US embassy cable - 05RANGOON224

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, BM, ASSK, NLD, Ethnics 
SUBJECT: BURMA: A TOUGH WEEK AND A MISERABLE YEAR FOR THE 
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 201 
     B. RANGOON 196 
     C. RANGOON 185 
     D. 04 RANGOON 1647 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  It's been a long week for the democratic 
opposition: Burma's most influential pro-democracy ethnic 
leader is behind bars; the regime put NLD leader U Tin Oo on 
notice that he, like Aung San Suu Kyi, will likely spend a 
third consecutive year in detention; the NLD, possibly to 
forestall a further regime crackdown, expelled 18 of its key 
members; and the regime reconvened its sham National 
Convention, completely ignoring the NLD and snuffing a 
potential boycott by the ethnic cease-fire groups.  It's also 
been a long year: the regime has banned the UNSYG's special 
envoy for nearly 12 months and the last visit of the UN's 
human rights envoy is a distant memory; Burma's neighbors 
increasingly favor a pro-engagement approach (a tremendous 
boost to the regime generals); and the SPDC's campaign of 
harassment, intimidation, and arrest perpetuates a climate of 
fear, rendering the democracy movement disunited and 
dispirited.  Local anticipation that Burma's 2006 ascension 
to the ASEAN chair will be an opportunity for change, or that 
the regime itself will implode, are the only sources of a 
steadily waning light of hope at the end of the opposition's 
long tunnel to democracy.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Nearly two years have passed since GOB-sponsored 
thugs attacked Aung San Suu Kyi's (ASSK) convoy of National 
League for Democracy (NLD) party members and supporters in 
northern Burma.  That dramatic event in May 2003 was a 
watershed for the pro-democracy movement, which was 
subsequently forced further underground and increasingly 
marginalized by a Burmese military regime that has lowered 
the tolerance bar for dissent to an all-time low. 
 
3. (C) The continued detention of its primary 
leadership--namely ASSK, U Tin Oo, and now Hkun Htun Oo--has 
rendered the democracy movement hopelessly disunited and 
dispirited.  Continued harassment, intimidation, and arrests 
of political party members and supporters perpetuates a 
climate of fear--making dissent palatable only for those 
willing to risk losing their paltry incomes, their property, 
their families, or even their own lives.  Since March 2004 
the regime has banned a visit by the UN Secretary General's 
Special Envoy (Razali), perceived by the opposition as 
ineffective but nonetheless an important link to the outside 
world.  The last visit (November 2003) granted to the UN's 
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights (Pinheiro), who 
championed the cause of Burmese political dissidents, is a 
distant memory. 
 
4. (SBU) Furthermore, the pro-engagement posture of China, 
India, and ASEAN continue to boost the regime's perceived 
legitimacy and deny democracy activists their hopes for 
regional solidarity.  The SPDC generals appear more confident 
than ever that the democratic opposition is the least of 
their worries, choosing to ignore the NLD altogether and 
instead focus efforts on bringing the country's restive 
ethnic groups under full central authority, building bridges 
and dams, and perpetuating military rule. 
 
5. (C) It's been a very tough year, but February 18 brings to 
a close a particularly depressing week for Burma's 
beleaguered democracy movement.  Among the low points: 
 
--On February 9, authorities arrested Hkun Htun Oo, the 
country's most influential pro-democracy ethnic leader, and 
several other members of his Shan Nationalities League for 
Democracy party (ref C); and arrests of other ethnic leaders 
are also in the works (authorities detained U Ohn Tin, leader 
of the Arakan League for Democracy, on February 18). 
Security agents this week raided Hkun Htun Oo's home and 
office, shut down his private courier business, detained and 
interrogated members of his family and his employees, 
transferred him to prison, and apparently charged him as a 
"subversive threat" under Section 10(a) of a 1975 law 
"Safeguarding the State from the Danger of Subversive 
Elements."  Rarely have detainees charged under this 
provision served less than twelve months in prison; most 
languish behind bars for years. 
--On the night of February 13, a half dozen GOB authorities 
visited the home of NLD Vice Chairman U Tin Oo, where he has 
been detained under house arrest since an eight-month prison 
stint following the May 2003 convoy attack.  According to 
sources, the authorities read U Tin Oo an official decree, 
reportedly signed by the Minister for Home Affairs, 
prolonging his detention for another year under Section 10(b) 
of the "Subversive Elements" law.  The regime similarly 
extended ASSK's house arrest in December 2004 for another 
year (ref D). 
 
--On February 7, authorities arrested officials of the Shan 
State Peace Council (SSPC), the political wing of two Shan 
State cease-fire groups (ref A).  Pro-democracy activists 
were initially heartened when the two groups, the Shan State 
Army North (SSA-N) and the Shan State National Army (SSNA), 
threatened to boycott the National Convention (NC) and 
perhaps lead other CFGs to follow suit.  However, on February 
15, SPDC representatives pressed four SSNA delegates to 
relocate to the Convention site north of Rangoon, where they 
will remain essentially "captive" for the duration of the 
session.  The SSA-N delegation, on the other hand, has to 
date still refused to attend the NC, but in order to avoid 
the wrath of the generals, submitted an official "leave 
request" which allows the regime to identify the organization 
as registered ("99.44 percent Convention attendance of all 
delegates," trumpeted the official media on opening day, 
February 17).  A dramatic boycott of the NC by the cease-fire 
groups, therefore, appears to be a bust. 
 
--On February 16 and 17, the Central Executive Committee of 
the NLD circulated internal decision memos dismissing a total 
of 18 members from the party, including four Members-elect of 
Parliament.  Although there are rumors the NLD leadership is 
unhappy with internal dissent, the move appears to be 
connected to the party's efforts to distance itself from an 
exile-led, underground movement to announce the formation of 
a parallel government inside Burma (ref B).  Some of the 
dismissed NLD members had previously called upon party 
leaders to declare a parallel government, though it is 
uncertain whether they had any contact with "unlawful (exile) 
organizations."  In any case, the NLD has in the past taken 
such draconian steps as a measure to protect party members 
from near-certain arrest or to deter the SPDC from banning 
the party outright (indeed, the NLD was forced to "expel" 
ASSK and U Tin Oo from the party while they were in detention 
during the 1990 election period).  Nonetheless, the NLD 
ouster of 18 key members, including nine party youth greatly 
needed to replenish aging leaders, was another blow to the 
morale of the party's rank and file. 
 
--On February 17, the SPDC reconvened the National 
Convention, on hiatus since July 2004.  The overwhelming 
majority of Burmese recognizes the NC for what it is: a 
concocted sham to rubber stamp a pre-determined constitution 
that enshrines a perpetual, preeminent governance role for 
the Burmese armed forces.  Nonetheless, it is the only 
political show in town and, in the process of plowing ahead 
on its "road map to a disciplined democracy," the SPDC has 
completely disregarded the democratic opposition.  Unlike the 
weeks preceding the May 2004 reconvening of the NC, this time 
around the regime did not even bother to extend token 
invitations to selected pro-democracy party members, initiate 
insincere back-channel negotiations, or criticize the NLD's 
stance.  Although many local observers believe the NLD, and 
the ethnic democrats, are just and righteous in their refusal 
to partake in the charade, the reality is that they will be 
on the distant sidelines in the coming weeks and months as NC 
delegates dither and pontificate over a new, albeit 
pre-packaged, constitution. 
 
Comment:  Which Way to the Elysian Fields? 
 
6. (C) Is there a light at the end of the opposition's long 
tunnel to democracy?  If there is, it has dimmed considerably 
over the past year, and events this past week have seemingly 
pushed the democracy movement's modest objectives for genuine 
political dialogue even further out of reach.  The detention 
of opposition leaders is perhaps the most harmful to the 
movement, leaving the reins of pro-democracy efforts in the 
hands of an aging leadership in fragile health (the NLD) or 
often less capable politicians (the ethnics).  The only 
short-term hope for an improvement in the situation appears 
to be local anticipation that Burma's ascension to the ASEAN 
chair in 2006 will force the region to address seriously the 
embarrassing behavior of the SPDC.  The only medium- to 
long-term hope we hear from democracy activists is that the 
regime itself will implode.  The current generals, however, 
have doggedly held on to "temporary" power for 17 years.  It 
will take more than hope to pry their fingers loose.  End 
Comment. 
Martinez