US embassy cable - 05NICOSIA291

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CY, TU, PHUM, PINR, ECON 
SUBJECT: CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NORTH CYPRUS: 
LIVING WITH AN 800-POUND GORILLA 
 
REF: A. 03 NICOSIA 2373 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. 03 USDAO NICOSIA IIR 6823001804 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. NICOSIA 221 
     D. NICOSIA 223 
     E. 04 NICOSIA 1916 
 
Classified By: Ambassador M. Klosson, for reasons 1.4, b & d. 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  With roughly 25,000 troops in Cyprus and a 
history of interference in Turkish Cypriot politics, the 
Turkish military exercised considerable sway in many spheres 
of civilian life in the north.  The army has kept a low 
profile, however, since the 2003 elections that brought the 
pro-settlement "government" of Mehmet Ali Talat to power. 
But the Turkish army remains influential thanks to its 
prestige, direct control over local security forces, and role 
in the economy.  Military sensitivity about its core policy 
equities -- control of overall security and of the Green Line 
-- constrain the civilian leadership's room to maneuver.  As 
a result, the Talat administration is sometimes unable to 
move ahead with policy measures opposed by the army, even if 
these steps are in the interest of the Turkish Cypriot 
community.  Future settlement talks will undoubtedly require 
difficult concessions from the Turkish side beyond those 
foreseen in the Annan Plan, and may reveal some differences 
between Turkish Cypriots and Ankara.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Over the years, often with "President" Rauf Denktash's 
active encouragement, the Turkish army has played a prominent 
role in north Cyprus.  Since the 2003 elections that brought 
the pro-settlement CTP of Talat to power, the military has 
loosened its grip on local politics and allowed a more open 
dialogue over most questions of governance.  But in the words 
of one academic, the Turkish army remains a "800-pound 
gorilla" with which the locals must cohabitate. 
 
3. (C) The army's influence is due in no small part to the 
sheer size of the Turkish garrison here, which is especially 
large compared to the local population.  Turkey keeps all 
information that might reveal the exact number and 
composition of these forces under wraps; OSCE and CFE 
requirements do not oblige Turkey to report its troop 
strength on Cyprus.  But UNFICYP and USDAO estimate the force 
consists of two mechanized infantry divisions totaling 25,000 
men (plus roughly 3,000 dependent family members).  This 
means there is more than one Turkish solider for every ten 
civilians in north Cyprus. 
 
4. (C) The Turkish military's power is augmented by its 
control over all Turkish Cypriot security forces.  Under a 
"temporary emergency" provision of Turkish Cypriot "law," the 
Turkish Cypriot security forces are under the direct command 
of a 2-star Turkish general.  The 3000-5000-man Turkish 
Cypriot military is completely integrated into Turkey's 
"Peace Forces," and the civilian authorities have no 
operational control over these units.  The 2000-strong police 
force is also directly subordinate to the Turkish army under 
this arrangement. 
 
THE MOST RESPECTED INSTITUTION 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The average Turkish Cypriot has positive feelings 
toward the Turkish military.  According to pollster Muharrem 
Faiz, 88 percent of the people in north Cyprus say the army 
is the "most trusted" institution on the island -- a figure 
that dwarfs the consistently low popularity of politicians 
and "TRNC government" institutions.  These feelings are 
rooted in the Turkish Cypriot community's historical 
experience; they remind anyone who is willing to listen of 
the violent oppression they suffered at the hands of the 
Greek Cypriot majority prior to the 1974 "Peace Operation," 
and even left-wingers only grudgingly admit that the Turkish 
army's treatment of Greek Cypriots during the invasion may 
have been less than humane. 
 
6. (SBU) With such prestige, the military can essentially 
ignore criticism from the locals.  Turkish Cypriot merchants, 
for example, routinely complain about cut-rate competition 
from duty-free PX stores to no avail.  Neither have they 
managed to convince the army to procure more than a small 
amount of foodstuff on the local economy.  The army, which 
uses over ten percent of all electricity produced by the 
rickety "TRNC" power company, has often been lax in payment 
of its utility bills -- drawing only muted protests from 
Turkish Cypriot leaders. 
 
7. (C) Even pro-solution figures such a "PM" Talat, who 
privately concede that the presence of the Turkish army is an 
obstacle to any settlement agreement with the Greek Cypriots, 
are hesitant to criticize it in public.  With the exception 
of the outspoken Mustafa Akinci and his former BDH allies, 
Izzet Izcan and Huseyin Angolemli, no Turkish Cypriot 
politician is willing to call openly for the removal of 
Turkish troops -- partly for fear of antagonizing Ankara, and 
partly for fear of alienating voters. 
 
THROWING ITS WEIGHT AROUND 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The military's uncontested moral authority, to say 
nothing of its size and strength, has allowed it to exercise 
a powerful role in Turkish Cypriot politics since before 
Cyprus independence.  Throughout the 50s and 60s, the Turkish 
military supplied TMT paramilitary forces with weapons and 
support, and had corresponding influence on the selection of 
Turkish Cypriot leaders.  According to local lore Rauf 
Denktash, who shoved former Cyprus VP Fazil Kucuk aside in 
the late 1960s, became leader of the Turkish Cypriot 
community with the consent and encouragement of the TGS. 
From the invasion of 1974, through the declaration of the 
"TRNC" in 1983, to the most recent elections in 2003, 
political developments in north Cyprus have all taken place 
under the watchful eye of Turkish troops. 
 
9. (C) Turkish priorities during that 30-year period were to 
consolidate their control over north Cyprus, forcing the 
Greek Cypriots to accept the "TRNC" as a fait accomplis. 
After 1974, the army facilitated the resettlement of mainland 
Turks to Cyprus, doled out contracts to sympathetic local 
businessmen, pressured opposition politicians, and supported 
a long string of hard-line governments under Rauf Denktash. 
This support was not a one-way street; USDAO notes that 
Turkish force commanders regularly get promoted after their 
service in Cyprus.  It is believed that Denktash has used his 
deep state connections to reward Turkish generals who were 
helpful to him during their tours on the island. 
 
10. (C) As recently as the parliamentary elections of 2003, 
the Turkish army (refs A and B) openly intervened on behalf 
of the nationalist UBP of Dervis Eroglu and the DP of Serdar 
Denktash, Rauf's son.  Reports of vote buying, logistical 
support to the parties, and open campaigning by Turkish 
officers were credible and widespread.  One local 
businessman, who had a long-standing contract to supply sugar 
to the army, told us the military suddenly stopped buying 
from him when he started campaigning for a pro-settlement 
party in 2003.  Rumors persist that there is a military 
"blacklist" of companies whose bad politics prevent them from 
getting contracts from the army.  In 2003, the army also 
brought charges against several Kibris newspaper writers for 
"defaming and insulting the military" and began proceedings 
against them in a military court. 
 
11. (C) Yet after the emergence of the pro-solution 
administration of "PM" Talat in January 2004, the Turkish 
military toned down its role in politics.  The army broke 
ranks with Denktash and, perhaps going against the better 
judgment of many of its own officers, stayed out of the April 
2004 Annan Plan referendum, allowing an overwhelming "yes" 
vote.  It suspended its charges against the Kibris 
journalists, and allowed the "TRNC" to repeal the law which 
allowed military courts to try civilians for political 
offenses. 
 
12. (C) There have been very few reports of military 
interference in this month's parliamentary elections (refs C 
and D).  During his January visit to the island, Turkish Land 
Forces Commander Buyukanit made a careful point of meeting 
with leaders from both left and right.  A close advisor to 
the DP's Serdar Denktash told us that Buyukanit carried a 
clear message from the TGS, which he delivered privately to 
each party leader: the army would keep its nose out of local 
politics. 
 
13. (C) Speculation abounds as to why the army is keeping 
such a low profile.  One journalist suggested that TGS Chief 
Ozkok has succeeded in forcing a more "European" outlook on 
the military.  Other observers simply believe that the army 
has decided to go along (for now, at least) with the AKP 
government's goals of a Cyprus settlement and EU membership. 
In the absence of military intervention, a more open, 
pluralistic political atmosphere is developing in north 
Cyprus. 
 
THE LIMITS OF TURKISH CYPRIOT PEOPLE POWER: KEY ARMY EQUITIES 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
14. (C) But Turkish Cypriots know there are limitations to 
their newfound political liberty.  In a recent meeting with 
the Ambassador, Talat privately admitted that his room for 
maneuver was very limited.  He noted that although he was 
allowed autonomy in matters of "administration," at the end 
of the day the army could still "control everything." 
 
15. (C) The military has a clear hierarchy of interests.  As 
Talat alluded, the generals pay little attention to most 
day-to-day governance issues, including the budget, 
education, economic development and the like.  The military's 
paramount concern is to retain control over north Cyprus 
security, including final authority over security along the 
Buffer Zone and continued command over local security forces. 
 Cognizant of -- and frustrated by -- the military's red 
lines, Turkish Cypriot civilian leaders are often unable to 
advance policy initiatives they feel would be to the benefit 
of their community.  For example: 
 
-- Proposals to bring the police under civilian leadership, 
while privately supported by almost all political leaders 
including Talat and Serdar Denktash, are generally considered 
too "radical" to be advocated openly.  The BDH is the only 
one of the major parties to include an open call 
"civilianization" of the police in its party platform. 
 
-- Despite a Turkish Cypriot willingness to proceed with the 
opening of additional Green Line checkpoints for civilian 
crossings, military footdragging on demining and police 
staffing has caused delays and limited the civilian 
leadership's flexibility on when and where additional 
crossings can be opened. 
 
-- According to Talat and other observers, the Turkish army 
has been historically "timid" about its cooperation with the 
Committee for Missing Persons, a three-member body set up by 
the UN to investigate the fate of people missing since the 
violence of 1963-74.  Talat seems genuinely interested in 
advancing this "human rights issue," but can move no faster 
than the military is willing to go.  While he says the 
Turkish army has become more forthcoming about information 
relating to possible mass grave sites in the north, the CMP's 
work has yet to bear fruit; one suspected grave proved empty 
when excavated last month. 
 
16. (C) Another telling example relates to procedures 
regulating Green Line crossing by U.S. Embassy FSNs.  In a 
recent and highly arbitrary change of practice, the Turkish 
Cypriot police began requiring our Greek Cypriot staff to 
show extra forms of identification and fill out "visa" forms 
when crossing north on Embassy business.  Although Turkish 
Cypriot civilian authorities (up to and including Talat, "FM" 
Serdar Denktash, and the "Minister of the Interior") have 
promised to rectify the situation by issuing new orders 
governing police procedure, the officers at the checkpoint 
continue to harass our FSNs.  An "MFA" official privately 
intimated that although the civilian authorities can cajole 
the police, the cops would not change even their simplest 
procedures -- especially relating to the Green Line -- 
without explicit direction from the military.  Our 
communications with the Turkish Embassy on this matter have 
so far been unsuccessful. 
 
17. (C) What's more, top army brass occasionally lay down 
public markers with regard to the Cyprus question.  General 
Buyukanit's January public declaration that "not one Turkish 
soldier" would leave the island without a settlement has 
generally been interpreted by Talat's people as a 
good-cop-bad-cop message to the Greek Cypriots.  Nonetheless, 
statements such as this render it virtually impossible for 
any Turkish Cypriot civilian leader even to discuss 
confidence-building measures involving a drawdown of troops, 
the hand-over of Varosha, or other such steps that might be 
to their tactical advantage in the future. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
18. (C) In spite of its reflex suspicion of Talat's 
ex-communist CTP, the Turkish army has left his "government" 
largely alone.  It stood out of the way and allowed him to 
take power, did not block the community's firm endorsement of 
the Annan Plan, has not voiced opposition to the new law that 
could eventually lead to the deportation of illegal Turkish 
settlers (ref E), and seems willing to let the current 
elections unfold without interference.  Nonetheless, Turkish 
Cypriots know the army retains the ability to run the show 
should events unfold in a way contrary to the military's 
interest. 
 
19. (C) If settlement talks restart in earnest, it is almost 
certain the Turkish Cypriot side will need to make 
concessions beyond what was provided for in the Annan Plan. 
How much would the army allow to ensure Greek Cypriot 
acceptance of a future settlement plan?  Would the generals 
agree to withdraw all their troops from Cyprus or abandon the 
right of intervention?  Would they allow the deportation of 
significant numbers of Turkish settlers? 
 
20. (C) These questions will not be decided in Cyprus.  USDAO 
notes the army here strictly adheres to orders from the 
mainland; local commanders must get approval from Ankara to 
meet with even working-level counterparts, and are unlikely 
to show any initiative on their own.  Turkish Cypriots will 
continue to study how relations between AKP and the TGS 
evolve -- and will need firm signals from both that the 
military is on board before they offer further concessions 
for a settlement.  END COMMENT. 
KLOSSON