US embassy cable - 05QUITO468

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000468 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, EC 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY MINISTER WORKING TO KEEP GOE ON TRACK 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires A.I., Arnold Chacon.  Reason 1.4 (b&d) 
 
1.  (S) Summary:  On February 25 CDA followed up on earlier 
calls to GOE presidential minister Carlos Polit to assure 
that the GOE took action to keep FARC suspects in custody. 
Polit assured the CDA that the GOE would do so, and 
understood the importance for GOE anti-terrorist cooperation. 
 On other issues, Polit acknowledged recent political 
mis-steps, signaled more cabinet changes, and said president 
Gutierrez' commitment to dialogue with the opposition was 
real.  He said president Gutierrez had been impressed with 
OAS SecGen candidate Paco Flores during a February 24 
meeting.  End Summary. 
 
GOE Doing Right on FARC 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (S) CDA invited Polit to breakfast on February 25 to 
follow up on an earlier call to congratulate the GOE for the 
arrest of a dozen FARC on February 23 in Quito.  He also 
emphasized the importance of protecting the GOE police 
anti-terror unit, which had developed the intelligence for 
the successful operation, from political interference.  Polit 
said he had spoken personally with president Gutierrez about 
the imperative of continued anti-terror cooperation with 
Colombia and the U.S. 
 
President Losing Patience with Opposition 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Polit said Gutierrez was losing patience with 
opposition tactics to pressure the GOE and Congress to act on 
the court issue.  He singled out civil society leader Cesar 
Montufar for special scorn, and requested USG assistance to 
get Montufar to drop confrontational tactics such as the 
ongoing "honk to change the court" campaign outside Congress. 
 Montufar's actions, and his reluctance to enter into 
dialogue with the GOE on the court issue, were clearly an 
indication of his own political aspirations, Polit asserted. 
Polit worried that the opposition's goal was to provoke the 
GOE to over-react in an authoritarian manner.  This strategy 
was strengthening the hand of hard-liners in the GOE, making 
it harder to convince Gutierrez to pursue political 
compromise. 
 
4.  (C) CDA defended USG support to NGOs working to 
strengthen democratic institutions, such as Montufar's 
Citizens Participation group, and said it would continue.  He 
suggested that the Foreign Ministry's request for an official 
USG response to alleged use of AID funds for the February 16 
protest march was not helpful.  Montufar has assured us that 
he had been misquoted by press; he had made clear that no USG 
funding was used for the protest march. 
 
Political Mis-steps Worsen Situation 
------------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Polit acknowledged that the GOE had hurt itself 
politically in recent days.  The arrest and subsequent 
release of General Gallardo (SepTel) had been a blunder. 
Supreme Court president Guillermo Castro had acted on 
fugitive ex-president Bucaram's behest.  Minister of 
Government Ledesma had dropped the ball.  The case would 
resurface to cause the GOE more damage, he predicted. 
Similarly, the move against the Jesuit charity had been a 
fiasco.  President of Congress Omar Quintana was losing 
control of Congress.  In response to the CDA's expressed 
concern about corruption allegations against the president's 
brother, Polit said Gilmar Gutierrez was naive and being used 
by others. 
 
Commitment to Dialogue is Real 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Polit said Gutierrez' commitment to political 
dialogue with the opposition was real.  Polit, Ledesma and 
Gutierrez himself were eager to begin that dialogue, and 
willing to "put everything on the table."  (We later relayed 
this information to Montufar, who said only that he would 
ponder the offer.)  Recognizing the need for conciliation, 
Gutierrez had agreed to fire controversial Social Welfare 
Minister Antonio Vargas and his confrontational 
Undersecretary Bolivar Gonzalez shortly. 
 
Gutierrez Impressed with Flores 
------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Polit said Gutierrez had spent two hours with 
visiting former Salvadoran president Flores, and had been 
very impressed.  Should Chilean candidate Insulza drop out 
after first-round voting, the GOE would give Flores serious 
consideration.  In light of the meeting, Polit expressed 
understanding of USG support for Flores, and thanked the 
Ambassador for her continued engagement with president 
Gutierrez on this matter. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C) Polit is a lonely voice of reason in an embattled 
government, and an ally on key USG interests.  He said the 
president was anxious to meet with the Ambassador on these 
issues, perhaps to add further balance to his circle of 
advisors.  We are encouraging the opposition to engage with 
Polit first, to explore possibilities for dialogue on the 
court issue.  Polit's read-out of Gutierrez' meeting with 
Flores tracks with Flores' own to PolChief on February 24. 
Polit and FM Zuquilanda have cautioned, however, that 
newfound enthusiasm over Flores' candidacy would come into 
play only if Insulza does not reach the second round of 
voting. 
Chacon