US embassy cable - 05PARIS1196

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MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) -- SMALL GROUP PROPOSALS FOR 2005 (C)

Identifier: 05PARIS1196
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS1196 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-02-24 17:47:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: AU FR KSCA PREL PARM ETTC TSPA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
S E C R E T PARIS 001196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2030 
TAGS: AU, FR, KSCA, PREL, PARM, ETTC, TSPA 
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) -- SMALL 
GROUP PROPOSALS FOR 2005  (C) 
 
REF: SECSTATE 31851 
 
Classified By: EST COUNSELOR ROBERT W. DRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D), an 
d (H) 
 
1. (C)  On February 24, EST Counselor provided French MTCR 
Point-of-Contact David Bertolotti with non-paper contained 
reftel, noting the request for feedback; the need to limit 
discussion within the small group; and, the invitation to 
share small group proposals.  Bertolotti said he would study 
the U.S. paper.  He commented generally that he thought the 
issues presented by the U.S. side would be "less contentious" 
than last year's subjects. 
 
2.  (C) While Bertolotti noted the French side had yet to 
conduct its preparatory meeting for the RPOC, he felt that 
the French might be willing to mention "something on Iran," 
possibly comparing assessments.  There might also be scope in 
the small group to review the Libyan request for membership. 
While there is no question that the request is "rather 
premature," the small group may wish to consider how to 
present the message to the Libyans.  Bertolotti considers it 
particularly important for the MTCR group to act in a manner 
consistent with the disarmament process.  There would be 
interest, he thought, in learning the U.S. assessment as to 
how well the Libyans are fulfilling their commitments in that 
regard.  The small group might also want to discuss 
approaches to dealing with the Chinese membership 
application.  It might be useful, Bertolotti added, to say 
something about "lessons learned" in the previous plenary 
session regarding Brazilian, South African, and Russian 
reaction to "initiatives" raised at the MTCR Seoul plenary. 
 
3.  (S) Another topic which might be ripe for discussion by 
the core group in early April according to Bertolotti is what 
he termed "the Ukranian problem," referring to the alleged 
tranfer of up to 20 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to 
Iran and China in the 1999-2001 timeframe, a subject which 
apparently has only recently come to light.  Bertolotti 
mentioned that the French and Germans plan to demarche the 
Ukranians about this.  He said that at this stage the French 
government had no reason to suspect the new regime in Kiev 
would not cooperate in the investigation of the alleged 
incident.  He thought that it might be possible to engage the 
Ukranians in a bilateral discussion on this topic. 
 
4.  (C) Finally, Bertolotti mentioned that there might be an 
opportunity to broaden discussion within the HCOC setting. 
He is cognizant of U.S. concerns not to duplicate MTCR work 
in the HCOC.  However, Bertolotti suggests there may be some 
room for real world discussion in the HCOC on 
non-proliferation trends. 
Wolff 

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