US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI819

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000819 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN PREPARING FOR STRONG ANTI-SECESSION LAW 
RESPONSE 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 362 
     B. TAIPEI 773 
     C. 2004 TAIPEI 2662 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (S) Summary: Senior Chen administration officials continue 
to warn that Taipei will react strongly to a PRC move to pass 
an Anti-Secession Law during the March National People's 
Congress.  President Chen Shui-bian told the AIT Director 
that Taiwan's most likely response will be to pass some form 
of an "Anti-Annexation Law."  Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) officials are backing away from Chen's public warnings 
to hold a referendum, citing likely resistance from the 
Pan-Blue.  Moderates are urging the DPP leadership to take a 
wait-and-see attitude to the PRC draft law, but most 
Pan-Green interlocutors assess that Chen has already decided 
on a hard-line response.  Senior Pan-Blue officials express 
concern that an over-reaction to the Anti-Secession Law could 
further exacerbate cross-Strait tensions, but acknowledge 
that public pressure may force them to support an 
Anti-Annexation Law.  The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) has 
thus far taken the most activist approach on the 
Anti-Secession Law, hoping to leverage the issue to gain 
enough seats in the May 14 National Assembly election to 
reverse a package of legislative reforms passed by the 
Legislative Yuan (LY) last August.  End Summary. 
 
Calm Before the Storm? 
---------------------- 
 
2. (S) Ruling and opposition party officials expect March PRC 
National People's Congress (NPC) action on the proposed 
Anti-Secession Law to evoke a shrill political response from 
Taipei.  DPP China Affairs Department Director Tung Li-wen 
told AIT that a series of activities sponsored by the DPP and 
NGOs on February 28 to protest the PRC law will likely signal 
the start of a downward spiral in cross-Strait atmospherics 
that will last at least into the summer, and perhaps longer. 
President Chen Shui-bian told the AIT Director on February 21 
that he will try to constrain Taiwan actions for the moment, 
but warned that if Beijing proceeds with its plan to pass the 
law in March, the Taiwan public will react strongly.  Other 
officials have lodged similar warnings.  The Mainland Affairs 
Council (MAC) spokesman publicly accused the PRC of damaging 
regional stability and harming the basic rights of the Taiwan 
people after the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) reaffirmed 
plans on February 25 to proceed with the draft law during the 
March NPC session.  The MAC spokesman stated that PRC threats 
to pass the law have already provoked a strong negative 
reaction among the Taiwan people. 
 
DPP: Divisions Persist 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) Despite occasional appeals for calm, President Chen 
has repeatedly signaled in public that Taiwan will hold a 
referendum or pass countervailing legislation if the NPC acts 
on its draft law.  Nevertheless, moderates in the government 
and ruling party tell AIT that no final decision will be made 
until the contents of the PRC law are revealed.  Several AIT 
interlocutors have argued that Taipei's assumptions that the 
Anti-Secession Law will fundamentally harm Taiwan's interests 
(Ref A) may be overstated.  Veteran DPP legislator (and vocal 
Chen critic) Lin Cho-shui assessed that Beijing's move to 
introduce the law was a strategic error that Taiwan might be 
able to exploit if it avoids overplaying its hand.  "Beijing 
likely took this decision as a result of pressure from 
hard-liners," Lin stated, "but if their actions undermine the 
PRC's relations with the U.S. and other major powers, the 
hard-liners may have to take the blame."  National Security 
Council (NSC) Senior Advisor for cross-Strait Affairs Chen 
Chung-hsin offered a similar assessment, adding that as long 
as the draft law is light on substance, it may provide Hu 
Jintao with more flexibility for dealing with Taiwan in the 
future.  "Hu can claim that he's given the hard-liners a 
public present, then proceed with a softer line on 
substantive relations with the DPP government," Chen added. 
 
Legislative Moves 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) Nevertheless, other Pan-Green officials say they 
believe President Chen has already made up his mind to offer 
a harsh response, regardless of the contents of the PRC law. 
DPP LY Caucus Secretary General Lai Ching-te said that while 
no final decision has been reached internally, the DPP is 
very likely to support a legislative response to the 
Anti-Secession Law.  Lai said this is a more realistic option 
than a referendum, since the Referendum Law passed in 
November, 2003, includes too many procedural hurdles to 
organize an Anti-Anti-Annexation Law referendum to coincide 
with the May 14 National Assembly (NA) election.  While 
President Chen could invoke Article 17 of the Referendum Law, 
which gives the President the right to call a "Defensive 
Referendum" in response to external threats to change 
Taiwan's sovereign status, such a move would likely 
antagonize the Pan-Blue alliance. 
 
5. (C) In contrast, DPP officials are confident they can win 
support from the opposition for an Anti-Annexation Law, 
achieving the government's objective of presenting a united 
front to Beijing over the issue (Ref A).  The DPP's Lai said 
that the Pan-Blue would not dare oppose an Anti-Annexation 
Law for fear of being labeled pro-Beijing.  KMT Policy Chief 
Tseng Yung-chuan separately acknowledged to AIT that the KMT 
 
SIPDIS 
would in fact support an Anti-Annexation Law for just this 
reason.  "I realize that passing an Anti-Annexation Law will 
just exacerbate cross-Strait tensions" Tseng commented, "but 
no Taiwanese could oppose an Anti-Annexation Law."  Tseng 
claimed to have conveyed this position to PRC Taiwan Affairs 
Office (TAO) Director Chen Yunlin during a January 11 meeting 
in Beijing.  Veteran KMT legislator Wu Dun-yi said the KMT 
may at least be able to minimize the risk of provoking a 
harsh PRC response by toning down the contents of an 
Anti-Annexation Law.  "We will not support a Taiwan 
independence law," he asserted, "but rather insist that an 
Anti-Annexation Law simply safeguard the effective 
territorial integrity of the ROC, defined as Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen, and Matsu." 
 
6. (C) The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) formally announced 
plans to introduce an Anti-Annexation Law text on February 
23.  TSU Policy Chief Lee Shang-ren told AIT that the 
proposed legislation will likely contain provocative 
language, including the "one country on each side" 
formulation.  However, he added that the TSU would be willing 
to moderate the contents in order to win support from the DPP 
and other parties.  Nevertheless, People First Party (PFP) 
officials tell AIT they will oppose any form of 
Anti-Annexation legislation, fearing that it will provoke a 
cross-Strait crisis (Ref B).  PFP Spokesman Hwang Yih-jiau 
told AIT that the PFP no longer fears being labeled as 
pro-Beijing and would not try to outdo the DPP to prove its 
pro-Taiwan credentials as it did during the 2004 presidential 
election campaign. 
 
Looking Ahead to May 14 
----------------------- 
 
7. (C) TSU Policy Chief Lee told AIT that it did not really 
matter to his party whether or not an Anti-Annexation Law is 
enacted, since the TSU's real goal is to win enough seats in 
the May 14 NA election to overturn the package of legislative 
reforms passed by the LY last August (Ref C).  TSU Secretary 
General Chen Chien-ming commented that if the TSU and PFP 
together win more than a quarter of the votes on May 14, they 
may be able to stop the NA from creating a 
single-member-district electoral system that would favor the 
DPP and KMT.  Chen noted that most of those who bother to 
turn out to vote on May 14 are likely to be hard-core 
ideologues on both ends of the spectrum.  He added that, from 
a purely selfish perspective, the TSU hopes the DPP will act 
responsibly on the Anti-Secession Law issue and allow the TSU 
to benefit from any backlash from fundamentalists that occurs. 
 
8. (C) To this end, the TSU is leading efforts by 
pro-independence NGOs to organize seminars, petitions, and 
rallies to protest the PRC's proposed law.  While the media 
has focused on anti-Anti-Secession Law events scheduled to 
coincide with the February 28 anniversary of the "Kaohsiung 
Incident," organizers say they will save resources for 
activities later in the Spring.  TSU Secretary General Chen 
Chien-ming admitted to AIT that his party simply failed to 
act soon enough to organize a large turnout for 2/28. 
Instead, the TSU decided to postpone its main effort until 
March 6, when it plans an "Oppose Annexation, Protect Taiwan" 
rally in Kaohsiung. 
 
To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize 
------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) The DPP appears to be divided on how actively it 
should support TSU and NGO protests against the 
Anti-Secession Law.  President Chen and other senior DPP 
officials are scheduled to attend a public ceremony on 
February 28 that will involve the announcement of a 
resolution against the Anti-Secession Law.  However, DPP 
party officials claim that this will be a low-key, 
non-provocative affair.  Shen Fa-hui, a legislator from the 
DPP's moderate New Tide faction asserted that it is 
irresponsible for the ruling party to participate in any sort 
of public protests against Beijing.  Grassroots leader and 
former DPP Chairman Lin Yi-hsiung offered a similar 
assessment to AIT, criticizing President Chen and MAC 
Chairman Joseph Wu for acting more like NGO activists than 
senior government officials.  Others in the DPP have cited 
the difficulty of mobilizing a massive public response to 
Beijing's moves in the current political environment.  "The 
atmosphere is simply different now, people are tired of 
political activities," commented Executive Yuan (EY) 
Secretary General Lee Ying-yuan, the organizer of the DPP's 
 
SIPDIS 
massive 2004 2/28 "Hands Across Taiwan" event. 
 
Comment: Assuming the Worst 
--------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Despite appeals for restraint from moderates within 
his own government, President Chen has given every indication 
that he plans to follow through on his threats to respond 
strongly to NPC action on the Anti-Secession Law, regardless 
of its contents.  While it appears that some form of 
Anti-Annexation Law could gain enough votes for passage in 
the current legislative session, finding a compromise that 
will gain Pan-Blue support will still be a challenge.  AIT 
will continue to urge Taipei to offer a moderate public 
reaction and encourage the LY to consider passage of the 
Special Defense Procurement Budget as the most effective 
legislative response to the Anti-Secession Law. 
PAAL