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| Identifier: | 05ANKARA1049 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ANKARA1049 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2005-02-28 09:07:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL CY TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001049 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 TAGS: PREL, CY, TU SUBJECT: TURKEY SET TO NEGOTIATE ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION REF: ANKARA 879 (U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) A Turkish delegation travels to Brussels March 1 to begin negotiating the text of the Ankara Agreement extension protocol. The Turkish MFA foresees no major problem negotiating a text Turkey can sign. The tricky part will be crafting the inevitable Turkish statement that the extension does not constitute recognition of the ROC. The Turks are coming armed with legal opinions on what text will prevent this; the EU will press for softer language; the MFA anticipates ROC opposition no matter what the language. End Summary. Turkish Delegation to Brussels March 1 -------------------------------------- 2. (C) A Turkish MFA delegation travels to Brussels March 1 to begin negotiating the text of Ankara Agreement extension protocol with the European Commission and to get a better understanding of the procedure by which the EU will approve it. MFA Acting DDG for Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs Bilman still foresees no major problems negotiating a text that Turkey can sign. However, the Turkish delegation includes hard-line MFA legal expert Bolukbasi (currently Turkish permrep to the WTO and head of the Turkish negotiating team for the abortive OIF northern front option in 2002-2003). 3. (C) Negotiations will center around whether the protocol should cover all countries that have entered the EU since 1963, when the Ankara Agreement was signed, or simply those that entered in May 2004; and the form of Turkey's addendum emphasizing the protocol does not constitute recognition of the ROC. 4. (C) The GOT would prefer, but will probably not insist, the protocol cover all countries that have entered the EU since 1963, not just the ten that entered in May 2004. Otherwise, Bilman wonders how the Agreement can be extended to the other EU countries. Bilman claims the ROC opposes this idea out of what he depicts as unreasoning concern that this waters down the effect of the extension to the ROC. The Tricky Part: Non-Recognition of the ROC -------------------------------------------- 5. (C) Crafting the form of Turkey's inevitable statement that the extension does not constitute Turkish recognition of the ROC will be tricky. Turkey originally envisioned labeling it a "reservation," but will probably settle for denominating it a "footnote" or "declaration." 6. (C) The MFA has solicited legal opinions on how to craft the text to prevent the ROC from claiming that the protocol constitutes recognition. An EU colleague here said EU countries are pressing the Turks to soften their language in order to keep the ROC from rallying support against the protocol. For example, Bilman claims the UK suggests the Turkish non-recognition language be accompanied by a statement that Turkey still seeks permanent settlement. No matter what the language, Bilman anticipates ROC opposition to the protocol. EDELMAN
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