US embassy cable - 02ABUJA1168

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001168 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W 
AF/DAS FOR BITRICK, ENGLE 
OSC FOR WHELAN 
LAGOS FOR GREANEY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: 18/03/02 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, MARR, PINR, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH NSA ALIYU 
MOHAMMED TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 1091 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER FOR REASONS 1.5(B) 
AND (D) 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 3, Ambassador Jeter met NSA 
General (Ret.) Aliyu Mohammed to raise concerns about the 
lack of Nigerian support for MPRI and Operation Avid 
Recovery (OAR). The Ambassador warned that obstacles faced 
by the OAR EOD support team and Nigeria's non-payment on 
MPRI are sending the wrong signals to Washington and could 
threaten the future of our security assistance 
relationship. END SUMMARY 
 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Office of Defense 
Cooperation Chief and Staff Assistant (Note-Taker), began 
by presenting NSA Mohammed with the original letter from 
POTUS to President Obasanjo offering USG assistance 
following the Ikeja munitions explosions. Ambassador 
expressed his desire to meet President Obasanjo before 
departing for the upcoming Chief of Mission Conference in 
Washington. General Mohammed agreed to try to make that 
possible. (Note: The meeting did take place, see REF A) 
 
 
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MPRI: 
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3. (C) Ambassador gave General Mohammed the unfortunate 
news that MPRI had been significantly downsized and half of 
the MPRI team had left Nigeria due to the funding shortfall 
on the Nigerian side. Ambassador said that MPRI was on the 
brink of being discontinued altogether until the GON 
committed 1.5 million dollars in FMF funding to continue 
MPRI with a radically reduced civil military component. 
Ambassador explained that although the program continues it 
was no "occasion to celebrate" because the stop-gap payment 
still meant that the GON had not contributed its own funds 
to the program. Ambassador Jeter warned that Nigeria's 
failure to cost share the program may be interpreted by 
Washington as a lack of commitment and threaten future 
security assistance programs. Ambassador explained that the 
continuance of the entire security assistance program at 
existing levels in Nigeria is directly related to the 
continued success of MPRI. 
 
 
4. (C) General Mohammed expressed disappointment that MPRI 
had diminished, recalling that he "pushed the program from 
the beginning".  When President Obasanjo visited Washington 
prior to his inauguration in 1999, Mohammed said that he 
insisted that the President visit MPRI. According to 
General Mohammed, "In Washington, everything was good but 
when MPRI came to Nigeria, that's when things went wrong." 
The NSA said that there is an apparent misunderstanding 
between the Service Chiefs and the MPRI personnel who run 
the program. He promised to raise the issue with President 
Obasanjo as soon as possible. Despite the difficulties, 
Ambassador said that the U.S. is still willing to commit 
the full 3.5 million if Nigeria antes up its half. 
 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador raised additional concerns about the 
transparency of the Nigerian money transfer process.  He 
said we may be heading in the same direction as last year, 
when Nigeria's MPRI payment was delayed in Nigeria's 
Central Bank so long that the exchange rate changed leaving 
a gap of nearly $319,000. The MOD now claims to have paid 
the $319,000 deficit and bank statements show a transfer of 
Naira from the Central Bank of Nigeria but the money has 
yet to show up at the Federal Reserve account. When it does 
show, Ambassador said, there will probably be another 
deficit caused by exchange fluctuations (Note: The money 
was subsequently received). 
 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador asked if Mohammed knew the status of 
the transfer. He responded that he did not know and 
frankly, " does not understand the system either." Even 119 
billion Naira deposited by the President for GON 
expenditures is caught up in the Central Bank's 
bureaucracy. 
 
 
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Operation Avid Recovery 
----------------------- 
 
 
7. (C) The Ambassador then shifted the conversation to 
Operation Avid Recovery and explained the rationale for 
our rapid assistance in the face of Nigeria's devastating 
tragedy. "We did it for the obvious humanitarian reasons 
but also to maintain the credibility and legitimacy of the 
Nigerian military." 
 
 
7. (C) Ambassador said that the EOD specialists have made 
significant progress in the clean up but we have reached a 
crossroads in our efforts. He explained that since the EOD 
team was sent here for only 60 days, their departure is 
imminent. In compliance with POTUS's letter to President 
Obasanjo, we are willing to provide contractors to finish 
the job. 
8. (C) The Ambassador cautioned, however, that given the 
lack of cooperation received by the EOD team, the Embassy 
was prepared to recommend that contractors come only if 
they are promised the full cooperation of the military and 
government. One of the conditions was that the 
contractor's equipment must be imported duty free and 
without complications; another was that the GON provide 
the C4 to detonate munitions since the EOD team had been 
using its own C4 and that supply was now exhausted. 
Without a commitment to meet these conditions, Ambassador 
said it would be impossible for contractors to carry out 
their duties. 
 
 
9. (C) Ambassador informed the NSA that the Ministry of 
Defense is prohibiting a special EOD unit from inspecting 
other potentially hazardous munition sites. The GON had 
earlier asked for this assistance and we did everything to 
meet this request. The GON's reversal sent a message of 
distrust with the clear accusation that the U.S. would 
engage in spying. No partnership could be based on that, 
the Ambassador said. The EOD special assessment team may 
leave next week if not allowed to do their job. General 
Mohammed waxed philosophical by responding that human 
beings and institutions fear change because they are 
unsure of the outcome. Nigeria is doing its best to bring 
changes but progress is slow. 
 
 
10. (C) The NSA asked the Ambassador whether he has spoken 
to MOD headquarters about the problems of access. Jeter 
responded that it is one thing to speak to the MOD, it is 
another to get the message to the guys on the ground. 
 
 
11. (C) General Mohammed promised to raise problems with 
both MPRI and OAR with President Obasanjo but cautioned 
that his influence was limited. He said that the 
President's conflicts with his own political party makes 
change difficult. 
 
 
12. (C) Ambassador added that these issues together with 
the recent media coverage of Nigeria have caused a 
problematic perception in Washington. Ambassador Jeter 
concluded, MPRI and OAR are success stories for the U.S. 
but skepticism still existed in Washington and the absence 
of Nigeria's full cooperation only increased the 
questioning.