US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI767

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MCAP, IZ, IR, SA, SY, LE, AF, TC 
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID VISITS ABU DHABI 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (S) Summary: CENTCOM Commander Gen. Abizaid met with Abu 
Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE 
Armed Forces General Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
(MbZ) February 14 to discuss Iraq,s security situation in 
the wake of the January 30 elections.  They also discussed 
other regional security developments, including Syria, Iran, 
Pakistan, and former Lebanese Prime Minister Al Hariri,s 
assassination earlier in the day.  MbZ focused on UAE fears 
of a future extremist threat from Saudi Arabia.    He said 
the UAE was acquiring sophisticated weapons systems, 
including the F-16 Block 60 aircraft, as insurance against 
both Iran and any potential threat from Saudi Arabia should 
an extremist regime emerge there.  It was the most 
pessimistic we have seen MbZ on a perceived threat from Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
2. (S) Summary continued: MbZ told us that the war on terror 
should be an Arab fight, and that Arabs had to play a larger 
role.  MbZ asked for more timely notification about UAE 
nationals captured in Iraq.  MbZ and his Special Operations 
Commander requested more active combat assignments for the 
UAE,s 250-man Special Forces contingent in Afghanistan, 
especially near the Pakistani border.  End Summary. 
 
3. (U) On February 14, CENTCOM Commander Gen. Abizaid met 
with MbZ over dinner.  Others attending were Interior 
Minister Sheikh Saif bin Zayed (MbZ,s half-brother); 
Information Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) (MbZ,s 
full brother); UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Hamad 
Thani Al Rumaithy; Special Forces Commander Brigadier Jumaa 
Al Bawardi; Director for Military Intelligence Brigadier Essa 
Al Mazrouie; Ambassador; CENTCOM POLAD Ambassador John 
Holzman; Col. Tom Lynch of the Commander,s Action Group; 
Executive Officer Col. Joe Reynes; and USLO Chief.  Gen. 
Abizaid met separately with Lt. Gen. Hamad Thani on February 
15.  (Note: Gen. Abizaid had met Sheikhs MbZ, Saif, and 
Abdullah earlier in the day at the International Defense 
Exhibition )- IDEX -) as they toured the American pavilion. 
 End note.) 
 
Lebanon/Syria 
------------- 
 
4. (C) As Gen. Abizaid and MbZ sat down at the table February 
14, MbZ asked bluntly, &Could Bashar (Al Asad) be that 
stupid?8  Sheikh Abdullah read an excerpt from the Syrian 
President,s statement in which he condemned the &terrible, 
criminal action8 and expressed &solidarity with brother 
Lebanon in these serious circumstances.8  Abdullah and MbZ 
were dismissive of Syria,s official reaction, and said they 
supported the French government,s request for an 
international investigation into the assassination.  Abizaid 
conveyed the USG,s sense of shock at the Hariri 
assassination, as well as our belief that the people of 
Lebanon deserve the freedom to choose their leaders free of 
intimidation and terror.  During their meeting the following 
morning, Lt. Gen. Hamad Thani reiterated to Abizaid that 
Bashar was not in control, and that Syria,s &old guard8 
are &corrupt and still dangerous.8  The Baathists, he 
added, are still a force in Syria. 
 
Saudi Arabia 
------------ 
 
5. (S) Foremost on MbZ,s mind, however, was the potential 
threat from Saudi Arabia (assuming Saudi Arabia one day were 
ruled by Islamic extremists), a theme he returned to time and 
again during the dinner conversation.  In fact, it was the 
darkest and most pessimistic we have seen MbZ on Saudi 
Arabia.  Abizaid described how extremists go to Saudi 
mosques, target Saudi men in the 17-19 age group, and 
indoctrinate them.  They then whisk away these young recruits 
to Damascus, issue them new IDs, then send them as part of 
&suicide bomber8 groups to carry out operations inside 
Iraq.  These foreign fighters, many of whom have been 
captured by U.S. forces in Iraq, are not welcomed by Iraqis, 
Abizaid said.  DMI Director Brigadier Al Mazrouie suggested 
that DMI assign some of its men to Damascus airport to 
&check on who is coming in and out8 of Syria. 
 
6. (S) MbZ then talked at length about the Saudi 
leadership,s challenge.  Saudi leaders no longer hold the 
position of respect they had in the 60s and 70s.  MbZ also 
was dismissive of the International Counterterrorism 
Conference that Riyadh hosted February 5-8.  The UAEG opted 
not to send &serious8 counterterrorism experts to the 
conference because it regarded the conference as a public 
relations event, said MbZ.  Interior Minister Sheikh Saif 
emphasized that there needs to be more regional sharing of 
information about CT and security issues, especially by Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. 
 
7. (S) Still on the Saudi theme, MbZ for the first time 
linked his country,s decision to adopt a sophisticated 
defense posture (including the acquisition of 80 F-16 Block 
60 aircraft) to a potential attack from Saudi Arabia, should 
the KSA regime be overthrown by Islamic extremists.  The UAE 
has always perceived Iran as the primary conventional threat, 
he said.  Now, however, MbZ said he worries increasingly 
about the prospect that a revolt by Islamic extremists in KSA 
might succeed there.  Should an extremist regime come to 
power in Riyadh, how was he going to bring down their F-15s? 
Certainly not with the UAE,s fleet of Mirages, he said. 
 
8. (C) MbZ also was seized with the issue of terrorism 
financing, particularly the links between Saudi Arabia, Ansar 
Al Islam and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi.  He said that the UK had 
(indirectly) passed information to the UAE on terrorism 
financing trails, and asked whether the U.S. had seen similar 
information.  We noted that terrorism financing had been one 
of the major themes during White House Homeland Security 
Advisor Fran Townsend,s visit to the UAE a week earlier, and 
that the U.S. and UAE were working together closely on the 
issue.  Abizaid opined that if Zarqawi were not captured or 
killed in Iraq, then he would likely move south, and could 
easily move to Saudi Arabia, &and it will really get bad.8 
Both he and MbZ characterized Saudi Arabia as the future 
&center of gravity8 in the war on terror. 
 
9. (C) As he often does in meetings with USG visitors, MbZ 
shared his views about the importance of proper education 
standards in the Islamic world.  He observed that an end to 
the dominance of the radicalized madrassa school systems was 
vital to winning the war against extremist ideology and 
terrorism over the long term. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
10. (C) MbZ and AbZ had exchanged thoughts about Iraq,s 
elections with Gen. Abizaid earlier in the day at IDEX.  AbZ 
expressed satisfaction that the Iraqi people had turned out 
in significant numbers to vote on January 30.  Both Abizaid 
and his UAE interlocutors shared the sentiment that Iraq,s 
Sunnis had been unwise to boycott the elections.  While MbZ 
expressed misgivings about Iran,s influence in Iraq after 
the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) victory, Abizaid said both 
Sunnis and Shi,a Iraqis are Iraqis and Arabs first.  The 
United States did not necessarily see the UIA election 
results as a victory for Iran. 
 
11. (C) In his meeting with Abizaid, Lt. Gen. Hamad Thani 
asked how long it would take to rebuild Iraq,s military. 
The U.S. intends to build up Iraq,s armed forces capability 
and thus be able to provide a &fundamental security role8 
by December 2005, Abizaid replied.  He added that there could 
be a &substantial reduction8 in U.S. forces by 2006, and 
more Iraqis in charge.  Hamad Thani expressed concern that 
the Iraqi Chief of Staff had &no vision.8  Echoing the 
previous evening,s discussion, Abizaid and Hamad Thani also 
shared concerns about Iran,s influence.  Abizaid noted that 
one of the warning signs of Iranian interference would be if 
the constitutional process in Iraq were not followed as 
currently envisioned. 
 
12. (C) Hamad Thani said he was worried about a 
&revolutionary export of Iran,s brand of Islam to southern 
Iraq, that would in turn spread to Kuwait.  &Then we would 
have another problem on our hands,8 he stated. 
 
UAE Detainees 
------------- 
 
13. (S) MbZ raised the issue of his need to receive timely 
notification about UAE nationals detained by Coalition forces 
in Iraq.  MbZ suggested that UAE military intelligence 
officers could question Emirati nationals held by the 
Coalition in Iraq.  &If they say five words, we can tell 
whether they are from the UAE,8 MbZ said.  Gen. Abizaid 
welcomed questioning by UAE authorities.  (Note: We are aware 
of three UAE nationals being detained by Coalition forces in 
Iraq: Musalem Al Sayri, Adnan Mahmoud Hamood, and Awad Al 
Mustad.  End note.)   MbZ had learned from Iraqi TV that 
Emiratis had been captured in Fallujah and had contacted 
Embassy Abu Dhabi.  It then took several days for the Embassy 
to receive confirmation from Baghdad of these names and to 
pass the information back to MbZ,s staff.  (Comment: MbZ is 
looking to speed up a time-consuming process.  As we 
understand it, the current process is as follows: The UAE 
Embassy in Baghdad sends a letter to the U.S. Ambassador in 
Iraq requesting access.  MNF-I forwards the request to 
CENTCOM JSD, which in turn either obtains CENTCOM approval, 
or goes to the Joint Staff.  Once approved, MNF-I and UAE DMI 
are informed.  At that point, there would be coordination by 
DMI and MNF-I on meeting times and dates.  End comment.) 
Abizaid and MbZ agreed to have quarterly exchanges of 
information on this process, and on related intelligence 
matters.  But as he has told visitors before, MbZ said he 
would prefer that the Coalition forces kill, rather than 
capture, these fighters because he does not want them to 
return to the UAE where he believes they are likely to stir 
up trouble. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
14. (S) MbZ expressed a strong desire to &toughen8 his 
country,s special forces, 250 of whom are currently deployed 
to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.  The current contingent 
(the fourth deployed since October 2003) has been in 
Afghanistan for three months and has not seen any action, he 
said.  He asked Abizaid to consider allowing the UAE force 
closer to the Pak-Afghan border.  Meanwhile, 35 members from 
Bahrain,s Special Forces are training with UAE special 
forces in Hatta (eastern UAE), with a goal to deploy to 
Afghanistan in April, our interlocutors said. 
 
15. (S) In his meeting with Hamad Thani, Abizaid thanked him 
for the role UAE troops were playing in Afghanistan.  Hamad 
Thani said he sees a threefold purpose for the deployment. 
It deters extremism, demonstrates a commitment to a common 
cause, and provides a mechanism for UAE forces to gain 
battlefield experience against possible future enemies. 
 
Pakistan 
-------- 
 
16. (C) MbZ and Abizaid agreed that President Musharraf was 
well in control of the situation in Pakistan.  MbZ said that 
he had given Musharraf advice, but that he was seized with 
the fact that Baluchistan remained a &wild place.8  MbZ 
recalled that during his hunting trip to Pakistan 10 days 
ago, he had lost a falcon in Baluchistan.  When MbZ attempted 
to follow the bird,s path, his Pakistani security escorts 
reportedly refused to go further, so MbZ and his Emirati 
escorts went in alone to retrieve the falcon.  MbZ said the 
illicit drug trade contributes significantly to the 
province,s hostile reputation, which in turn poses a major 
challenge to Musharraf. 
 
Meeting with New Armed Forces Chief of Staff 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
17. (C) Following on the previous evening,s dinner 
conversation, Gen. Abizaid met separately with Lt. Gen. Hamad 
Thani, who succeeded MbZ as the UAE Armed Forces, Chief of 
Staff in November 2004.  MbZ told Abizaid that he had turned 
over &a number of issues8 to Hamad Thani, clearly 
indicating to Abizaid that military authority had changed 
hands.  The February 15 meeting between Abizaid and Hamad 
Thani was the first significant exchange between them.  Hamad 
Thani explained that his focus had been on getting his armed 
forces &trained and ready8 to fight transnational 
terrorism.  So far, he said, &we have seen no imminent 
threat,8 referring to the current UAE domestic situation. 
He went on to state that the UAE has put in a lot of effort 
to &guard8 the border )- both sea and land including 
dedicating five battalions to this effort.  He also talked 
about an air surveillance balloon being used along the 
UAE-Saudi border, and he described the construction of a 
fence along approximately 1,200 kilometers of the border. 
 
18. (C) Abizaid and Hamad Thani agreed to meet more 
frequently, and Abizaid proposed a concept of quarterly staff 
talks designed to improve awareness of regional security 
issues.  Hamad Thani said that, building on the Joint 
Military Commission,s success in January 2005, the UAE could 
host a joint counterterrorism planning meeting.  Abizaid said 
that was possible, but explained that his intent was to hold 
staff-level (J2, J3 and J5) talks with CENTCOM,s UAE 
counterparts to discuss routine operations.  Such talks would 
be in addition to J2 intelligence exchanges, the first of 
which is likely to occur March 14-16 (DOVE PINE).  Hamad 
Thani concurred with Abizaid,s idea. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
19. (C) We think it is significant that MbZ now believes that 
the greatest potential threat to the UAE could come not/not 
from long-time nemesis Iran, but from Saudi Arabia, should 
the KSA regime be overthrown by Islamic extremists.  MbZ,s 
views about UAE nationals captured in Iraq revealed his lack 
of tolerance for extremist elements in UAE society.  He has 
frequently told USG visitors that he would prefer that 
Coalition forces kill extremists rather than capture them and 
risk having them return to their respective countries where 
they could stir up more trouble.  Abizaid,s discussions with 
MbZ and Hamad Thani also made clear that the Emiratis are 
focusing increasingly on troop readiness in the UAE. 
 
20. (C) Comment continued: Lt. Gen. Hamad Thani was more at 
ease offering his own analysis of the region than we have 
ever seen him.  He seemed to have genuinely stepped into his 
role as the UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff ) in front of 
his boss.  His reasoning behind the UAE Special Forces, 
deployment in Afghanistan indicates he has the correct 
strategic picture of the region. 
SISON