US embassy cable - 05ANKARA1104

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HQ USCENTCOM FOR GENERAL BELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2029 
TAGS: PREL, MARR 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR 3-4 MARCH VISIT OF US ARMY EUROPE 
AND 7TH ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL B.B. BELL TO ANKARA AND 
ISTANBUL 
 
REF: CDRUSAREUR 231726Z FEB 05 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman; Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  While your visit comes on the heels of a 
series US visits since the first of the year (Deputy 
Secretary of State Armitage, NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
 
SIPDIS 
General Jones, Commander US Central Command General Abizaid, 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith and Secretary of 
State Rice), it is unique in that it is the most significant 
Army to Army engagement since before the Spring of 2003.  You 
arrive in Turkey as we begin to recalibrate bilateral 
relations emphasizing renewed dialogue on areas of mutual 
concern to maximize achievable cooperation.  Our task is 
complicated by a widespread antipathy to our policies and a 
Turkish Government that has only recently begun to reaffirm 
the value of the U.S.-Turkish publicly, after a period where 
it at times joined the choir publicly condemning us. The 
Turkish General Staff (TGS) was not much better, privately 
voicing its support, but careful not to get out ahead of the 
Government publicly. In late January the TGS Deputy Chief 
made a bold statement of  support for the relationship, but 
we are waiting to see if this is a beginning of a pattern or 
an aberration. The reinvigoration of Army-to-Army engagement 
is therefore, a welcome and timely building block to this 
effort. End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
-------------------- 
 
2. (S) Given General Buyukanit's nickname of "weathervane," 
it is difficult to accurately gauge the sincerity of his 
feelings towards restoring the U.S.-Turkey Mil to Mil 
relationship to its pre-March, 2003 levels.  Buyukanit, while 
charismatic, popular within the Army and adept at working the 
press, is also successful at playing his political cards 
close to his vest, and consequently has avoided becoming 
attached to politically controversial positions.  Members of 
his staff assert to us that he strongly favors returning to a 
robust military relationship with the U.S.  Leading candidate 
to be the next CHOD like Buyukanit traditionally reveal 
little of their own ideas to avoid spoiling their chances 
with controversy.  He will also grip and grin with the best 
of them in welcoming you. 
 
3. (S) Despite resentment and suspicion of AKP by the 
military and other elements of the secular elite, Prime 
Minister Erdogan appears unassailable; he has a two-thirds 
majority in parliament; he remains highly popular; his 
government continues to reform Turkey's political and social 
space - at least on the books; and he has pursued an activist 
foreign policy.  The cracks within his party and internal 
dissension are growing, however.  The effective opposition is 
the military, and TGS Chief Ozkok, while a solidly 
pro-Atlanticist senior commander, has been reluctant to take 
on the government publicly for fear of derailing Turkey's EU 
accession prospects and thereby losing popular support for 
the military.  Deputy Chief of the General Staff General 
Basbug's (in line to become CHOD in 2008 after  General 
Buyukanit), repeated emphasis on the breadth, depth, and 
importance of relations with the U.S. during his January 26 
televised press conference (the first such televised 
briefing), likely signals a shift in this TGS reluctance to 
confront the government publicly.  General Buyukanit, in line 
to succeed General Ozkok in 2006, is somewhat of an unknown 
quantity, but can be assumed to be viewed by General Ozkok as 
being of similar thinking.  He was DCHOD and, therefore our 
primary operational interlocutor, in the run up to OIF.  His 
actions at that time were not always helpful.  General Ozkok 
has moved step-by-step to try to bring more modern thinkers 
into senior ranks, but left-nationalist sentiments are strong 
at lower ranks. 
 
4. (S) The Wall Street Journal's publication on Feb. 16 of a 
negative article on Turkey's lack of appreciation for its 
relationship with the US, written by a WSJ editor who 
accompanied USDP Feith to Turkey on Jan. 31, received 
widespread condemnation in the Turkish government.  J-5 
Strategy Division Chief MG Cengiz Arslan called the article 
"poisonous" and warned it would negatively impact US 
perceptions of Turkey.  While not acknowledging any 
responsibility for Turkey's negative portrayal in the 
article, the government has responded with public statements 
of support for the bilateral relationship and refrained from 
the negative public comments that dominated the press last 
fall.  This, combined with the positive press coverage 
received by Secretary Rice following her Feb. 5-6 visit, may 
reflect a deliberate GOT shift towards a more constructive 
relationship. 
 
------------------------- 
Iraq Dominates the Agenda 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Turkish Government shares the goal of a unified, 
prosperous, democratic Iraq, at peace internally and with its 
neighbors, and contributed to international pressure on the 
Sunnis to participate in the elections.  However, the Turks 
worry about long-term US staying power in Iraq, that events 
there could spiral out of control, and that Ankara could be 
faced with either a Shia-dominated government that they 
assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an intensified 
movement toward an independent Kurdish state emanating from 
northern Iraq, or both.  Turkish Army leaders will possibly 
seek your assurance that our military remain committed to 
ensuring a stable -- and unified - Iraq whatever the outcome 
of the elections. 
 
6. (C) Owing to a feeling of Sunni solidarity, preference for 
the "stability" of Saddam, and influence of misinformation 
about U.S. intentions, ninety percent of the Turkish public 
opposed the effort to oust Saddam Hussein and sentiment 
against coalition operations in Iraq still runs deep.  Most 
Turks get their information on events in Iraq from a press 
that is biased against the US-led effort and full of 
reporting based on unsubstantiated half-truths or lies, (much 
of it sourced from al-Jazeera or similarly biased sources) as 
well as a steady stream of reports on the kidnapping and 
killing of Turkish truck drivers (over 70 deaths as of March 
2005).  Despite the presence of Turkish Liaison Officers 
(LNOs) assigned to Task Force Olympia (TFO) (now Task Force 
Freedom), and MNF-I who received up-to-date reports on the 
October 2004 coalition action in Tal Afar, both the Turkish 
public and government expressed outrage at the operation, 
based on false stories of civilian casualties and violent US 
treatment of residents.  To address the misinformation, and 
in hopes that Turkish officials would do likewise, the 
mission established a system of providing periodic cleared 
information on coalition operations to Turkish government and 
military officials, and to the press.  This effort may have 
contributed to Turkish military silence during the subsequent 
operation in Fallujah and the less vitriolic Turkish 
government response. Additionally, we are in the process of 
employing CENTRIX into the TGS Headquarters to further this 
information sharing effort. 
 
7. (C) Turning a corner?: The December death of five Turkish 
policemen enroute to Baghdad to take up security duties at 
the Turkish Embassy shocked the country.  The Turkish 
government and military (General Ozkok sent a personal note 
of thanks to  General Myers), made a point to thank the US 
for the swift TFO response, including killing or capturing of 
some insurgents, aiding the wounded and repatriating the 
bodies of the policemen killed.  Additionally, the Turkish 
military was quick to tell the mission that Turkish First 
Army Commander General Tolon's accusations of US 
responsibility did not reflect the Turkish General Staff 
position.  Turkish press reporting on the incident was 
generally factual.  The November establishment of trilateral 
(US/TU/IZ) talks on Turkish truck driver safety, with the 
participation of Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I), opened 
the door to cooperative information sharing and other efforts 
to support the drivers. 
 
8.  (C) Additionally, Turkey has provided valuable assistance 
on Iraq.  Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq 
in October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base of 
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF), authorized the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq on 
rotation out, and permits the transit of humanitarian goods 
and supplies for coalition forces via the border crossing at 
Habur Gate. Turkey is active in reconstruction efforts, 
including providing electricity for Iraq, and training in 
Turkey of Iraqi diplomats, Sunni political groups and, as its 
contribution to the NATO training mission, Iraqi security 
forces.  The EU decision on December 17 to begin accession 
negotiations with Turkey on Oct. 3, 2005, may have provided 
the starting point for a small, but perceptible positive 
shift in relations.  While government officials still refrain 
from publicly supporting US policies or actions in Iraq, they 
have been adding less fuel to the fire.  In meetings with 
then DepSecState Armitage and General Abizaid, both Turkish 
government and military officials reaffirmed the importance 
of our bilateral relationship and called for close dialogue 
on issues of mutual interest. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
PKK - Unfulfilled Promises and New Direction 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand 
that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq 
will increasingly pass to the Iraqis, and their agreement to 
host the Jan. 11 trilateral PKK talks was a positive sign 
that they will work together with the Iraqis on this shared 
problem.  Still, they, and the public at large, remain bitter 
over their perception that the US has taken no steps to 
fulfill President Bush's June 2004 reiteration of the U.S. 
pledge that Iraq will no longer be a base for terrorist 
operations against Turkey and they expect the US to remain 
engaged in the effort.  Some in the Turkish military harbor 
the belief that the US acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's 
presence in Iraq, continually citing unsubstantiated reports 
of US/PKK meetings.  However, when pressed, they are unable 
to provide any names or specifics. (NOTE:  We also know that 
the military uses our lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel 
to needle the current AK Government.) 
 
10. (S) When confronted with this issue, you should make 
reference to the Jan. 11 trilateral talks where, with the US 
role in Iraq more one of facilitator than actor, the Turks 
and Iraqis focused on concrete steps to pave the way for 
actions against the PKK, including establishing an 
intelligence-sharing mechanism and holding a legal experts 
meeting after the Jan. 30  elections,(on hold until the Iraqi 
Transitional Government is formed) to discuss issues related 
to closure of PKK front offices and media outlets in northern 
Iraq and the handling of known PKK terrorists who are 
arrested. 
 
----------------------- 
Global War on Terrorism 
----------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Turkey took command of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan on Feb. 13 and 
will retain command until August 2005, during which time it 
will contribute over 1,600 troops.  Ankara has twice offered 
to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Afghanistan, but location proved to be a problem - the GOT 
was only willing to consider a PRT in the north while the 
Alliance would prefer Turkey locate its PRT in the west or 
the south.  With sufficient pledges of ISAF Stage II 
expansion of PRTs in the west already in hand, we need to 
encourage Turkey to consider contributing elsewhere.  Ankara 
is already preparing a significant assistance package for the 
Afghan War College; we should encourage the Turks to consider 
a PRT in the south as well. 
 
12. (C) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Turkey 
coordinate military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
improving their abilities to protect important energy 
transport routes.  Turkey subscribes to every arms control 
arrangement it is eligible to join, including the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), under which it is 
considering hosting an exercise in 2006.  (We had hoped that 
the Turks would hold this in the Black Sea, especially given 
their own OAE-like Operation Black Sea Harmony and their 
leadership in focusing the BLACKSEAFOR organization on 
prevention of trafficking.  However, they have been reluctant 
to facilitate non-littoral states' operations in the Black 
Sea and the PSI exercise looks likely to occur in the 
Mediterranean.)  Ankara has also been supportive of 
international efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments 
to the IAEA, although they are more inclined to persuasion 
than coercion, fully backing the EU-3 dialogue.  Turkey has 
also taken seriously information about Turks' involvement in 
the AQ Khan network and is moving toward prosecution of these 
individuals. 
 
13. (U) The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training 
Center in Ankara provides counterterrorism and other training 
to personnel from PfP partner countries.  The military has 
established a NATO Center of Excellence-Defense Against 
Terrorism (COE-DAT), that will provide more specialized 
training opportunities for both NATO partner nations and 
Allies.  The inaugural course at the COE-DAT will be in the 
third week of  March. (LTG Broadwater is the guest speaker). 
While this is not a Turkish Land Forces responsibility it is 
possible that you may be asked for U.S. instructor support 
for this center.  Currently the TRADOC LNO, a U.S. Army 
Major, is serving part time as the Deputy Director/Project 
Officer in lieu of appointment of a permanent 06.  The TGS 
has also offered training at the COE-DAT as Ankara's 
contribution to NATO's Iraq training mission. 
 
------------------- 
TURKISH LAND FORCES 
------------------- 
 
14.  (C) The 400,000 man Turkish Land Forces has since the 
late 1990s, when the current CHOD, General Ozkok, was its 
commander, been struggling to modernize both its equipment 
and  organization. While the term 'modernization' has 
traditionally meant to the TLF equipment acquisition, since 
2003 it has also encompassed organizational and Command and 
Control transformation.  However, due to a combination of 
economic constraints and internal resistance progress has 
been halting at best.  In the Summer of 2003 the Turkish 
Defense Industries (SSM) withdrew the RFPs for three major 
procurement projects, 40 UAVs, 1000 main battle tanks (MBT) 
and 145 attack helicopters. On 10 February 2005 SSM reopened 
a tender to buy 50 attack helicopters with an option to buy 
41 more, but in an RFP with ostensibly non-negotiable terms 
that will make it difficult for U.S. firms to bid on.  The 
Tender has a deadline of 10 June 2005.  With regard to the 
MBT, SSM initiated a study last summer to examine the 
feasibility of Turkish industry building the MBT. However, 
the potential acquisition of 249 Leopard 2A4 MBTs from 
Germany has put this project as well as the $ 700 million 
modernization contract for 170 M60A1 MBTs with Israel in 
question. A revised tender for 10 UAVs and 3 ground systems 
was issued in Nov. '04 and received the participation of a 
U.S. and an Israeli firm.  We expect a decision by the end of 
March. 
 
15. (C) The major organizational transformation effort in the 
TLF is centered around a strength reduction initiative by the 
CHOD, General Ozkok.  Last May he directed a 10% reduction of 
the Land Forces to be realized by the abolishment of four 
brigades and the Aegean Army HQs in Izmir. While there has 
also been much discussion of transforming the TAF into an 
all-volunteer force this is not likely to happen anytime soon 
due to costs and the view within the TGS that conscription 
serves as a valuable socialization process.  Minister of 
National Defense Gonul stated "in the foreseeable future 
there are no plans for an all volunteer army." However, as a 
cost saving measure the TGS did already reduce the personnel 
strength of it armed forces by 17% by shortening the 
compulsory military service from 18 months to 15 months, 
reducing the conscript personnel across the Turkish Armed 
Forces from 685,000 to 569,000. Efforts within the TGS to 
establish an integrated Command Information System 
infrastructure have been under way and it is likely that you 
will be briefed on the progress of this undertaking at 
Turkish Land Forces Headquarters. 
 
------------------- 
CYPRUS and NATO/EU 
------------------- 
 
16. (C) The European Union at the December 17 Summit agreed 
to open accession talks with Turkey in October, marking a 
major step forward in anchoring Turkey's future and in our 
strategic vision for Turkey and the region.  However, before 
talks begin, the EU expects Turkey to sign a protocol 
extending the EU Association agreement to the 10 new EU 
members, including the Republic of Cyprus.  Turkey is 
dissatisfied with the EU's handling of this issue, with 
several European leaders indicating publicly that extending 
the protocol would constitute recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus.  Moreover, Turkey sees the EU as failing to fulfill 
its pledge to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots 
following their vote in favor of a settlement last April.  As 
a result, Ankara is blocking Cyprus' entry into 
nonproliferation regimes that the EU desires to include all 
its members.  Similarly, taking a legalistic view of North 
Atlantic council decisions related to Berlin Plus, the GOT is 
blocking Cyprus from participating in  NATO-EU fora, 
effectively blocking dialogue between the two organizations. 
While some Turkish officials recognize how keeping NATO and 
the EU apart hurts Turkey's interests, to date Cyprus policy 
has won out over alliance management considerations within 
the GOT.  Last month General Buyukanit was on television 
announcing that Turkey will not withdraw one soldier from 
northern Cyprus until there is a Cyprus solution. 
 
---------- 
ECONOMY 
---------- 
 
17.  (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001.  Real GDP grew by over 8% in 
2004 and inflation has declined from a high of 70% in 2001 to 
under 9% last year.  Despite this progress, the recovery 
remains vulnerable due to a large current account deficit 
(about 5 percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short 
maturity structure.  Unemployment and poverty remain high, 
and ordinary people have not felt much benefit yet from the 
overall macroeconomic improvement. Turkey remains a strategic 
hub in the global energy supply network.  About 5% of the 
world's traded oil passes through the Turkish Straits and an 
additional 1 million barrels per day will start flowing from 
Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan when the BTC 
pipeline is completed this year. 
 
18. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and 
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received 
less foreign direct investment than other countries of 
similar size and potential.  Many in the Turkish elite are 
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment in 
the wake of the EU's December decision to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey in October.  However, this is 
unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the area of 
structural reform. In addition, Turkey will shoulder 
tremendous challenges in the accession negotiations, given 
that EU accession will affect nearly every aspect of Turks' 
lives, and that it may in the end be quite costly for Turkey 
to comply with EU directives in environmental protection and 
other areas. 
 
19.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN