US embassy cable - 05CANBERRA374

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AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON STRENGTHENING THE IAEA AND RAISING IRAN AT THE NEXT BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING

Identifier: 05CANBERRA374
Wikileaks: View 05CANBERRA374 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Canberra
Created: 2005-02-28 05:36:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KNNP AORC PARM AS IR IAEA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/ANP, NP/MNA, AND NP/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KNNP, AORC, PARM, AS, IR, IAEA 
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON STRENGTHENING THE IAEA AND 
RAISING IRAN AT THE NEXT BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING 
 
REF: A. STATE 21700 
 
     B. STATE 30313 
     C. STATE 31323 
     D. CANBERRA 322 
     E. CANBERRA 323 
     F. CANBERRA 341 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS WOO LEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D). 
 
1.  (C) We presented Ref A demarche on February 7 to DFAT 
Arms Control Office Director David Mason and ASNO DG John 
Carlson, and continued discussions during and after the visit 
of NPT Envoy and CD Ambassador Jackie Sanders (Refs D - F) 
about the U.S. proposals to strengthen the IAEA.  Mason, 
Carlson and First Assistant Secretary for International 
Security David Stuart told us the GOA broadly supported the 
U.S. approach to strengthening the IAEA, but wondered whether 
the NAM would find it acceptable (Ref F).  We raised ref B 
points with Mason and NPT action officer John Page on 
February 22.  They appreciated the revisions to the Terms of 
Reference for the IAEA Special Committee and said Australia 
could accept the U.S. language as written.  Mason and Page, 
however, highlighted what they saw as a disconnect between 
ref B talking points on the critical issue of Committee 
membership and the concommitant language in the Terms of 
Reference (TOR) document, as follows: 
 
Begin excerpt from Ref B talking points: 
 
"We are prepared to modify our position on membership.  We 
can agree that the committee membership shall be open ended. 
This position, however, is without prejudice to our proposal 
on membership that we will submit for consideration by the 
Special Committee, i.e., that countries under investigation 
for non-technical violations of their nuclear 
nonproliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not 
to participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors 
(BOG) or the Special Committee regarding their own cases." 
 
Begin text from draft Terms of Reference: 
 
"Committee Membership 
 
The Committee should be a Committee of the Board made up of 
governments in good standing with the IAEA.  No states under 
investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed 
to serve on the new Special Committee.  Any state on the 
Committee that comes under investigation should recuse itself 
from the Committee." 
 
2.  (C) Mason and Page explained that although the language 
in the Ref B draft Board Decision language matched that in 
the talking points about committee membership, they believed 
the reference to "countries under investigation for 
non-technical violations" needed to be repeated in the TOR 
document.  In addition, they were concerned about the TOR 
phrase that such countries "should elect not to participate" 
in decisions by the BOG.  This could be viewed as 
"mandatory," they said, and would therefore be unacceptable 
to the NAM.  Mason proposed a "less strident" phrase, such 
as: "it would be expected that states under investigation for 
non-technical violations .... would recuse themselves ...." 
He again emphasized that the GOA itself was satisfied with 
and would support the overall U.S. approach.  His suggested 
language was intended to help the USG make the approach 
acceptable to others.  Mason especially endorsed the idea of 
reviving special inspections, as well as the language on 
identifying the consequences of states withdrawing from the 
NPT, adding that Australia would present an NPT Article X 
initiative at the May 2005 NPT Review Conference (septel). 
 
3.  (C) On February 23, we presented Ref C points on the U.S. 
remarks at the February 28 BOG about Iran's nuclear programs 
to Mason and IAEA Iran action officer Sam Roggeveen.  Mason 
and Roggeveen said they were in the process of finalizing the 
Australian national statement on Iran.  They expressed 
appreciation for the U.S. points and said elements of them 
would be factored into the Australian statement as 
appropriate. 
 
STANTON 

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