US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN287

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000287 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/SNEC, EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, GG, AJ, AM, RU 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN FM LAVROV: ARMENIA'S PLACE IS BY RUSSIA'S 
SIDE 
 
REF: A) TBILISI 420 B) MOSCOW 1753 
 
Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) Armenia and Russia are "old friends, reliable allies 
and strategic partners" declared Russian FM Sergey Lavrov on 
February 17.  The GOAM and Russia broke no new ground during 
the FM's high-profile visit to Yerevan February 16-17, but 
used the occasion to cement their existing strong 
relationship.  Heading the list were Russia's security 
concerns, including a hard push for Armenia to limit its 
engagement with NATO, a confirmation of Russian and Armenian 
military cooperation, and a request for GOAM support for 
Russia's positions on international organization reforms, 
especially in the CIS, OSCE and UN.  Armenia sought Russian 
commitments to improve regional economic and trade relations. 
 Lavrov underscored Russia's continued support for the OSCE 
Minsk Group process to seek resolution of the conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  End Summary. 
 
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ARMENIAN WELCOME A CONTRAST TO TBILISI 
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2. (C) According to Senior Advisor to the Foreign Minister 
Salpi Ghazarian (AmCit), Lavrov arrived in Yerevan still 
smarting from Tbilisi's decision to downgrade his visit from 
"official" to "working" (ref A).  Claiming that Lavrov's 
visit to Yerevan had originally been seen as the centerpiece 
of his Caucasus trip, Ghazarian noted that the necessity to 
add Baku to the trip and the Russian-Georgian tensions had 
detracted from what had been expected to be a visit 
essentially dedicated to highlighting close Armenian-Russian 
cooperation.  Underlining Lavrov's ties to Armenia (including 
a previous visit to Yerevan in 1993 and an ethnic Armenian 
father) and the close, friendly nature of the 
Armenian-Russian relationship, Lavrov joined Foreign Minister 
Oskanian at President Kocharian's favorite jazz club in 
Yerevan, Poplavok (where Kocharian frequently takes VIP 
visitors).  Lavrov's official schedule included a meeting 
with FM Oskanian, placing a wreath at the Genocide Memorial, 
an official lunch hosted by FM Oskanian including members of 
the National Assembly, a brief meeting with Prime Minister 
Markarian, an official meeting with President Kocharian, a 
joint presentation at the Russian-Armenian Slavonic 
University, and closed with a brief press conference at the 
MFA.  Lavrov departed Yerevan after spending fewer than 24 
hours on the ground. 
 
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PUSH-BACK ON NATO ISSUES 
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3. (C) According to Ghazarian, Lavrov pushed hard for Armenia 
to limit its cooperation with NATO and western military 
structures; Armenia needed to remember that its military 
relationship with Russia was central to its security.  FM 
Oskanian reportedly responded that Armenia's growing 
relationship with NATO does not endanger its close ties to 
Russia, and that Armenia cannot let its neighbors, Georgia 
and Azerbaijan, move toward closer engagement with NATO 
without doing the same.  Above all, Oskanian told Lavrov, 
Armenia cannot allow itself to be isolated and become a 
distant third in the race to integrate into western 
structures.  Lavrov was reportedly unsatisfied with this 
response, and pressed for assurances that Russian-Armenian 
basing agreements and military cooperation would continue 
unchanged.  According to both Ghazarian and Russian Embassy 
officials, FM Oskanian and President Kocharian gave him those 
assurances. 
 
4. (C) Lavrov's visit was also designed to lay the groundwork 
for President Putin's upcoming March 7 visit to Yerevan, and 
Ghazarian noted that the GOAM expects that Putin will push 
harder for Armenia to get in line more clearly behind Russia. 
 
 
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CIS, OSCE, UN REFORM 
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5. (C) In his meetings with Kocharian and Oskanian, Lavrov 
reportedly asked for Armenia's support for Russia's proposed 
reforms of the CIS and the OSCE.  According to Ghazarian, the 
changes to CIS structures would give Russia more influence in 
the internal affairs of other CIS countries.  She claimed 
both Oskanian and Kocharian listened politely, but did not 
agree to support changes that would limit Armenia's de facto 
sovereignty.  On OSCE reforms, however, the GOAM agrees with 
Russia that changes are necessary to limit OSCE's ability to 
"interfere" in the internal affairs of member nations, and 
would like to see the OSCE take a more active role in 
economic development issues and a much smaller one in human 
rights issues and electoral monitoring.  According to 
Ghazarian, Lavrov secured the GOAM's commitment to continue 
to support Russia's positions in the OSCE.  Lavrov also told 
Oskanian that Russia supports UN reform, including expanding 
the security council, but only if a consensus can be reached 
about precisely how that should be done -- a consensus that 
Lavrov told Oskanian he did not expect would come about. 
 
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CONTINUING RUSSIAN SUPPORT ON N-K 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) In private meetings and in press statements, Lavrov 
made clear Russia's continued support for the OSCE Minsk 
Group process in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
pledged continued Russian support to block any attempt by 
Azerbaijan to move potential conflict settlement into any 
other arena, such as the UN.  According to Ghazarian, there 
were no substantive new issues discussed on N-K during 
Lavrov's visit.  Oskanian, in a press conference at the close 
of the visit, joked that Lavrov probably knew more about the 
Karabakh peace process than he did, and underlined Moscow's 
key role as an international mediator. 
 
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TRANSPORTATION, TRADE, ECONOMY 
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7. (C) During meetings with both Prime Minister Andranik 
Markarian and President Kocharian, GOAM officials raised 
transportation issues central to land-locked Armenia. 
Markarian expressed concern that a proposed railway link 
between Russia and Iran would bypass Armenia and run through 
Azerbaijan instead, increasing Armenia's isolation.  The 
press reported that Lavrov assured Markarian that Russia 
would "take Armenia's interests into account" and not take 
any steps that would damage them.  Russian Embassy Political 
Counselor Oleg Korobkov, however, stressed to us privately 
that Lavrov "made no promises."  Lavrov said that the GOR 
continues to push to get the Kavkaz (Krasnodar Kray) - Poti 
rail ferry link on track, and commented briefly on the GOR's 
intention to consider opening the rail lines through 
Abkhazia, noting that Russia's interests in the region hinged 
on Armenia's continued access to Russian transportation 
links. 
 
8. (C) PM Markarian raised the issue of five factories in 
Armenia which had been transferred to Russian ownership as 
part of a debt-for-equity swap.  Markarian complained that 
the factories remain idle; part of the deal was that the new 
owners were to get them working.  Again, Lavrov made no 
promises, but agreed to raise the matter with the appropriate 
authorities. 
 
9. (C) Lavrov told the press that Russia hailed Armenia's 
development of economic relations with the Arab world and in 
particular welcomed the deal to build a natural gas pipeline 
from Iran to Armenia.  Lavrov said that the "corresponding 
Russian structures" might participate in the project and 
hoped for a "definite reply" in the near future. 
 
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COMMENT: RUSSIA NOT IN DANGER OF LOSING ARMENIA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
10. (C) The central message of Lavrov's brief visit to 
Armenia was clear:  Russia counts on Armenia to be its ally 
in the Caucasus.  Armenia recognizes its reliance -- even 
dependence -- on Russia's continued support on security and 
trade issues and will remain a loyal supporter of Russian 
policies where it counts.  Russia can rely on continued 
Armenian support for its military presence and for the 
majority of its positions in international fora such as the 
OSCE.  Armenia can count on Russia for its role as mediator 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Complementarity remains 
the watchword of Armenian foreign policy, but when push comes 
to shove, Russia remains Armenia's key ally. 
GODFREY