will be as successful in practice as was the process that 
constituted them.  Mufti (and the GOI) now must ensure that 
they have the funds and the authority to act on issues voters 
entrusted to them, lest an opportunity to demonstrate the 
positive results of the democratic process for Kashmiris is 
lost.  Given the rhetorical emphasis Mufti and the GOI are 
now placing on economic development in J&K (while leaving 
dialogue with the separatists for another time), it would be 
a major mistake for the state and central government not to 
put their money where their mouth is. 
MULFORD