US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI685

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, JA, CH, TW 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN TAKES LOW-KEY RESPONSE OVER 
DIAOYUTAI/SENKAKU DISPUTE 
 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Chen administration is trying to reduce 
local reaction over the February 9 Japanese government 
decision to take direct control of a lighthouse on the 
disputed island of Diaoyutai/Senkaku.  Taipei gently chided 
Japan for its move in public, reminding Tokyo of the 
"Republic of China's" claim to the islands.  Privately, 
Taipei also urged that Japan not exacerbate the incident by 
sending more personnel to the area.  Chen administration 
officials see the issue primarily as a PRC-Japanese dispute 
that Taiwan should avoid getting in the middle of.  There is 
also concern that tensions between Beijing and Tokyo over the 
islands could spill over into the domestic political arena in 
Taiwan.  End Summary. 
 
New Year Surprise 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) Chen administration officials tell AIT they were 
surprised by the February 9 decision by the Japanese 
government to take possession of a lighthouse built by a 
Japanese rightist organization in 1986.  The Taiwan Foreign 
Ministry issued a mild public protest over the move on 
February 10.  However, the MOFA Spokesman who delivered the 
statement also told reporters that the GOJ's action had a 
positive side, since it opened the door to government-level 
consultations on the territorial dispute.  National Security 
Council (NSC) Senior Advisor for Asian Affairs Lin Cheng-wei 
also tried to put the episode in a positive light.  Lin 
asserted that, from the Chen administration's perspective, 
the main substantive interest for Taiwan is to protect 
fishing rights in the area.  Since the Japanese government 
assured Taipei through private channels that its February 9 
move will not affect Taiwan's current access to the area's 
fishing grounds or future right to explore for natural 
resources, Lin said Taiwan did not feel directly threatened 
by the move. 
 
3. (C) Nevertheless, Lin told AIT that Taipei did convey 
concern to Tokyo over the timing of the move and warned the 
GOJ against taking further actions, such as dispatching 
military personnel to the island.  Lin said that Japanese 
officials claimed that the decision to take possession of the 
island was intended to reduce chances for a clash between 
Japanese and Chinese nationalist groups.  While Taipei 
accepted this explanation, it did express displeasure that 
the Diaoyutai action came the same week as Tokyo Governor 
Ishihara Shintaro revealed plans to build a power generator 
on the disputed Okinotori island.  While the two moves were 
likely coincidental, Lin said, the Taiwan and Chinese media 
lumped them together to suggest that Tokyo was making a 
coordinated push to expand its claims in the area. 
 
Taiwan's Dilemma 
---------------- 
 
4. (C) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration 
officials say that Taiwan finds itself in a bind over the 
Diaoyutai dispute.  On the one hand, they claim that Taiwan 
needs to maintain its formal claims on the area in order to 
minimize criticism from the opposition in the Legislative 
Yuan (LY).  DPP International Affairs Department Deputy 
Director Hsieh Huai-huei told AIT that the Diaoyutai issue is 
linked closely to ethnic politics in Taiwan.  "Older DPP 
supporters and followers of Lee Teng-hui feel strongly that 
the islands are Japanese and they do not want the government 
to help China over the dispute," she commented.  Hsieh added, 
however, that many leading ethnic Mainlander politicians, 
including Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, got their start in 
politics as activists on Diaoyutai and are likely to strongly 
attack the government if it failed to stand up over the issue. 
 
5. (C) At the same time, the NSC's Lin said that the Chen 
administration also wants to avoid being seen as siding with 
Beijing against Tokyo.  Lin noted that Taiwan's stock is on 
the rise within the same political and bureaucratic circles 
in Tokyo that are most exercised about issues like 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku.  Thus, Lin said Taipei needed to be 
particularly careful not to offend them on the issue. 
National Taiwan University (NTU) Professor Philip Yang 
assessed that Taipei will likely try to leverage its low-key 
response to gain future concessions from Tokyo.  However, 
Japan Interchange Association Economic Section Chief Sugita 
Masahiko told AIT that Tokyo fully expected Taiwan's 
restrained response and would not feel obliged to give 
anything in return. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
6. (C) The NSC's Lin said that the Foreign Minister will 
likely be called upon to restate Taiwan's position when the 
LY reconvenes on February 25, but stated that no other 
actions are under consideration.  The Interchange 
Association's Sugita told AIT that Tokyo does not plan any 
immediate steps, but noted that his office received 
information that Taiwan pro-unification activists may join 
like-minded groups from the PRC and Hong Kong in an attempt 
to land on Diaoyutai in May.  Sugita said that if these 
reports were confirmed, the Japanese Coast Guard might send 
additional personnel to the island to prevent a landing. 
 
Comment: A Peripheral Issue 
--------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The Diaoyutai dispute is clearly no longer the 
hot-button political issue it once was in Taiwan.  While 
extremists on both ends of the domestic spectrum may get 
animated over the conflicting claims, the government in 
Taipei views the issue as a problem for Beijing and Tokyo to 
work out.  Taipei's relative silence is certain to be 
appreciated by Tokyo, but it is unlikely to win Taiwan any 
new points with the Japanese government.  There might be a 
greater risk if Taiwan were to raise the ire of Chinese 
nationalists by tilting too far towards Japan on the issue. 
Thus far, fear of inviting opposition censure has driven 
Taiwan towards a cautious central course on the issue.  As 
long as frictions do not develop further between Tokyo and 
Beijing, Taipei is likely to continue on its low-key course. 
PAAL