US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1484

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ELTN, ETRD, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKS TRYING TO CHANGE A LOSING GAME 
 
REF: A. 04 ANKARA 6615 
     B. ANKARA 1211 
     C. ANKARA 1071 
     D. BAGHDAD 923 
     E. USADO ANKARA IIR DTG 281402Z FEB 05 
     F. ANKARA 1283 
     G. ANKARA 1230 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Turkey's leadership and policy establishment 
appears to be grasping for a new and more constructive policy 
direction on Iraq, in part (we believe) based on the desire 
to limit the weight Iraq puts on the U.S.-Turkish 
relationship, in part also due to the Turks' post-election 
evaluation that they have been pursuing a losing strategy on 
Iraq.  We believe the Turks will now try to focus on Iraq as 
a whole and to support the ITG (when it emerges), and will 
resist their inclination to look at Iraq as a collection of 
northern Iraq-centered problems (federalism cum Kurdish 
separatism, Kirkuk, Turkmen, PKK) as it does now.  We have a 
small but discernible window of opportunity to work with the 
Turks on Iraq, but we fear bad news from Iraq could close 
this window, so we should capitalize on this opportunity 
quickly and strengthen the GOT's willingness to stand up to 
the pressure.  End summary. 
 
Turks Seek to Change a Losing Game 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) While the GOT has not formally announced a new Iraq 
policy, we have picked up indications publicly and privately 
that it is struggling to form one.  Just before and after 
Iraq's Jan. 30 elections, MFA statements were lukewarm at 
best and took particular pains to cite at length Turkish 
concerns about Sunni non-participation and what the Turks 
viewed as Kurdish manipulation of events on the ground in 
Kirkuk, including allegations that the Kurds sought to 
disenfranchise and intimidate the region's Turkmen.  Erdogan 
was particularly unhelpful, at one point criticizing the 
election as "undemocratic." 
 
3. (C) Yet following the Feb. 13 announcement of the election 
results--and despite their obvious disappointment with the 
performance of Iraq's Turkmen overall and especially the 
Ankara-supported Iraq Turkmen Front (ref b)--MFA issued a 
somewhat warmer statement supporting the transition to 
democracy in Iraq and a separate statement praising the UIA's 
choice for PM, Ibrahim Ja'afari, as a "senior politician whom 
we know well."  In a stunning revision of history, FonMin Gul 
said in a March 1 interview that it was Turkey who had 
propped up a wobbly Arab world and the U.S. by insisting that 
elections in Iraq go forward on Jan. 30 as planned.  We were 
also surprised when in a recent interview Turkish National 
Intelligence Organization (MIT) U/S Atasagun showed subtlety 
and flexibility in analysis, including on the eventuality of 
a Kurdish state. 
 
4. (C) On Feb. 24, a civilian and military delegation led by 
GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Amb. Osman Koruturk traveled to 
northern Iraq to meet PUK leader Jalal Talabani (usually 
Talabani comes here) (ref c).  Koruturk carried a letter from 
PM Erdogan to Talabani in which--according to the Ankara PUK 
rep Bahros Galali--Erdogan offered Turkey's support for a 
federal system for Iraq (previously many Turks saw federalism 
as merely a step on the way to the establishment of an 
independent Kurdish state).  The press here (and, to us, 
Galali) portrayed the trip positively and spun Koruturk's 
mission as Turkey lending its support to Talabani in his bid 
to become President of Iraq.  The Turks have often complained 
to us about Kurds being given too much influence in Baghdad, 
but we are not hearing such complaints now from Ankara. 
Indeed, MFA DG For the Middle East Oguz Celikkol told the DCM 
March 10 that part of the intention behind the Koruturk 
mission was to dispel reports that Turkey objected to 
Talabani becoming President. 
 
Looking at the Kurds from a National Perspective 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
5. (C) We believe the Turks see the Kurds as a balance 
against possible UIA moves to impose both Sharia law and Shia 
hegemony into the Iraqi political system, and they have also 
recognized the importance of Kurdish buy-in (as shown by 
Turkish Ambassador Cevikoz's March 2 conversation with 
Ambassador Negroponte--ref d).  Yet even as the Turks want 
the Kurds to be part of the Baghdad policy nucleus, they are 
concerned that Ja'afari may be forced to make too many 
concessions on Kirkuk and maintaining the peshmerga, still 
hot-button issues here.  DCM emphasized to Celikkol in their 
March 10 conversation that there are other communities and 
political forces in Iraq who take Kirkuk seriously, not just 
the Kurds, and that we do not believe these forces will 
easily concede to Kirkuk's becoming part of the KRA. 
Celikkol understood the point. At the same meeting, MFA 
Department Head for Iraq Avni Botsali said that U.S. and 
Turkish policies on Iraq "are coming together," and repeated 
with emphasis that a U.S. failure in Iraq would also be a 
failure for the West, including Turkey. 
 
Turkish Leaders (Finally) Talk About the Importance of 
Working With Us on Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6. (C) According to press reports, at the Feb. 25 meeting of 
the National Security Council (which includes the PM as well 
as key ministers and military leaders), the GOT evaluated 
both its Iraq policy and the U.S. relationship and assigned 
PM Erdogan to work on improving the U.S.'s public image in 
Turkey--an image pummeled in recent months by outrageous 
allegations against the U.S., usually centered on Iraq, by 
journalists and politicians inside and outside the 
government.  Instrumental in turning the government around 
was a series of senior visits in the first six weeks of the 
year, culminating in the Secretary's visit Feb. 5-6.  Indeed, 
even the day before the Feb. 25 NSC meeting, Erdogan 
(discussing U.S. policy in Iraq) commented that "There could 
be differences in our ways of taking an approach to various 
regional issues and events.  Nevertheless, the rich 
historical background of the ties between the two countries 
and their multifaceted character...are sufficient to ensure 
that our friendship and cooperation continue with greater 
vigor."  This is not the kind of line we have heard from GOT 
leaders for some time indeed. 
 
7. (S) The military also appears to be shifting to a more 
positive position on Iraq.  TGS was well out in front of the 
civilian leadership in standing up for the relationship 
despite policy differences on Iraq, best illustrated by 
Deputy CHOD Basbug's Jan. 26 press briefing, in which, while 
laying out Turkish concerns, he did so judiciously and 
accompanied by repeated emphasis on the importance of 
relations with the U.S. and on not reducing them to a single 
issue.  Some military sources have indicated that TGS is 
revising its view that the U.S. is failing in Iraq and that 
the country is in imminent danger of disintegrating.  These 
sources tell us that TGS is drafting a paper saying that the 
U.S. is succeeding and therefore Turkey should support us and 
the Iraqis (see ref e).  While Embassy has its doubts that 
the report is correct, our recent contacts with the military 
indicate they are also thinking of Iraq as a larger issue 
than the usual Turkish concerns.  When PolMilCouns met with 
TGS J3 Plans and Operations Chief Maj Gen Eroz on March 9, 
Eroz never once raised the PKK/Kongra-Gel or the Turkmen. 
This seems to be a contrast to his harsh assessment after 
Jan. 11 trilateral talks on PKK/Kongra-Gel that they had 
accomplished nothing. 
 
Comment: Can They Take the High Road? 
------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The positive shift in Ankara's approach toward Iraq 
is, thus, the result of realizing its previous approach 
failed and a desire to prevent a further slide in U.S.-Turkey 
relations.  While we believe the Turks are now making a 
renewed effort to be helpful on Iraq and in supporting our 
relationship, we are not convinced that the policy apparatus 
or the leadership has either the discipline or the political 
courage to stay on course if events in Iraq bring the 
standard Turkish bogeymen back to life.  Injudicious 
statements by Kurds on Kirkuk or Kurdish independence, new 
allegations of oppression of Turkmen, an uptick in PKK 
attacks in Turkey (a normal occurrence in the spring), or a 
major CF anti-insurgent operation could each by themselves be 
enough to inspire the Turkish press to renew its blatant 
misreporting and airing of grievances.  The proof of the 
pudding will come when Erdogan or Gul face the microphones 
and have to decide whether to pander to Turkish public 
opinion or be real leaders.  Their past record does not give 
us strong reason for optimism. 
 
9. (C) Comment, cont.: Thus, if we have issues where we can 
press forward--issues such as helping with reconstruction, 
the second border gate (ref f), encouraging Iraqi-Turkish 
dialogue on water issues (ref g), more contributions to NATO 
Training Mission-Iraq or training police, or simply pushing 
the Turks to show more leadership in supporting the ITG and 
democratization in Iraq--we should move smartly before this 
window of opportunity might slam shut.  Deepening their 
engagement with us on Iraq may strengthen their will to stand 
up to the critical press and for our relationship.  End 
comment. 
 
10. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered. 
EDELMAN