US embassy cable - 05HARARE311

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI, MDC, March 05 Elections 
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER RELENTS ON ELECTION BOYCOTT, 
LOOKS TO 2008 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) The Ambassador met February 18 with Lovemore Maduhku, 
head of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).  Madukhu 
said his organization and other civil society groups regarded 
the upcoming elections as a sham and had unsuccessfully tried 
to convince the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) not to participate.  That said, they no longer intended 
to call for a boycott, which would have further damaged the 
MDC,s chances.  Madukhu said relations with the MDC were 
complicated and that outside help and resources would be 
needed to unite the opposition after the election.  He agreed 
with the Ambassador that the next big chance for change in 
Zimbabwe would be the 2008 presidential elections.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Election Boycott 
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2. (C) Madukhu said that his preferred approach to the 
upcoming parliamentary elections had been non-participation. 
It was his belief that this would have underscored the 
elections illegitimacy and the illegitimacy of the GOZ.  His 
organization and much of Zimbabwean civil society supported 
such an approach but they had ultimately been unsuccessful in 
convincing the MDC to go along. 
 
3. (C) Maduhku said, however, that his organization would not 
push for a boycott past March 8, at which time they would 
issue a statement denouncing the legitimacy of the elections. 
 At the same time, the statement would not urge people to 
boycott the elections, which he acknowledged could seriously 
damage the MDC,s chances.  The Ambassador suggested that the 
statement should also be worded in such a way as to bolster 
the MDC by offering moral support for its uphill struggle on 
a tilted playing field.  Madukhu seemed to agree. 
 
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Relations with MDC 
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4. (C) Madukhu said he and other civil society groups had 
complicated and at times difficult relations with the MDC. 
The MDC was unfair to these groups in that it expected them 
to do its bidding.  He said part of the reason the NCA would 
wait until March 8 to issue its statement was to underscore 
the organization,s independence from the MDC through the 
apparent conflict over election participation. 
 
5. (C) Madukhu said there was a lot of tension now, but that 
would dissipate.  He noted that the fundamental disagreement 
with the MDC was how to effect change ) through electoral 
politics or through mass-based actions and constitutional 
reform ) not on the need for change or on the direction it 
should take.  He hoped that after the elections the MDC would 
see the light and agree to support a mass action campaign of 
civil disobedience.  He added that both the MDC and civil 
society groups needed to learn to accept differences as 
normal and to avoid personalizing them. 
 
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Post-Election Plans 
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6. (C) The Ambassador said that unless the MDC could pull off 
a miracle and win two-thirds of the seats in parliament, the 
March elections would not, indeed could not result in any 
fundamental change in Zimbabwe,s crisis of political 
legitimacy.  Barring unforeseen developments, such as the 
sudden demise of Mugabe, it appeared that the next real 
opportunity for fundamental change by democratic means would 
come in 2008, when presidential elections were scheduled to 
be held.  Between now and then all the democratic forces of 
Zimbabwe needed to work toward the goal of outing a democrat 
in power and to be ready to apply the pressure of mass action 
should ZANU-PF try to steal the elections. 
 
7. (C) Madukhu agreed and said the key was to start building 
momentum now by unifying the opposition around a common 
platform.  He said outside help would be important in that 
regard, and he suggested the Embassy could play a key role 
given that it was trusted by all elements of the opposition, 
many of whom did not trust each other. 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador said it was his impression that the 
opposition needed to address the concerns of real people, 
such as the failure of land reform and the resultant economic 
collapse, rather than focusing exclusively on more esoteric 
concerns such as constitutional reform.  Maduhku responded 
that it was important to link issues such as the need for 
constitutional change to the day-to-day concerns of average 
Zimbabweans.  However, the opposition had to be careful not 
to give the GOZ sound bites that could be spun against them. 
For instance, on land reform, any hint that the opposition 
opposed land reform would be trumpeted in the official press 
as support for white farmers.  Without access to the media, 
the opposition would be unable to explain that its objection 
was to land reform,s ineffectiveness. 
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U.S. Trip 
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9. (C) Madukhu said he had been encouraged by the degree to 
which his interlocutors in the Department had understood that 
the struggle in Zimbabwe had entered a new, longer-term, 
phase.  He had told them change would come to Zimbabwe but it 
would take time and resources.  He added that one of the 
highlights of the visit had been his address at the Woodrow 
Wilson Center, where he had found the audience remarkably 
well-informed.  He had been struck by the fact that the 
official Zimbabwe press had felt the need to report on his 
address, even though they had tried to spin what he had said 
to the regime,s advantage. 
 
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South Africa,s role 
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10. (C) Madukhu said the SAG seemed to be bending over 
backwards to ignore the bad news out of Zimbabwe and to play 
up whatever signs of democratic space appeared.  That said, 
he thought President Mbeki was under increasing pressure to 
promote democracy in Zimbabwe, of which the latest 
manifestation was Obasanjo,s success in convincing Togo to 
go forward with a presidential election. 
 
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Comment 
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11. (C) We were frankly relieved that Madukhu had already 
decided on his own not to further undercut the MDC in the 
upcoming elections.  The MDC will have a tough enough fight 
on its hands, the last thing it needed was to have its civil 
society allies trying to organize a full-scale boycott of the 
election. 
DELL