US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA1750

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 001750 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR P, WHA, WHA/AND. NSC FOR INTER-AMERICAN DIRECTORATE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CO 
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN MEETS FOREIGN MINISTER 
BARCO 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  Foreign Minister Carolina Barco told U/S 
Grossman on February 14 that the GOC was satisfied with the 
international donors conference in Cartagena, in particular 
with USAID Administrator's speech and the NGO declaration. 
The latter would be a solid foundation on which to deepen GOC 
collaboration with civil society.  Barco had spent the day 
preparing for her Feb. 15 trip to Caracas with President 
Uribe.  Like the President (septel), she too was pessimistic. 
 The GOC was putting the final touches on 17 new extradition 
requests to Venezuela.  Problems continued on the communiqu, 
with the GOV balking at any references to terrorism and 
ongoing bilateral mechanisms.  U/S Grossman urged Barco to 
hold firm on the need for an explicit commitment to fight 
terrorism from Chavez.  Barco said the GOC continued to look 
for mechanisms to build confidence and bind Venezuela to the 
fight against terrorism.  Barco had conferred with Spanish 
officials on counter-terrorism mechanisms on their borders 
with France and Morocco, to explore whether this was 
something Uribe could suggest to Chavez.  The Spanish told 
Barco that Chavez was trying to improve relations with PM 
Zapatero; the GOS was receptive as long as it was convinced 
Chavez was not engaged in activities to destabilize the 
region.  GOS officials expressed particular concern about El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. The U/S, Ambassador and FM welcomed 
press statements from Paraguay regarding the links between 
the FARC and the kidnapping of former President Cubas' 
daughter.  This made the FARC an international problem, 
subjecting nations to international commitments including 
relevant Security Council resolutions.  Barco raised recent 
reports of Russian arms sales to Venezuela, expressing 
concern some would find their way to the FARC.  Finally, 
Barco thanked U/S Grossman for the level of support for 
Colombia in the Administration's FY 2006 budget request.  U/S 
Grossman stressed the strong USG commitment to the GOC, 
despite competing priorities.  To sustain this support, he 
encouraged the GOC to adopt a good demobilization bill and 
continue its efforts to improve the human rights situation, 
including investigation and punishment of those responsible 
for the Mapiripan massacre and the Arauca killings, as well 
as resolving the case against Lt. Colonel Orozco.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Under Secretary Grossman and the Ambassador met 
Foreign Minister Carolina Barco and Vice Minister Camilo 
Reyes late on February 14.  U/S Grossman opened by expressing 
U.S. gratitude for GOC efforts to free the three U.S. 
hostages.  He also expressed condolences for COLMIL losses in 
recent FARC attacks, and for the emergency situation caused 
by recent flooding and loss of life in the Santander and 
Norte de Santander departments.  He told Barco the U.S. would 
contribute $50,000 toward the relief effort as a sign of 
solidarity with the GOC. 
 
3. (C) U/S Grossman briefed the FM on his meetings with 
President Uribe, Senator Rafael Pardo and NGOs earlier in the 
day (septels), noting Uribe's pessimism about the upcoming 
meeting with Chavez, the success of the Cartagena conference 
(including USAID Administrator Natsios's speech), and U.S. 
views on the demobilization law which the Congress was 
scheduled to discuss in special session beginning February 
15.  On the law, U/S Grossman stressed the importance the 
U.S. placed on a strong law that provided for peace with 
justice and dismantled the paramilitaries. 
 
-------------------- 
CARTAGENA CONFERENCE 
-------------------- 
 
4. (C) Barco said the GOC was pleased with the Cartagena 
conference, underscoring her delight with Natsios' remarks 
during the intergovernmental session, and satisfaction with 
the NGO declaration (septel).  The GOC had worked hard to 
make the GOC-NGO dialogue a constructive one.  GOC officials 
now believed that there was a stronger basis on which to 
accelerate and deepen collaboration with civil society. 
 
------------------------ 
GETTING READY FOR CHAVEZ 
------------------------ 
5. (C) Barco apologized for not traveling to Cartagena with 
U/S Grossman to see Uribe, explaining that she had spent the 
day preparing for the upcoming encounter with Chavez.  The 
GOC was preparing 17 new extradition requests for terrorists 
operating in Venezuela.  She had met the Spanish Cooperation 
Minister to explore whether counter-terrorism mechanisms put 
in place with France and Morocco could be applicable to the 
situation with Venezuela.  For example, the French and 
Spanish had exchanged judges and other Ministry of Interior 
personnel which had enhanced communication and coordination 
when information on ETA movements emerged.  Barco said the 
GOC continued to look for ways to increase the level of 
confidence with the GOV and secure a stronger commitment to 
fight against terrorism.  The GOC was also trying to secure 
better mil-to-mil cooperation on border issues, including the 
possibility of personnel exchanges, but the GOV remained 
reticent to collaborate on issues dealing with security. 
Barco also reported that the Spanish told her Chavez was 
making a particular effort to reach out to the Zapatero 
government on a variety of issues.  The Spanish were willing 
to engage Chavez, she said, but only if they were convinced 
he would refrain from destabilizing actions in the region. 
In that regard, the Spanish expressed particular concern 
about El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
 
6. (C) Barco reviewed the difficulties with the communiqu 
she had been negotiating with her Venezuelan counterpart, 
noting that the GOV continued to resist any references to 
terrorism and was now questioning every bilateral mechanism 
in operation.  The GOV was willing to say it would fight 
against delinquents but not terrorists.  The reference to 
terrorism and the status of bilateral mechanisms would remain 
in brackets in the text for the two presidents to negotiate. 
U/S Grossman suggested that if these issues could not be 
resolved, no communiqu could be a better solution.  In 
particular, if the GOV continued to resist an explicit 
reference to terrorism, Uribe would be free to publicly state 
the problem and highlight Chavez' unwillingness to commit to 
fighting terrorism. 
 
7. (C) The U/S, Ambassador and FM all welcomed press 
statements from Paraguay earlier in the day regarding the 
links between the FARC and the kidnappers (and killers) of 
the daughter of former President Cubas.  U/S Grossman 
underscored the importance of identifying the international 
aspects of FARC activities which made the problem subject to 
international agreements, including Security Council 
resolution 1373 and others that committed nations to fight 
international terrorism. 
 
8. (C) Drawing on the earlier discussion with President Uribe 
over which neighboring countries were pro-actively fighting 
against terrorism (septel), U/S Grossman asked for Barco's 
views on Brazil.  Barco responded that Brazil did not/not 
touch the issue of terrorism during discussions on the row 
between Colombia and Venezuela.  Rather, President Lula and 
FM Amorin simply continued to reiterate Chavez's interest in 
resolving the situation.  Nonetheless, Barco stressed that 
she maintains a constructive relationship with her Brazilian 
counterpart and that "he never closed the door" during the 
crisis.  She also noted that Lula had prevented FARC 
participation in this year's "Davos alternative meeting" in 
Porto Alegre.  Regarding Colombia's other neighbors, Barco 
emphasized that all were subject to retaliation from the FARC 
but Peru had been and continued to be the most collaborative. 
 The Ambassador noted President Uribe's interest in exploring 
with President Gutierrez of Ecuador and others the 
possibility of their making public statements against 
terrorism, if not against the FARC. 
 
9. (C) Barco also reported that Minister of Defense Uribe had 
had a good meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld in Munich but was 
unsuccessful in arranging a meeting with his Russian 
counterpart.  The GOC remained concerned about reports of 
Russian arm sales to Venezuela, noting that some of these 
weapons would likely end up in the hands of FARC soldiers. 
U/S Grossman agreed and said the U.S. had tried to enlighten 
the GORF about Chavez intentions and actions and dissuade 
Moscow from making the sale, but to no avail. 
-------------------------- 
BUDGET/HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Barco expressed gratitude for the Colombian portion 
of the Administration's FY2006 budget presented to the U.S. 
Congress on February 7.  The GOC was making progress, had a 
ways to go, and counted on continued U.S. backing.  U/S 
Grossman underscored the USG commitment to the GOC, 
emphasizing its ongoing moral, political and financial 
support.  The Ambassador noted that the underlying consensus 
of support for Colombia in Washington was holding, despite 
competing priorities such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and various 
domestic issues. The FM asked whether the request for 
Colombia would get through the Congress.  U/S Grossman 
responded that the Administration had put an honest budget 
forward and would fight for it.  That said, as budgets got 
tighter, the GOC had to persevere in making the case and show 
forward movement.  In particular, the GOC had to get a good 
demobilization bill adopted and continue its efforts to 
improve the human rights situation.  This should include 
investigation and punishment of those responsible for the 
massacre in Mapiripan and the killings of the three trade 
unionists in Arauca, resolution of the case against Lt. 
Colonel Orozco, and progress on other outstanding human 
rights cases. 
 
11. (U) This message has been cleared by U/S Grossman. 
DRUCKER