US embassy cable - 05CANBERRA341

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 CANBERRA 000341 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, NP/MNA, EAP/ANP AND NP/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KNNP, AORC, PARM, AS, IR, IAEA 
SUBJECT: NPT ENVOY AMBASSADOR SANDERS CONSULTS ON NPT 
REVIEW CONFERENCE IN CANBERRA 
 
REF: A. STATE 18228 
     B. STATE 21700 
     C. CANBERRA 322 
     D. CANBERRA 323 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS WOO LEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During February 10 consultations at the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in Canberra 
on preparations for the May 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) 
on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), Ambassador Jackie Sanders, Special Representative of 
the President for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
discussed U.S. priorities with GOA officials, who concurred 
with the U.S. goal to focus on non-compliance with the 
Treaty's non-proliferation obligations.  They speculated on 
the motivations of various unhelpful Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) states and strategized with her on tactics to work with 
NAM, EU and other states, urging even wider consultations in 
the run-up to the RevCon.  Australian officials agreed on the 
need to restrict access in some way to full nuclear fuel 
cycle technologies, and hoped that consensus language could 
be found at the RevCon on this commonly recognized need, 
while the details would have to be decided later.  They were 
concerned that the USG's plan to restrict access to 
enrichment technologies also included restricting Australian 
access, even though it already had laser enrichment research 
underway with U.S. corporations and nuclear labs.  DFAT 
officials announced they were considering making the 
Additional Protocol (AP) a condition of supply for sales of 
uranium, although this position had not yet been cleared 
throughout the GOA or with Australian industry.  They also 
informed the Sanders delegation that they would soon begin 
negotiations with China on a bilateral safeguards agreement 
for uranium sales.  End Summary. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador Jackie Sanders, Special Representative of 
the President for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, met on February 10 with DFAT Deputy Secretary Nick 
Warner and Arms Control Office Director David Mason, before 
attending a large roundtable gathering, hosted by DFAT First 
Assistant Secretary for International Security David Stuart, 
that included Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation 
Office (ASNO) Director General John Carlson, Mason, DFAT NPT 
action officers John Page and Martin Walker, Analysts Doug 
Keen and Miles Burgess from the Office of National 
Assessments (ONA), ADOD Executive Officer for Proliferation 
Security Sasha Kaminski, and Executive Officer for Security 
Affairs Nicole Park from Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). 
Renick Smith, Special Advisor to Ambassador Sanders, Dr. 
Elizabeth Murphy from the Office of Multilateral Nuclear 
Affairs, John Mentz, Special Assistant for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Policy from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and Polmiloff (notetaker) also attended. 
 
DEPSEC WARNER: GOA AND USG PRIORITIES ALIKE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador Sanders laid out for DepSec Warner the 
USG's priorities for the NPT RevCon, per Ref A guidance, 
noting how closely she worked with Australian Ambassadors 
Mike Smith in Geneva and Deborah Stokes in Vienna on 
Conference on Disarmanent (CD) and International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) issues.  The USG wanted the RevCon focus 
to be on non-compliance issues: the bad guys.  The U.S. would 
be prepared to discuss Article VI disarmament issues as well, 
including the Moscow Treaty and Cooperative Threat Reduction 
WMD dismantlement efforts in the Former Soviet Union. 
Efforts to strengthen the NPT and the IAEA through 
initiatives to restrict access to nuclear fuel cycle 
technology would not be resolved before the RevCon, she 
predicted, but they needed continued focus.  She stressed the 
need for high level involvement in capitals to prepare for 
this year's RevCon, or risk losing the outcome to the "CD 
mafia's 1995 mindset" on disarmament issues.  She highlighted 
Secretary Rice's committed attention to the NPT RevCon, as 
 
SIPDIS 
indicated during her Senate confirmation hearings.  Warner 
assured Sanders that the GOA likewise took the RevCon very 
seriously and Mason informed her that Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer would attend the RevCon's opening and 
deliver Australia's national statement, after which 
Ambassador Smith would remain as Head of Delegation.  Warner 
described the GOA's priorities as the same as the USG's: Iran 
and North Korea.  He asked what kind of P-5 statement could 
be presented, noting its absence would detract from common 
goals to focus on other issues.  Sanders outlined U.S. 
efforts in the P-3 and P-5, citing Washington's goal to 
achieve such a statement, but it had to be worth something 
significant and not watered down.  The U.S. was trying to 
find commonly acceptable language on a Fissile Material 
Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), while willing to be much more transparent on 
disarmament than either Russia or China. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
4.  (C) Switching briefly to Iran's non-compliance, Warner 
took note of Secretary's Rice's somewhat tougher language 
in the press that day on EU-3 efforts with Iran, saying there 
needed to be a timeframe for Iran to be brought into 
line.  He said there was little to separate the GOA's view on 
Iran from that of the USG or the Euros, but he was 
skeptical that the EU-3 effort would lead to a desirable 
outcome.  Once the process with Iran failed, the GOA "would 
be very supportive of referral to the UNSC," but he worried 
whether Russia and China would effectively tackle the 
issue.  He said a carefully orchestrated process would be 
needed to get Iran reported to the UN Security Council 
(UNSC).  Sanders agreed, saying there was little choice but 
to let the EU-3 process play out while hoping it was not 
facilitating secret Iranian nuclear operations.  The United 
States would make a strong statement on Iran at the upcoming 
IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) meeting, but realized others 
might not because the EU-3 process was ongoing.  While many 
countries wanted the issue to remain within the IAEA, if Iran 
backed out of the EU-3 negotiations, most of them would find 
it hard to keep Iran's non-compliance from being reported to 
the UNSC.  Warner stated that he had been Australia's 
Ambassador to Iran 10 years ago, and its nuclear program was 
an issue even then.  He noted the Iranians' ability to "work 
directly against their own best security interests."  OSD's 
Mentz commented that some NAM countries were growing more 
frustrated with and skeptical of Iran, to include China. 
Warner observed that the Chinese MFA had become significantly 
more professional in the past few years.  He stated that in 
consulting with the GOA, the U.S. was "talking to the 
converted," and he urged the U.S. to talk more about its 
goals for the NPT and Iran with Brazil, South Africa and 
Egypt, "the spoiler group."  He also noted that their 
economic relationships with Iran were likely to influence 
states' positions on the Iranian nuclear issue.  Sanders laid 
out USG efforts to work with those countries, including an 
upcoming trip through South America. 
 
NPT CHALLENGES: FUEL CYCLE 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Sanders stated the NAM's growing mantra about have's 
and have-not's with respect to the nuclear fuel cycle, 
without recognizing the concommitant compliance obligations, 
had to be countered.  France and the UK also had ambitious 
consultation plans before the RevCon, and several 
international NPT Conferences had already taken place or were 
scheduled, so there was ample opportunity for consultations. 
Mason agreed with Sanders' concerns about the NAM view that 
the transfer of sensitive technologies was an "inalienable 
right."  Innovative ideas were needed, and he mentioned IAEA 
DG ElBaradei's call for a five-year moratorium, as well as 
the U.S./G-8 plan.  He asked whether there was an effective 
way to address the fuel cycle issue at the RevCon.  Sanders 
said she was not optimistic.  Although she had not yet seen 
the report from ElBaradei's experts group, it would have to 
be considered and then "we will have to sort out what's the 
best we can do at the RevCon."  She recalled that some states 
had called for a subsidiary body on the fuel cycle at the 
RevCon, in addition to the already existing ones on 
disarmament and the Middle East, neither of which were 
useful.  There had been some discussion with like-minded 
countries in Geneva on whether there should be a 
"proliferation" of subsidiary bodies, including on topics 
which we considered important like compliance, or none at 
all, she stated.  (NOTE: In the later roundtable discussion 
on this topic, Murphy noted that UN representatives had 
pointed out that there was insufficient meeting space in the 
UN building to host more than two subsidiary bodies.  End 
Note.)  Mason was hopeful, since ElBaradei and others saw the 
need to better control sensitive technologies, that at least 
some common language could be found at the RevCon that 
recognized the problem.  Sanders agreed and said that since 
the NAM states were ElBaradei's biggest supporters, the onus 
should be on him to craft such language that would put 
caveats on their "inalienable rights."  To the degree that 
the U.S. would be on the hotseat anyway for unwarranted 
criticism on disarmament, she told Warner the USG would 
appreciate whatever support the GOA could give.  He replied, 
"We will be there with you."  He thanked her for traveling 
all the way to Australia and asked her to stay in touch in 
the lead-up to May.  Mentz and Mason mentioned in passing 
that Singapore had been particularly helpful within the NAM 
on the NPT and Iran over the past few years, and Warner 
concurred. 
 
DFAT ROUNDTABLE: NAC AND NAM CHALLENGES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) FAS David Stuart welcomed Ambassador Sanders and the 
delegation to his roundtable session, noting the U.S. 
had an important leadership role to play in the NPT in 
getting its message out to friends and others.  He thought 
the U.S. was having some effect, as noted in a press account 
of a more helpful statement on the APthat RevCon 
President-designate Duarte had made the day before.  Stuart 
confessed that the GOA was worried about the upcoming RevCon, 
stating that this was a key motivation for the nuclear 
terrorism conference that FM Downer had sponsored in Sydney 
in November 2004, in order to get Asia Pacific countries onto 
common ground on that issue.  Sanders said the USG intended 
to address all three pillars of the treaty: nonproliferation, 
disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but the 
focus had to be on nonproliferation and the crisis of 
non-compliance.  The U.S. would be working with Australia and 
others about strengthening the IAEA (Ref B and septel) as 
well.  While the U.S. was proud of its disarmament 
accomplishments, she acknowledged that peaceful uses would be 
contentious. 
 
7.  (C) Stuart pointed out that New Zealand, and not South 
Africa, would be chairing the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) this 
year and a few GONZ officials had a particular zeal for the 
NPT.  Sanders referred to the NAC's ability, by moderating 
its stance, to get several NATO countries to support its 
unhelpful disarmament resolution at the 2004 UN First 
Committee (UNFC); she inferred that South Africa did not like 
such moderation.  Stuart posited that the reason South Africa 
was backing away of the NAM and NAC was part of its strategy 
to claim one of the African seats in the potentially expanded 
UNSC, adding that he had just been talking with FM Downer 
about how to take advantage of this opportunity for more 
moderation.  Stuart said he had found South African behavior 
"quite appalling" up to now, even though it wanted to be 
considered equal to Japan, Brazil and India for a UNSC seat. 
ASNO DG Carlson thought South Africa was worried about being 
locked out of the opportunity for fuel cycle technology and, 
although he thought Pretoria had no plans to get back into 
uranium 
enrichment, it did not want to foreclose the option, and had 
"reluctantly (gotten) in bed with Iran."  Some of Carlson's 
South African contacts were embarrassed by this, but said 
their broader interests were being challenged.  Their 
concerns needed to be addressed: there was a difference 
between noncompliant states and those that simply had an 
interest in nuclear energy.  Stuart said that in bilateral 
pol-mil talks with Brazil later in the day, he would be 
urging the GOB to increase its focus on NPT compliance issues 
and language, especially given Brazilian Amb. Duarte's 
presidency of the RevCon.  Stuart was considering doing some 
Australia Group (AG) outreach to Africa. 
 
8.  (C) Stuart and Sanders compared notes on how difficult 
Egypt had been to work with over the past year in arms 
control fora.  Sanders stated that the Egyptian delegate at 
the Wilton Park NPT Conference had gone so far as to 
excuse the Iranian nuclear program while claiming that Israel 
was the main threat, as well as to indicate that if Egypt did 
not get what it wanted at the RevCon - progress on a nuclear 
weapons free zone in the Middle East -- the 
U.S. would not get what it wanted either.  She expected that 
the RevCon could be messy; there were hints from some 
NAM states that they wanted the RevCon to fail, and to ensure 
that the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) took the blame. 
Sanders remarked that the U.S. wanted a consensus document at 
the RevCon, but it was not mandatory.  Three of the last six 
had not had one, and this would be as tough a Review 
Conference as any of them.  She added that the USG had 
encouraged Duarte not to equate the success of the NPT or the 
RevCon with the achievement of a consensus document.  At the 
January NPT Conference in Bali, he had said some unhelpful 
things about the necessary elements of a consensus document. 
She had encouraged him in Tokyo the day before to back away 
from those notions.  Mason related that Duarte had attended 
the November nuclear terrorism conference in Sydney and had 
been in "full flight" on some pet issues;  Mason had inferred 
that Duarte saw Brazil as the equal of India and likewise 
wanted the status of a nuclear-capable state. 
 
9.  (C) Stuart labeled much of NAM behavior since 2002 as 
"pernicious," such as Malaysia reading out a NAM statement on 
Iran at the IAEA that had been written by Iran.  At the 
Sydney conference, he related, the Malaysian delegation had 
tried to assert that the AP should not be seen as the 
standard requirement to enable technology transfers; peaceful 
nuclear energy was an unfettered right and Malaysia would not 
be bound by an international protocol.  Malaysia found itself 
isolated when the Philippines had declared it was preparing 
to adopt the AP.  Mentz said he believed Malaysia had grown 
disenchanted with Iran, and he suspected it would no longer 
be willing to be its mouthpiece. 
 
10.  (C) Stuart observed that when senior officials of most 
NAM states met with U.S. or Australian counterparts, they 
invariably said the right things about nonproliferation, but 
this did not extend to their arms control diplomats. 
The "Egypts of the world" with narrow agendas should not be 
allowed to drive the RevCon agenda, he declared; there 
ought to be an institutional interest in a positive outcome. 
One way to get Egypt on board, he believed, might be to work 
through ElBaradei, who, along with his staff, at least shared 
Western concerns.  There should be a strategy 
to break through the sterile bloc mentality, he added, and 
our Foreign Ministers needed to reach out to FM Wirayuda in 
Indonesia as well to do more on counterproliferation.  He 
believed Indonesia shared GOA and USG concerns about 
proliferation.  One thing the GOA would start saying to 
counterparts more often, Stuart offered, would be to ask, 
"how do you expect the NWS to disarm without assurances of 
nonproliferation?"  Sanders said the U.S. had also been 
asking that question, but she agreed it was more helpful when 
other states said it for us; "no one disarms in a vacuum." 
She observed that Malaysia and South Africa had fallen out 
with one another within the NAM during the 2004 NPT Prepcom, 
and she assumed it was partly over leadership issues.  Stuart 
pointed out that Malaysia would be the head of both the NAM 
and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) until early 
2006, which meant that unhelpful nationalistic holdovers from 
the Mahatir era were still around.  When Sanders commented 
that at least the U.S. and Indonesia were working to improve 
their relationship as an offshoot of tsunami relief 
cooperation, Stuart replied, "we'd love you to be friends 
again with them."  He noted that Australia, Indonesia and 
Norway were working on a paper together on integrated 
safeguards. 
 
NAM AND EU CHALLENGES 
--------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Ambassador Sanders pointed with dismay to the 
problem of EU and NAM caucuses.  At the IAEA Board of 
Governors (BOG) meeting in September and November, meetings 
were suspended from the podium so that these groups could 
meet.  Stuart concurred, observing that both groups would 
meet and then tell the rest of the world what they had 
decided.  The EU caucus now served to undercut the ability to 
act as "the West" because they would have exhausted 
themselves in their own negotiations and there was no room 
for compromise with others afterwards.  The EU problem would 
only get worse at 25 states, he remarked.  Sanders said the 
rest of us -- the U.S., Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand 
and others -- needed to organize too.  The Western European 
and Others Group had met almost daily during the 2000 RevCon. 
 Stuart pointed out that G-8 meetings helped to steer EU 
meetings, so more of those might be needed.  Sanders 
commented that Australia had become an honorary G-8 member in 
Vienna.  Stuart strongly agreed with Sanders' point that high 
levels of governments had to be involved in nonproliferation 
and NPT policy, stating that was the way to leverage the 
senior level concurrence on APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum 
statements on nonproliferation and to "get them to reign in 
their mafias."  Sanders observed that that was the U.S. 
message in every capital: this was everyone's security 
treaty and everyone's concern. 
 
NUCLEAR ENERGY ISSUES AND COMPLIANCE 
------------------------------------ 
 
12.  (C) FAS Stuart said Australia had an important stake in 
the nuclear fuel supply as the world's major uranium 
producer.  Sanders related that the U.S. provided more 
peaceful nuclear energy technical assistance than any other 
country.  At the moment, technical safety concerns about the 
nuclear power industry were very low compared to 
the post-Chornobyl era, Stuart averred, but governments 
needed answers on proliferation safeguards to have full 
confidence in the nuclear industry.  He outlined the 
Australian priority on compliance as recognition of the AP 
as a condition of supply for technology.  In addition, 
although this idea had not been cleared through the GOA 
interagency yet, DFAT was considering making the AP a 
condition of supply for uranium as well.  This idea would not 
be cleared with Australian industry in time for the RevCon, 
he noted.  It would also likely have to be coordinated with 
Canada and South Africa.  As one of the G-10 "critical 
supply" countries of sensitive technologies, Australia would 
be watching the results of a UK-led G-8 meeting the following 
week on this issue.  He did not think there was scope to do 
more than continue working on the G-8 plan before the RevCon; 
but serious RevCon support for the one-year moratorium would 
be useful.  In Stuart's view, there was "not much hope for" 
ElBaradei's ideas; the IAEA could not be the physical 
guarantor of fuel supply.  The GOA did support a moratorium 
for some period of time to reach an agreeable framework on 
nuclear fuel cycle technology.  The GOA has not yet decided 
on ElBaradei's five-year moratorium idea, but Stuart believed 
that five years was too long and would allow states to avoid 
dealing with the problem.  Stuart also urged that guaranteed 
supply had to be part of any restrictions.  Australia also 
had to consider its own status as a supplier and its possible 
future interest in enrichment and reprocessing technology. 
The USG agreed on the need to make the AP a condition of 
supply, Sanders said, but likely would not have its own AP in 
force before the RevCon because the implementing legislation 
was not complete. 
 
13.  (C) Stuart expressed GOA reservations with parts of the 
U.S./G-8 plan to guarantee supply of enrichment technology 
only to those countries which already had an enrichment 
capability.  Carlson stated that the Australian 
company Silex was already working with U.S. nuclear labs and 
energy companies on a laser enrichment project.  (NOTE: 
At lunch the previous day (Ref C), Carlson had expanded on 
this issue.  Although he and Stuart agreed with the 
general need to limit enrichment research in some way, the 
U.S. had not listed Australia under its plan as a country 
that would be allowed to continue its research.  The irony 
was that the ongoing Australian laser research would lead 
to program development in the U.S., to the benefit of the 
U.S. firms.  End Note.)  Sanders stated that the U.S. 
continued to prefer the President's proposal to limit the 
fuel cycle.  She offered to follow up on the Australian laser 
enrichment issue.  She saw problems with ElBaradei's effort 
to multilateralize the handling of the fuel cycle.  For 
starters, it would be too taxing for the IAEA.  Stuart 
agreed, adding that national export control laws and other 
rules also applied.  The main goal was to garner the 
political will to agree that the problem had to be addressed. 
 This was an area where G-8 leadership was good, he assessed. 
 
STRENGTHENING THE NPT AND IAEA 
------------------------------ 
 
14.  (C) Sanders remarked that the topic of creating an IAEA 
Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification (Ref B and 
septel) would be addressed in the BOG meeting at the end of 
February.  Stuart said he thought the GOA would agree with 
it, but he wondered whether it would be acceptable to NAM 
states.  He said the GOA would also like the RevCon to 
consider what more the UNSC could do in the event a party 
moved to withdraw from the NPT.  In Australia's view, the 
matter should be automatically referred to the UNSC; 
withdrawal should not absolve the party from any unmet NPT 
obligations; and withdrawal should not free any previously 
supplied equipment or technology from restrictions imposed by 
the supplier at the time of supply.  The GOA would discuss 
this with Russia, China and those states looking for 
permanent UNSC status.  Carlson pointed out that the Treaty 
itself required that the withdrawing party notify the UNSC of 
its intention.  Sanders agreed and offered that no further or 
automatic mechanisms related to UNSC referral of withdrawal 
were needed.  She agreed that withdrawal did not excuse 
previous violations and noted that the USG was looking at the 
issue of making it a part of fuel and technology supply 
contracts that those materials would have to either be 
destroyed or returned to the supplier if the receiving 
country later withdrew from the NPT.  Stuart stressed that 
his point was to ensure that all states saw the issue of NPT 
withdrawal as a core matter for the UNSC.  He was not trying 
to prescribe what the Council would have to do about it, but 
he also did not want to let the matter get lost in obscure 
technical arguments at the BOG. 
 
DISARMAMENT, FMCT, CTBT 
----------------------- 
 
15.  (C) Stuart commended the USG effort to get its empirical 
message on disarmament out, mentioning specifically the 
recent speech by Assistant Secretary Rademaker on Article VI 
efforts. Stuart cautioned that it would also be good if 
Congress did not approve more funding for nuclear weapons 
research.  Under the RevCon optics, the U.S. could be seen as 
strengthening its arsenal.  He also warned that Duarte had 
pitched the "irrational and facile" sales line that the P-5 
NWS had to "offer something" on disarmament at the Conference 
in order to get what they wanted, but he did not think U.S. 
explanations were enough.  He asked for further bilateral 
discussion on the FMCT, stating he thought there was a way to 
address U.S. concerns about verification.  Even some 
indication that the USG might reconsider verification before 
the RevCon would be helpful, he posited.  Carlson thought 
there could be an innovative approach, different from the 
rigid IAEA safeguards model.  He handed out copies of his 
article in "Arms Control Today" on the idea.  Stuart said he 
sought greater detail on the U.S. perspective and would be in 
Washington February 28 - March 3.  Sanders welcomed his visit 
and willingness to talk about FMCT verification, but she 
cautioned that he should not expect to change minds after 
Washington's very lengthy interagency review of FMCT 
verification.  Stuart said it bothered the GOA that China and 
others were hiding behind the USG position on the FMCT. 
Sanders said simply that the USG could not agree to a 
negotiating mandate that included FMCT verification.  Stuart 
asked Sanders what sort of RevCon final document language the 
United States could live with on the CTBT.  Stuart said he 
knew Australia would not change U.S. minds on the CTBT, but 
Australia was doing work on the CTBT which it thought was 
important.  Sanders noted that the United States continued to 
support the testing moratorium and the CTBT monitoring 
system. 
 
16.  (C) NPT Action Officer John Page asked about the RevCon 
agenda and where the U.S. stood with respect to the "13 
Steps" from the 2000 RevCon Final Document.  Sanders 
explained that Duarte was working to get an agreed agenda, a 
satisfactory way for him to spend his time from her 
perspective.  The U.S. was still sorting through what to say 
about the 13 Steps, noting there had been five years of 
momentous events since 2000.  It was important to remember 
that the goal was arms reductionnot a sterile debate on the 
13 Steps, some of which no longer even existed.  She said the 
U.S. was working on a UNSC Presidential Statement on the 35th 
Anniversary of the NPT.  Hopefully, it would serve to remind 
NPT parties not to lose the (security) forest for the 
(disarmament) trees. 
 
AUSTRALIA'S INTENT TO SELL URANIUM TO CHINA 
------------------------------------------- 
 
17.  (C)Stuart said Carlson would be visiting Beijing soon to 
work on a bilateral safeguards agreement in order for 
Australia to be able to sell uranium to China.  Carlson wryly 
commented that the Chinese starting position was 
"trust us" without regard to accounting rules and other 
safeguards requirements.  He related that China wanted to 
secure a longterm uranium supply.  Up to now, it had been 
self-sufficient.  Mentz stated that a long-dormant USG 
civilian cooperation agreement with China had been activated 
the previous year.  U.S. constraints included 
catch-all controls and end-use checks.  He hoped Australia 
would include those measures as well. 
 
18.  (U) Ambassador Sanders and the delegation have cleared 
this cable. 
 
STANTON