US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU710

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000710 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
NEW DELHI PLEASE PASS A/S ROCCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, NP, Government of Nepal (GON) 
SUBJECT: KOIRALA COMEBACK?  IMPLICATIONS OF (YET ANOTHER) 
CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 0707 (NOTAL) 
 
     B. (B) KATHMANDU 0672 
     C. (C) STATE 67794 
     D. (D) 01 KATHMANDU 1603 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Refs A and B reported apparent efforts by 
former Prime Minister and Nepali Congress Party President 
Girija Prasad Koirala to oust current Prime Minister Sher 
Bahadur Deuba and regain the post of prime minister--which he 
has held five times in Nepal's twelve years of democracy--yet 
again.  This message contains additional information on the 
Koirala campaign and our assessment of what another Koirala 
administration could mean for domestic political stability. 
End summary. 
 
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SIEGE MENTALITY 
---------------- 
 
2.  (C) Supporters of former Prime Minister and Nepali 
Congress (NC) Party President Girija Prasad Koirala, who is 
stepping up his campaign to replace current Prime Minister 
Sher Bahadur Deuba (Refs A and B), are indicating that the 
five-time former PM may be planning a move to oust his rival 
in the near future.  In an April 9 meeting with poloffs, 
Sujata Koirala, G.P.'s only child, hinted that a decision 
would be made after her father and she return from an April 
14-18 visit to India, where he expects to meet with (unnamed) 
Indian officials.  (Note:  The Indian Ambassador to Nepal 
confirmed the visit and told the British Ambassador the 
Indian Government will tell Koirala to stand down.)  While 
emphasizing that the decision on who leads Nepal is for 
Nepalis to decide, poloffs hinted back to Sujata Koirala that 
a change of government at the present could only further 
erode Nepal's stability and undermine the GON's ability to 
address the insurgency and other pressing national issues. 
 
3.  (C) Sujata, a philanthropist and aspiring politician who 
earned a reputation for corruption during her father's 
previous administration, charged that the Royal Nepal Army 
(RNA) and the King are in league against her father, and are 
propping up Deuba because he is more easily manipulated than 
her father would be by "anti-democratic" forces.  She 
predicted the NC Central Committee will soon expel 
Communications Minister Jaya Prakash Gupta for publicly 
supporting Army Chief Rana's controversial remarks about past 
Nepali Congress leaders (Ref B).  She accused the RNA of 
harassing and even killing Koirala supporters in the field. 
Deuba, on the other hand, has completely cut off dialogue 
with the Koirala faction in his party.  When a NC MP from 
Kalikot turned to Deuba to ask for assistance for his 
beleaguered, Maoist-affected district, she said Deuba 
peremptorily "threw him out" of his office because of his 
affiliation to the Koirala camp.  To add to their woes, 
Koirala supporters are also being targeted by Maoists, she 
claimed, alleging the insurgents specifically ask Nepali 
Congress cadres if they are Koirala men or Deuba men.  If 
they respond with the former, they are attacked.  (Note: 
This we strongly doubt and have not heard elsewhere.  End 
note.)  Her father is not interested in regaining the prime 
minister's chair, she asserted, but what can he do when 
democracy is so threatened and district party leaders and MPs 
are "crying" for him to return to power?  When poloff asked 
about her father's relationship with the RNA and Palace 
during his last administration, she brushed off the question. 
 
------------------------------ 
LIKELY PALACE, RNA REACTIONS 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (S)  Koirala has been chipping away at Deuba's support 
within his own faction-riven party since his term began in 
July; it appears that by now Koirala might well have won over 
enough MPs to win a vote of no confidence.  Opposition party 
leaders are unlikely to protest or interrupt their rivals' 
self-destructiveness, discerning as always, in the NC's 
recurrent internal crises, potential opportunity to take the 
prime ministership back from the Nepali Congress.  The 
general public, long inured to the self-absorbed infighting 
of their political leaders and frequent flip-flops in 
government, can probably be counted on to accept Koirala's 
re-emergence with relative indifference.  Maoist reaction to 
another Koirala administration is difficult to determine; it 
seems unlikely, however, to produce an environment any more 
conducive to dialogue than in his previous tenures.  The 
Maoists almost surely welcome continual infighting within the 
NC Party and among the various parties in Parliament.  We and 
other donors have been quietly letting the Koirala camp know 
that we regard a change in government at this crucial 
juncture as ill advised (Ref A). 
 
5.  (S)  The other two figures in the national equation, 
however--the Palace and the RNA--do not favor a Koirala 
comeback. Koirala enjoyed particularly stormy relations with 
the RNA during his last term in office, and he has made no 
secret since of his displeasure with the military.  Chief of 
 
SIPDIS 
Army Staff Rana's public comments criticizing the past 12 
years of political leadership (Ref B) made pointed implicit 
references to Koirala, who served as Prime Minister for more 
than half of that time.  Koirala, on the other hand, regards 
the RNA's refusal to engage the Maoists in Rolpa last July 
(Ref D)--and King Gyanendra's reported refusal to support his 
request that the RNA do so--as evidence of a Palace-Army 
conspiracy against him. 
 
6.  (S)  The RNA, understandably, views the fiasco at Rolpa 
differently and blames Koirala for having forced the military 
into a no-win situation without the legal and Constitutional 
cover of emergency powers.  Our military contacts have made 
it clear that they do not trust Koirala and would not like to 
see him back in power again.  While always taking care to 
emphasize to us their respect for the Constitution and 
democracy, our military interlocutors have also frequently 
expressed frustration at what they view as the civilian 
leadership's mismanagement of the crisis.  Should Koirala 
re-insert himself as Prime Minister, we don't anticipate a 
coup, but the mutual mistrust between the former PM and the 
military would surely complicate--and could undermine--RNA 
efforts to counter the insurgency under the state of 
emergency.  The Maoists, of course, would welcome this 
development. 
 
7.  (S) In private conversations with the Ambassador, King 
Gyanendra has made the same points--respect for democracy but 
impatience with its inept leadership--as Rana.  But the King, 
who has generally maintained a public posture of aloofness 
from domestic politics, is letting it be known behind the 
scenes that he is comfortable with Deuba but would not 
welcome G.P.'s return.  Many observers view Army Chief Rana's 
public remarks criticizing years of Koirala's leadership (Ref 
B)--which must surely have been vetted by the Palace 
beforehand--as a not-so-veiled royal admonition to the former 
PM.  The King is obviously trying to head off what he sees as 
a potential crisis before it happens.  Koirala understands 
the message--his supporters allude freely to his strained 
relations with the Palace. 
 
8.  (S) We remain hopeful that Koirala will have the good 
sense not to pursue his agenda at this time in the face of 
obvious opposition from both the military and the Palace. 
Advice from the one potential ally he apparently thinks he 
has left--India--could prove critical in persuading him to 
desist.   But whether or not Koirala decides to follow 
through, his constant conniving distracts Deuba and his 
embattled Cabinet from devoting their full attention to the 
other threat at hand--the Maoists. 
MALINOWSKI