US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK1280

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, S/CT; HQ USPACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, TH, Southern Thailand 
SUBJECT: THAILAND'S DEEP SOUTH -- VIOLENCE UPTICK AND 
HARDENING POSITIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Clarke.  Reason: 1.4 (d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary:  Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announced 
February 16 that the Royal Thai Government (RTG) will use a 
scheme of color coding to classify and zone villages in 
Thailand's three southernmost provinces.  Villages where 
incidents of violence remain high and the RTG believes it is 
getting low cooperation in suppressing Muslim insurgents will 
be labeled "red."  Villages thus zoned will lose access to 
provincial development and other government funding.  The 
Cabinet has also approved deployment (in 4-5 months) of 
12,000 additional troops to the South.  A powerful car bomb 
in Narathiwat province on February 17 killed 6 and wounded 
scores more, reportedly mostly Malaysian tourists.  This 
capped several weeks of continuing violence and escalating 
use of bombs, still limited to the deep South.  PM Thaksin 
appears bent on pursuing a southern policy that is heavily 
weighted towards tough security measures.  His critics insist 
that this approach will further alienate the Muslim 
communities and exacerbate the violence. End Summary. 
 
LATEST GOVERNMENT DEEP SOUTH POLICIES:  ZONING AND PUNISHING 
HOT VILLAGES, AND A NEW SECURITY FORCE 
 
2. (U) On February 16, PM Thaksin announced a new government 
program to classify villages in the Muslim majority 
population provinces of Yala, Pattani and Natathiwat in 
Thailand's deep South into red, yellow and green zones. The 
classifications will denote a government-assessed degree of 
violence and cooperation with the authorities, with "red" 
indicating a violence-plagued, low cooperation area, "green" 
no violence and supportive citizenry, and "yellow" something 
in-between.  Thaksin said that red zone villages will be cut 
off from government financing for provincial development and 
the Small, Medium, Large (SML) village enterprise program. 
Yellow zone villages will receive reduced benefits, and only 
villages in green zones will get full financing.  He 
justified the policy as preventing government funds from 
being used by separatists for bombs and guns with which to 
attack RTG soldiers and officials (although this connection 
has not been established). The Prime Minister unveiled this 
zoning scheme in Narathiwat, the province in which the 
highest number of red zone villages are located.  Reportedly, 
of 1570 villages in the three provinces, 358 are classified 
"red," including 204 in Narathiwat. 
 
3. (C)  Senator Chirmsak Pinthong, a former TV commentator, 
and a strong critic of PM Thaksin, told Polcouns February 18 
that the Thai National Security Council (NSC) devised the 
zoning scheme in November 2004 simply as a means of keeping 
track of southern hotspots.  However, he said, it was Thaksin 
himself, "in another example of his emotional, unadvised 
reactions," who decided to link punitive distribution of 
government funding to the zones.  Senator John Ungphakon, 
another frequent critic of Thaksin, said that the new program 
was certain to backfire and provoke more, not less violence. 
These negative reactions were typical of other opposition 
commentary.  The English-language newspaper "The Nation" ran 
a front page editorial February 18 which labeled the PM's "us 
or them" attitudes toward the South as "simplistic," and 
warned that the zone scheme was "collective punishment" which 
will only push already resentful and marginalized people into 
the arms of Islamic militants. 
 
4. (U)  Earlier in the week, on February 15, the Thaksin-led 
Cabinet approved deployment of a new 12,000 strong military 
unit, the 15th Infantry Division, to reinforce security 
forces in the South.  The RTG announced that the new unit, 
which will be in place in 4-5 months, is intended to protect 
local residents and suppress separatists. It will be staffed 
by civil affairs and psychological warfare specialists as 
well as combat troops. 
 
CONTINUING, AND ESCALATING, VIOLENCE IN THE DEEP SOUTH 
 
5. (SBU) On February 17, a powerful car bomb, probably 
detonated remotely by cell phone, exploded around 7 pm in 
front of a restaurant in Sungai Kolok, Narathiwat, near the 
border with Malaysia.  The blast killed four persons 
instantly (two more died later) and injured about 50 others. 
Several of the dead and many of the other casualties 
reportedly were Malaysian tourists.  There was damage to 
other restaurants and facilities in the tourist and 
entertainment area.  Thai newspapers are portraying the car 
bomb as the work of Muslim separatists and an immediate 
response to PM Thaksin's zoning scheme, but the evidence for 
that conclusion is not yet clear.  Thaksin himself, however, 
reportedly responded to the car bomb news with a declaration 
that he would not allow a single inch of Thailand to be 
separated "even if blood covers the land." 
 
6. (SBU)  The Sungai Kolok car bomb capped several weeks of 
escalating violence, marked almost every day by individual 
killings by ambush or bombs.  On February 10, Pracha Therat, 
Governor of Narathiwat, narrowly escaped being killed when a 
bomb exploded near where he and other senior provincial 
officials were watching a military parade.  This incident was 
only one of several recent bold acts of violence which 
indicate a growing technical and tactical skills of the 
perpetrators. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  For a few days after the huge February 6 
electoral victory of his Thai Rak Thai (TRT), Thaksin was 
making slightly conciliatory statements about how he intended 
to approach the violence in the South.  His swing through the 
deep South this week was partially to show he is paying 
attention to the needs of the region.  When Abhisit 
Vejjajiva, leader of opposition Democrat Party (DP) -- which 
swept the parliamentary races in the South -- publicly 
offered to work with the government to defuse tensions, 
Thaksin seemed to accept the proffered assistance.  With the 
election behind him, the opportunity seemed ripe for the 
Prime Minister to rethink the RTG's southern strategy. 
However, Thaksin has quickly reverted to form, continuing his 
characteristic bellicose rhetoric and stances, backed up with 
an even greater reliance on tough security measures. End 
Comment. 
 
 
BOYCE