US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO404

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000404 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES IT IS PREPARED 
FOR "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" ON INTERIM AUTHORITY 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 0312 
 
     B. COLOMBO 0359 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In a speech marking the third anniversary of the 
Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), Jayantha Dhanapala, head of the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) Peace Secretariat, announced on 
February 22 that the GSL is "ready to reopen direct 
negotiations" with the insurgent Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) on an interim authority, to be followed by 
efforts toward "negotiating a final settlement of the ethnic 
conflict."  Public statements by other key actors in the 
peace process were notably less conciliatory.  In a separate 
statement from Kilinochchi the same day, LTTE political chief 
Thamilchelvan accused the GSL of waging "a covert war" 
against the Tigers, while Opposition Leader Ranil 
Wickremesinghe issued a warning from Colombo that the 
ceasefire, signed during his tenure as PM, was "under 
threat." Although the GSL has publicly noted before its 
willingness to talk about an unspecified interim 
authority--rather than the controversial Interim 
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposed by the Tigers--this 
is the first time such a statement has been issued 
unconditionally, without the usual qualifiers that a 
resolution reflect territorial integrity, national 
sovereignty or the principle of federalism.  Although the 
LTTE has not formally responded to this possible overture, we 
view it a hopeful sign of GSL intentions to revive the peace 
process.  End summary. 
 
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THREE-YEAR CEASEFIRE; 
STILL NO LASTING PEACE 
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2.  (U) At a public forum on February 22 to celebrate the 
third anniversary of signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) 
between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), GSL Peace Secretariat head 
Jayantha Dhanapala read out an official statement announcing 
GSL readiness for direct talks with the LTTE on an interim 
authority, followed by negotiations on a final resolution to 
the ethnic conflict.  The anniversary commemoration coincided 
with a visit to Sri Lanka by Norwegian special envoy Erik 
Solheim, who arrived in the country on February 21 for talks 
with GSL and LTTE leaders.  Solheim last visited one month 
ago. 
 
3.  (U) The text of the GSL statement follows below: 
 
While expressing satisfaction that the continued absence of 
full-scale conflict has saved many valuable lives and 
prevented widespread destruction, the Government of Sri Lanka 
regrets that despite all its efforts, a positive atmosphere 
for negotiating a lasting solution has still not been 
created.  For its part, the Government of Sri Lanka 
reiterates its strong commitment towards the implementation 
of the CFA in letter and spirit.  It continues to be ready to 
reopen direct negotiations with the LTTE on the establishment 
of an interim authority to meet the urgent humanitarian and 
development needs of the people of the North and East and to 
proceed thereafter to negotiating a final settlement of the 
ethnic conflict.  The Government hopes that all concerned 
will cooperate to remove the scourge of conflict and 
political violence from our country enabling all Sri Lankans 
to live together in peace and harmony. 
 
End text of statement. 
 
4.  (U)  As of mid-day February 23 (a national holiday), the 
LTTE had not issued an official response to Dhanapala's 
statement.  Instead, its website featured a statement from 
S.P. Thamilchelvan, head of the Tigers' political wing, 
issued the same day after meeting Solheim at LTTE 
headquarters in Kilinochchi.  Citing the February 7 killing 
of LTTE eastern military leader Kausalyan (Ref A), the Tiger 
political ideologue accused the GSL of undermining the 
ceasefire by waging "a covert war" against the LTTE.  (Note: 
Responsibility for the killing has been claimed by the Tamil 
National Force, a previously unknown and possibly fictitious 
organization.  The LTTE continues to allege Sri Lankan 
security forces' involvement in the incident.  End note.) 
Despite these alleged provocations, LTTE "leadership is 
determined to remain fully committed to peace initiatives 
with whatever international support we may get . . . (and) 
with extreme patience despite the murders, CFA violations and 
instigations," Thamilchelvan averred. 
 
5.  (U) Other key actors' anniversary statements sounded 
ominous notes about the strength of the CFA, weakened by 
repeated violations and two years of stasis on the 
negotiating front.  Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, 
under whose tenure as Prime Minister the CFA was signed, 
issued a statement from Colombo on February 22 warning that 
"the Ceasefire Agreement and the ceasefire are under threat." 
 Hagrup Hauckland, head of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission 
(SLMM), cautioned that "lack of peace is putting a serious 
strain on the ceasefire and creating dangerous uncertainty," 
adding that assassinations and killings "pose a serious 
threat to the peace process." 
 
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A POST-TSUNAMI SEA CHANGE? 
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6.  (SBU) Although Dhanapala's statement did not specifically 
refer to the Tiger's controversial proposal for an Interim 
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)--which the LTTE insists must 
form the sole basis for resumed negotiations--neither did it 
include the usual GSL qualifiers and conditionalities, e.g., 
that a resolution must respect the principles of federalism 
and/or national sovereignty and/or territorial integrity. 
Nonetheless, Dhanapala said on a morning talk show February 
23 that the statement does not signal a change in GSL policy. 
 The same fundamental differences in the parties' position 
remain, he explained:  LTTE "unilateralist" insistence on the 
ISGA and GSL preference for "the more generic phrase like 
Interim Authority (which) would enable all proposals to be 
discussed." 
 
7.  (C)  None of our interlocutors attached much significance 
to the February 22 announcement either.  Kethesh Loganathan 
of the Center for Policy Alternatives, a prominent local 
think tank, said that the statement does not represent a 
shift in the GSL stance since it did not address the major 
sticking point--the LTTE demand for ISGA--that has been 
impeding resumed negotiations for more than a year.  Gajen 
Ponnambalam, an MP for the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance 
(TNA), also discounted the possibility that the statement 
offers new room for maneuvering.  "There is no change in 
(GSL) position," he told us flatly, because it continues to 
exclude the ISGA as a basis for revived talks.  The LTTE has 
always been ready to discuss any "shortcomings" in its ISGA 
proposal at the negotiating table, he asserted, while 
President Kumaratunga has already acknowledged that "75 
percent of the ISGA is not objectionable."  As long as the 
GSL does not formally accept the ISGA as a basis for talks, 
Ponnambalam indicated, the TNA sees little chance for 
progress. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (C) Dhanapala's disclaimer notwithstanding, we 
nonetheless view the announcement as significant.  While we 
have often heard GSL interlocutors privately assert readiness 
to discuss a non-specific interim arrangement, we have never 
before heard Kumaratunga's government--with its debilitating 
dependence on the jingoistic Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
as a coalition partner--publicly avow this position without 
qualifications or conditions.  In the aftermath of the 
December 26 tsunami, President Kumaratunga sees herself 
riding a wave of international and domestic good will, shored 
up by substantial pledges of financial assistance, that makes 
her less solicitous of JVP demands (Ref B).  We believe this 
simple statement, devoid of stipulations about federalism or 
national sovereignty, offers important new possibilities to 
find common ground for renewed dialogue. 
 
LUNSTEAD