US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA1706

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 001706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, KJUS, PREL, PGOV, CO, Demobilization 
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER'S CONCERNS ABOUT DEMOBILIZATION 
LAW 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: On February 17, President Uribe rejected 
Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo's offer to resign and 
authorized him to suggest changes to the GOC's draft 
demobilization law.  Restrepo explained to the Ambassador 
that he fears the current GOC draft law would discourage 
demobilization.  Restrepo's negotiating strategy is to get as 
many paramilitaries to demobilize as possible by requiring 
relatively few hurdles at the onset.  Once the state has 
identified and disarmed them and put them under firm state 
control, it can then focus on identifying and punishing the 
major criminals and dismantling paramilitary economic and 
political power.  Restrepo's main concern with the draft law 
is that, if all paramilitaries are required to confess all 
crimes and undergo an investigation immediately upon 
demobilizing, they will refuse to do so.  He noted that the 
GOC has no identifying information on approximately 95 
percent of the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). 
Restrepo is also concerned that the law is too focused on 
punishing paramilitary sympathizers and that the reparations 
mechanism is ineffective.  He is a strong advocate of 
mandatory time in confinement for paramilitaries who 
committed major crimes.  End Summary. 
 
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Restrepo's Negotiating Strategy 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) On February 14, Peace Commissioner Restrepo offered to 
resign over his disagreement with the GOC-sponsored 
demobilization bill ("Law for Peace and Justice").  On 
February 17, President Uribe rejected the resignation and 
authorized Restrepo to suggest changes to the law to Minister 
of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt and to Congress.  Uribe 
assured Restrepo that he would personally oversee the 
Congressional debate on the bill to ensure a viable draft is 
passed.  On February 18, the President held an initial 
meeting with Restrepo, Pretelt, Vice President Francisco 
Santos and some pro-Uribe Congressman to discuss the draft. 
 
3. (C) Restrepo explained to the Ambassador on February 17 
that the current draft jeopardizes his negotiating strategy 
with the AUC.  His objective is to get as many paramilitaries 
as possible under state control, by offering incentives to 
demobilize rather than imposing strict requirements at the 
onset.  According to Restrepo, the GOC has no record of about 
95 percent of the AUC.  Once they demobilize, the state can 
identify and disarm them and put them under firm state 
control.  After this is done, the GOC can begin finding and 
punishing those who committed major crimes and dismantle the 
AUC's economic and political power structure.  In short, 
Restrepo is working to persuade the paramilitaries to turn 
themselves over to the state by delaying the investigation 
and punishment phase until it is too late for them to flee. 
 
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Main Concern: Encourage Demobilization 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Restrepo's principle problem with both the government 
draft and the version submitted by Senator Rafael Pardo is 
that it would discourage demobilization by imposing too many 
legal requirements immediately after demobilization.  The GOC 
and Pardo draft laws call for demobilizing persons to confess 
all crimes and for the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) 
to open an investigation on each individual.  Restrepo 
explained that if this were the case, the paramilitaries 
would instead forgo demobilization knowing that there was 
little chance the authorities would ever be able to capture 
them.  Moreover, the requirement to investigate all 
demobilizing individuals would make Law 782 obsolete.  Law 
782 authorizes the state to pardon members of an illegal 
armed group who demobilize and who are guilty only of 
rebellion against the state and other related, minor crimes. 
Under Law 782, the Fiscalia debriefs the individuals but a 
formal investigation is not conducted.  Restrepo emphasized 
that Law 782 was working well to facilitate demobilization 
and screen out the major criminals, and that he wanted it to 
stay in place. 
 
-------------------------- 
Confession and Reparations 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Restrepo has two other concerns with the drafts.  He 
is worried that, by requiring a full confession, the law 
would call for paramilitary supporters to be punished.  He 
noted that in some AUC-dominated areas nearly the entire 
community collaborated with the paramilitaries, including 
politicians and military personnel, because they had no 
choice.  He expressed concern that some leftist politicians 
are eager to expose and punish these sympathizers.  Instead, 
Restrepo asserted that the state should focus on sensitizing 
the population on responsible civilian behavior and building 
confidence in legitimate authority.  He emphasized that any 
sympathizers who committed major crimes would be punished. 
 
6. (C) Lastly, Restrepo said the reparations mechanism in the 
draft laws was ineffective because it simply demanded full 
disclosure of illicit assets.  Most AUC members have very 
little property held in true name and would be unlikely to 
turn over even a small percentage of their assets.  Instead, 
Restrepo wants to strengthen the current asset forfeiture law 
to give the state greater and permanent power to seize all 
illicit assets.  In Restrepo's view, the state would then be 
responsible for giving reparations to victims from those 
seized assets.  He underscored that dismantling the AUC's 
economic power was key to a successful peace process. 
Otherwise, the AUC would retain its power because of its 
capacity to buy off people. 
 
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Holding Criminals Responsible 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Restrepo will insist that paramilitaries guilty of 
major crimes are fully investigated, serve a mandatory time 
in confinement, and have all illicit assets seized.  He is a 
proponent of some sort of truth commission that would offer a 
judicial benefit, such as a reduced sentence, for major 
crimes for those who demobilize and collaborate with 
authorities.  He noted that President Uribe wants the 
alternative sentence to be served in an official prison, but 
that the AUC leaders would demand a less restrictive 
confinement center. 
 
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Committed to His Positions 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Restrepo is aware that his views may lead to 
accusations that he is a paramilitary supporter, especially 
since he cannot reveal his negotiating strategy publicly.  He 
said, however, he could not allow a draft law to pass that 
would compromise his strategy.  The Ambassador reiterated 
that the USG would like to see a law that dismantles the AUC, 
punishes major criminals, and is transparent. 
 
 
DRUCKER