US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA1775

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 001775 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, CO, MX, ELN Peace Process 
SUBJECT: ELN PEACE TALK'S ADVANCES AND RETREATS 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 1081 
 
     B. BOGOTA 863 
 
Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C):  Mexican facilitator for the peace process with the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) Andres Valencia met with the 
Ambassador on February 18 to report on progress this year. 
Although January saw positive commitments by both the ELN and 
GOC on negotiation pre-requisites (ref a), the process 
stalled in early February.  Valencia said the negotiations 
shifted from a discussion of word choice for a communique in 
January to an introspection by the ELN on whether it was 
ready to talk at all.  Valencia is taking a "wait and see" 
approach towards the latest setbacks and told the Ambassador 
he appreciated the ongoing support from the United States. 
End summary. 
 
 
You say "cease-fire"; I say "military action freeze" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (C) Valencia reported to the Ambassador on the excellent 
progress made in January toward reaching an agreement on a 
face-to-face meeting between the ELN's Central Command (COCE) 
and Valencia in Mexico.  Valencia read out twenty-three pages 
of details he compiled on his efforts to bring the GOC and 
ELN towards compromise: the GOC softened its demand for a 
temporary cease-fire and accepted the ELN's offer to refrain 
from military actions other than acts of self-defense during 
talks in Mexico.  The GOC agreed to suspend arrest warrants 
and allow the Red Cross and Valencia to provide safe transit 
for ELN negotiators.  By January 24, after seven months of 
written haggling, it appeared that the two sides were 
approaching the face-to-face negotiation stage. 
 
Let's call the whole thing off 
------------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) However, the ELN again retreated from talks by 
issuing a February 4 "clarification" communique to Valencia, 
attacking his facilitation efforts and demanding that their 
concerns be addressed.  ELN leadership's message (1) claimed 
Valencia was acting on behalf of the Mexican Government 
rather than serving as a neutral facilitator; (2) complained 
that Valencia was hard to contact (since the ELN is 
underground); (3) asserted he had made no progress on talks; 
and (4) accused him of going public with negotiation details. 
 Valencia did not respond.  On February 8, the ELN wrote 
another message asking why they had not received a reply and 
insisting on an apology from Valencia. 
 
4. (C) Later that week, the GOC responded by attacking the 
ELN for endangering the prospects for talks.  President 
Uribe's speech to the International Symposium of Restorative 
Justice in Cali on February 12 accused ELN leader Antonio 
Garcia of repeatedly sabotaging negotiations and called on 
the ELN to take the necessary steps to begin face-to-face 
talks soon.  Uribe reiterated the GOC's willingness to 
negotiate in either Colombia or Mexico after the ELN began a 
cease-fire.  On February 19, Peace Commissioner Restrepo 
added his commentary in an op-ed printed in leading daily "El 
Tiempo."  He stressed that the GOC remained willing and open 
to negotiations with the guerrilla group, but acknowledged 
that, in its own way, the ELN process was as complicated as 
creating a process with the FARC would be.  Restrepo 
reiterated the call on the ELN leadership to end the 
never-ending cycle of communiques and agree to talks. 
 
5. (C) Valencia told the Ambassador that Uribe's comments, 
although accurate, further damaged negotiations and returned 
both sides to their original positions.  Valencia added that 
he would not end the negotiation process without the ELN 
officially ending Mexico's facilitation role.  According to 
Valencia, the ELN's vacillating communiques proved that the 
group lacked internal consensus on its readiness to 
negotiate.  He juxtaposed the words of imprisoned ELN leader 
Francisco Galan, who played the "good cop" during talks, with 
leader Antonio Garcia's hostile "bad cop" comments.  Valencia 
said such contradictory messages made it difficult to gauge 
the ELN's true position. 
 
6. (C) Valencia speculated that psychological barriers or 
third party actors could be responsible for the latest ELN 
retreat.  The ELN has spent decades outside the democratic 
system and could see talks in Mexico as marking the end of 
their struggle.  He said the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) or the Cuban Government also could have 
scuttled the talks, the latter in an attempt to win back the 
role facilitator.  In either case, Valencia said the GOC 
emerged appearing flexible and willing to negotiate as the 
ELN attacked the process. 
 
7. (C) The Ambassador commented that the ELN's internal 
indecision was not sustainable -- ELN's military weakness 
would guarantee that, if talks failed, it would have to align 
itself with FARC forces and lose its autonomy and identity. 
The Ambassador asked Valencia to solicit the Catholic 
Church's good offices to return the ELN to talks.  Valencia 
said he planned to meet with several Church leaders before 
returning to Mexico on February 23. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) Valencia has maintained a balanced, facilitating role 
and kept communication open despite the ELN's personal 
attacks.  Mexico, with U.S. support, will keep the door open 
to the ELN for awhile, leaving room for COCE to come to terms 
with itself.  If the ELN is unable to do so, Valencia may be 
inclined to publicize the recent train of events, exposing 
the ELN as responsible for the setback.  End comment. 
DRUCKER