US embassy cable - 02ABUJA1193

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NIGERIA: BENUE UPDATE - INFORMATION ON JUDICIAL COMMISSION

Identifier: 02ABUJA1193
Wikileaks: View 02ABUJA1193 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2002-04-16 16:21:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM MOPS PINS NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, MOPS, PINS, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: BENUE UPDATE - INFORMATION ON JUDICIAL 
COMMISSION 
 
 
REF: STATE 41523 
 
 
Classified by CDA Tim Andrews; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Dr. Sani Sufi, Secretary of the Judicial 
Commission of Inquiry on inter-communal conflicts in Plateau, 
Benue, Taraba and Nassarawa States April 15 briefed PolOffs 
on the Commission's plans.  Members have been selected and 
the body inaugurated by the Federal Government.  Sufi was 
optimistic about the composition of the panel, and expected 
public hearings would begin in May.  An end-date cannot yet 
be established.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2. (U) Dr. Sani A. Sufi, Secretary of the Judicial Commission 
of Inquiry on the inter-communal conflict in Benue, Taraba, 
Nassarawa and Plateau States April 15 briefed PolCouns and 
PolMilOff on the Commission.  Sufi is a civil servant who is 
concurrently Secretary of the Commission and Director of 
Administration at the Ministry of Defense. 
 
 
====================== 
THE DELAYS APPEAR OVER 
====================== 
 
 
3. (C) Sufi noted that while the Commission was announced 
late last year, its inauguration took until March. The delay 
was because the body was constituted as a full-fledged 
judicial commission; arrangements had to be made with the 
Supreme Court for the provision of bailiffs, court reporters 
and other judicial support staff.  Because of the nature of 
the Commission, the presiding officer had to be a well-known 
jurist.  The Ministry of Justice also had to second two 
prosecutors to work full time with the Commission. 
Allocation of funds was difficult and time-consuming as well, 
Sufi admitted.  Additionally, the Federal Government engaged 
in informal consultations with the four states in question, 
asking each state to either present the name of an indigene 
it wanted on the commission or to comment on names proposed 
by the federal government.  While these consultations took 
time, they assured that the states would be more comfortable 
about the make-up and the deliberations of the group.  The 
four other members of the panel were chosen from among 
Nigeria's corps of distinguished, retired civil servants. 
These four were selected for their overall knowledge of 
government and Nigeria.  Not from any of the affected states, 
this quartet was selected to bring significant expertise and 
greater objectivity to the Commission. 
 
 
   4. (U) The Commission Chairman is Justice Chukwuemeka 
Opene, the Presiding Judge of the Federal Court of Appeal, a 
highly respected jurist.  The other eight members include 
Alhaji Mohammed Liman, Micleans Dikwal, Daniel Agogo, Alhaji 
Haruna Ahmadu, Ambassador Yahaya Abdullahi, Alhaji Yahaya 
Hamza, Chief Patrick Okon, and Ruth Akafa. 
 
 
============= 
THE GAME PLAN 
============= 
 
 
5. (U) The Commission's formal terms of reference include: 1) 
Examining the proximate causes of the conflicts between 
communities in the four states; 2) Identifying the basic 
issues underlying tension between communities and providing 
strategies for peace; 3) Identifying groups and individuals 
involved in the crises; 4) Recommending appropriate 
sanctions; 5) Examining the roles of states and local 
governments and traditional authorities; 6) Providing 
recommendations to improve existing security arrangements; 
and 7) Providing recommendations on other measures to secure 
peace and facilitate reconciliation between communities. 
 
 
6. (C) According to Sufi, the body will have the power to 
summon witnesses and compel testimony. Sufi stated the 
Commission will not only investigate the Benue tragedy but 
also incidents of communal conflict in the other states as 
well.  Stressing the Commission's judicial quality, Sufi 
mentioned the panel was not limited to trying to reconcile 
the disputant ethnic groups. The Commission would have the 
authority to investigate any criminal act within the scope of 
its mandate.  While not empowered to conduct criminal 
proceedings itself, the Commission was expected to recommend 
to the federal government, via the Justice Ministry, 
appropriate criminal indictments for "anyone" identified as 
having committed criminal acts. 
 
 
7. (C) The Commission has already collected 37 written 
submissions from interested parties.  Sufi expected the 
Commission to receive many more. The Commission would 
actively solicit contributions from important individuals, 
such as traditional rulers and local community leaders, who 
might not be well-versed in the functions of a judicial 
commission but whose input would be important to furnishing 
the Commission with an accurate picture of the problems in 
the affected areas.  Sufi stated that the Commission not only 
anticipated receipt of reports averring particular incidents 
of abuse or violence but more far-reaching submissions 
offering policy suggestions to curb the conflicts.  He said 
the Commission would ask institutions, such as the Institute 
for Peace and Conflict Resolution and the National Institute 
for Policy and Strategic Studies, to provide such position 
papers. 
 
 
8. (C) Sufi commented that he had reviewed the Human Rights 
Watch report on the Benue massacre.  He did not think the 
Commission would actively seek contributions from HRW or 
other international human rights groups.  He maintained that 
the HRW report was based primarily on work done by Nigerian 
groups.  The commission already had received reports from 
several domestic human rights organs.  The Commission would 
request submissions directly from other local groups whose 
work that helped informed the HRW report but who had not yet 
provided any report to the Commission, he emphasized. 
9. (C) The GON had not placed any time limits on the panel's 
investigative mandate, giving the body wide latitude 
regarding how far it wanted to dig into the past history of 
these conflicts.  Sufi remarked that many of these conflicts 
had been brewing for decades.  The panel might have to dig 
relatively deep to appropriately understand some of these 
conflicts and to provide suggestions to the GON on resolving 
these quarrels. The Federal Government also had not set a 
timeframe for the Commission to finish its work, preferring 
the body take the time needed to get the job done, Sufi 
opined.   He expected that shortly after the group reconvened 
April 29, they would begin their public work.  Sufi said the 
Commission was contemplating holding public hearings for 
approximately one week in each of the states. 
 
 
10. (C) After the visits to the states, the group would 
return to Abuja to digest the information gathered on the 
four-state circuit ride and then continue public sittings 
here.  The public hearings in Abuja would allow groups not 
heard in the states to present evidence and would give the 
Commission an opportunity to summon persons and organizations 
implicated in criminal acts to present testimony.  These 
people and groups would be afforded the right of counsel at 
the hearings.  Sufi hoped the hearings in the states would 
begin in May.  He did not know how long the hearings in Abuja 
might take.  However, once they were finished, the Commission 
would promptly present a report to the President. 
 
 
11. (C) After expressing some frustration over the earlier 
delay in getting the Commission's judicial support and 
resources from the Supreme Court, Sufi voiced optimism that 
the body would be effective and fulfill its terms of 
reference.  He noted that the members selected made for a 
"good composition," and he clearly held Justice Opene in 
esteem.  He also praised Minister of State for Army 
Batagarawa's efforts to help furnish much-needed logistical 
support for the Commission. 
 
 
12. (C) COMMENT: Nigerian judicial commissions have a history 
of being very deliberate in their proceedings.  However, 
Batagarawa clearly understands the importance that we attach 
to the efficacy and impartiality of this tribunal in 
promoting the rule of law and investigating what happened in 
Benue last October (and in the other states before and 
after).  While in a perfect world, we would have preferred 
that Sufi have no ties to the Ministry of Defense, this is 
not a perfect place, and his connections to the Ministry 
might facilitate a level of cooperation that might not 
otherwise exist.  We will sustain contact with Sufi and 
monitor the Commission to make sure the link to the Ministry 
does not have a corrosive impact on the panel's independence. 
 END COMMENT. 
Andrews 

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