US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA1735

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U/S GROSSMAN AND SENATOR PARDO DISCUSS LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION

Identifier: 05BOGOTA1735
Wikileaks: View 05BOGOTA1735 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bogota
Created: 2005-02-23 19:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV KJUS PTER CO Demobilization
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 001735 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KJUS, PTER, CO, Demobilization 
SUBJECT: U/S GROSSMAN AND SENATOR PARDO DISCUSS LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION 
 
REF: BOGOTA 1660 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 B & D. 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  On February 14, visiting U/S Grossman and 
Ambassador discussed the status of draft demobilization 
legislation with Senator Rafael Pardo.  U/S Grossman 
expressed the U.S. desire that any legislation be 
transparent, workable, and put the paramilitaries out of 
business.  Pardo worried about the proliferation of 
legislative proposals in the last week and the lack of 
coordination on the part of senior GOC officials.  Ambassador 
noted that President Uribe had committed to rally GOC 
officials around the proposal introduced February 9 by 
Interior and Justice Minister Sabas Pretelt.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) U/S Grossman noted that given the importance the USG 
places on paramilitary (AUC) demobilization, the U.S. is 
following debate on the draft demobilization bills closely. 
He stated that demobilization is a key part of the peace 
process, and congratulated Colombia for having demobilized 
roughly 5000 AUC members.  While the specifics of the 
legislation are for Colombians to decide, he stressed that we 
want to see a law that is transparent, strong on punishment, 
and that puts the AUC out of business.  U/S Grossman urged 
Pardo to view demobilization legislation as a likely model 
with which to put the ELN and FARC out of business as well. 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador told Pardo that in U/S Grossman's meeting 
with President Uribe earlier on February 14 (septel), both 
Uribe and Legal Advisor Camilo Ospina indicated that the GOC 
desired to be associated with only one bill (in spite of 
widespread media speculation that senior GOC officials were 
divided on the issue).  Ambassador noted that Uribe said the 
GOC preferred the bill introduced by Interior and Justice 
Minister Sabas Pretelt on February 9.  Ambassador reviewed 
the points on which the USG has insisted in private 
conversations with GOC officials and members of Congress: 
 
--Disclosure of past criminal or terrorist activities, a key 
step toward national reconciliation; 
--Punishment for all those responsible for serious crimes; 
--Dismantlement of these narco-terrorist organizations 
through seizure of property, and individual and collective 
reparations; 
--Transparency; and 
--Government monitoring and control to ensure that those 
demobilized do not return to crime. 
 
Ambassador also emphasized that the law should contain 
nothing that could prejudice Colombia's excellent cooperation 
on extraditions. 
 
4.  (C) Turning to the specifics of the bills formally 
introduced to the Congress, Pardo noted that GOC negotiators 
took 80 percent of his draft and incorporated it in theirs. 
Pardo stressed that his group's version is the strongest in 
terms of confession of crimes.  Pardo also noted the 
importance of dismantling the AUC's organization, business, 
and drug routes; and not just taking away their weapons. 
Turning to the bill introduced by Rep. Armando Benedetti on 
February 11, which he described as the draft the GOC "really 
wanted," Pardo rejected it out of hand, lamenting its lack of 
reference to both confession and reparations, and the fact 
that it did not exclude members of drug cartels.  Pardo noted 
that the AUC's web page had "welcomed" the Benedetti version. 
 
5.  (C) U/S Grossman asked Pardo how he expected the 
deliberations in the Congress to proceed.  Pardo responded 
that the GOC should announce it has agreed on one position 
and that he supposed it would be the draft that Sabas Pretelt 
introduced on February 9.  However, the remained skeptical 
that the GOC would "fight hard for it."  Ambassador commented 
that the GOC bill appeared to be the compromise bill, in the 
middle position between the Pardo group draft and the latest 
entry from Rep. Benedetti. 
 
6.  (C) In terms of support for the different bills, Pardo 
stated that his bill counts on 8-9 votes in the 18-member 
Senate First Committee, with the Sabas Pretelt version 
counting on 8-9 as well.  In terms of the Full Senate, Pardo 
admitted his group's bill only counts on approximately 35 
votes (of 102 total).  Regarding the House, he said that his 
group's version has 12-14 votes in the 35-member First 
Committee and is far from a majority in the full Chamber. 
Pardo felt the Benedetti bill had strong support in the 
House.  Given the flourish of bill-drafting activity in the 
last 10 days, Pardo worried in the end that a "child of 
Frankenstein" hodge-podge bill would emerge. 
 
7.  (C) In response to a question from U/S Grossman about 
merging his bill with the Pretelt bill, Pardo expressed 
pessimism.  He said that perhaps prior to the strong 
pronouncements by VP Santos and Peace Commissioner Restrepo 
against the Pardo group version such a possibility had 
existed, but not now. 
DRUCKER 

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