US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1274

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 001274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, ELAB, PHUM, PINR, IN, NP, Counter-Terrorism, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: NAXALITES AND SYMPATHIZERS ENCOURAGED BY NEPAL 
EVENTS - HAVE BIG PLANS FOR INDIA 
 
REF: A. 04 CHENNAI 1395 
     B. CHENNAI 120 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., Reason 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In a reflection of India's mounting concern 
about internal disorder, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee 
recently described India's Naxalite insurgency as "the 
gravest threat to our internal security."  This worry is also 
reflected in the stern GOI reaction to the coup in Nepal, 
with the GOI attributing the September 2004 merger of a once 
disparate Naxalite movement into the Communist Party of India 
(Maoist) in part to Maoist gains in recent years in Nepal. 
Named after the West Bengal village of Naxalbari, where 
peasants revolted in May 1967, Naxalite strategy is to create 
a "revolutionary corridor" from Nepal southward and extending 
across eight states, followed by a "Compact Revolutionary 
Zone (CRZ)" that they can control and administer, and 
finally, a Maoist state in this area.  While Naxalite 
violence has spread into 15 states in Central and Eastern 
India, the level of violence has not increased dramatically, 
with the GOI reporting roughly the same number of deaths 
(500) in 2004 as in 2003.  Naxalites have taken root in 
regions ruled by a nexus of organized criminals and corrupt 
politicians, where governance is poor and poverty and 
injustice endemic.  Indian experts note that Naxalism tends 
to find favor among peasants in agricultural areas suffering 
from "extreme distress," which suggests that the movement's 
potential to spread may be limited.  The GOI sees increased 
development assistance and law enforcement action as the keys 
to a solution, but cannot succeed until the police and local 
politicians radically change their approach to governance. 
In addition, the GOI has only recently focused on Naxalism, 
as the previous National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government 
made "Islamic terrorism" its top priority.  The mainstream 
Communists would like to absorb the Naxalites, whose leaders 
have thus far rejected this possibility on the grounds that 
Congress long ago coopted the Communists into supporting 
economic reform.  Naxalites have attacked at least one 
affiliate of a US corporation (Coca Cola), but not American 
citizens.  End Summary. 
 
What is a Naxalite? 
------------------- 
 
2.  (U) The Naxalites view themselves as a historical 
movement with a long-term vision, and both short-term and 
strategic goals.  For the present, they are bent on securing 
a base in India's remote areas, but hope to carry out a 
revolution in all of India that will result in the 
establishment of a "People's Republic."  The Naxalite 
movement was an attempt by young Indian Communists in the 
late 1960's to renew the Communist movement, which they 
charged was being coopted into mainstream politics.  Its name 
comes from a peasant movement which started in the village of 
Naxalbari in the Darjeeling District of West Bengal in May 
1967, and formally began in 1969 when activists formed the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). 
 
3.  (U) The CPI(ML) concluded that a traditional Marxist 
revolution based on an urban proletariat could not take place 
in India, as it is largely a agrarian, pre-Industrial 
society.  The party's ideology instead sought to create a 
peasant movement focusing on land reform and agricultural 
issues, and its largely urban proponents fanned out to remote 
areas of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh to organize.  The CPI(ML) 
quickly fragmented into factions, as leaders developed 
ideological differences and broke away to form their own 
groups, some of which turned to violent insurgency.  Once 
fighters reach the age of 45, they are urged to surrender, 
gain amnesty and work above ground to support the younger 
fighters. 
 
4.  (U) GOI and Indian press accounts assert that Naxalite 
influence has increased dramatically in the past year, with 
Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee recently describing the 
Naxalite insurgency as "the gravest threat to India's 
internal security."  A GOI intelligence report leaked to the 
press in January claimed that as of September 2004, Naxalites 
were active in 156 districts in 13 states, and by February 
2005 this had reportedly expanded to 170 districts in 15 
states, although evidence is difficult to verify.  There are 
purportedly 35 active Naxalite groups in India, although only 
12 engage in political violence.  The GOI estimated that 
approximately 6,000 persons have been killed in the Naxalite 
insurgency in the past 10 years.  With a well-established 
support base in some areas, the Naxalites have in some 
instances negotiated unofficial cease-fires with political 
parties, which allow them to operate freely without fear of 
police intervention. 
 
Military Capabilities 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Although they can gather up to company strength (150 
cadres) to conduct attacks, the Naxalites usually operate at 
the squad level (15 cadres).  Their combat with Indian 
security forces has been restricted to classic small infantry 
encounters, relying primarily on concentration of superior 
forces, attacking at a time and place of their choosing, and 
use of surprise and ambushes, to overcome the military 
superiority of the enemy.  GOI and Indian think tank reports 
verify that Indian Naxalites do not receive weapons from 
abroad.  They have determined that while the Naxalites have 
armorers that manufacture and repair weapons, their principal 
source remains the Indian security forces and the local arms 
market At present they rely on infantry weapons, including 
some automatic weapons, but have begun to construct crude 
indirect fire weapons (mortars), which are inaccurate and of 
little military value. 
 
6.  (C) The biggest upgrade in Naxalite military capabilities 
has been the integration of Claymore mines into their 
attacks.  The most spectacular use of Claymores was on 
October 1, 2003, when Naxalites attempted to assassinate AP 
Chief Minister Chandrababa Naidu with a simultaneous 
detonation of up to nine mines.  Since the Naidu attack, 
Naxalites have used Claymores several times to kill up to 
eight policemen at a time by detonating the mines under their 
vehicles as they travel along rural roads.  Indian analysts 
have hypthosized that the Naxalites are acquiring the mines 
and training in their use from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), but have not presented verifiable proof to back 
up this assertion.  Naxalite groups have repeatedly oppose 
the presence of American multinationals in India and have 
targeted their facilities for attack, most notably an attack 
on a Coca Cola bottling plant.  However, they have not 
threatened American citizens or conducted attacks against 
them. 
 
Nepal as Inspiration 
-------------------- 
 
7.  (U) The "Peoples' War success" of the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) inspired India's Naxalites to restructure 
their organizations on the Nepalese pattern.  The main tenets 
of the CPN (Maoist) ideology and its relationship to India 
were outlined in an extensive interview conducted by American 
Communist journalist Li Onesto with Prachanda, the CPN 
(Maoist) General Secretary on February 20, 2000.  (The full 
text of the interview is found at www.lionesto.net). 
 
8.  (U) Prachanda pointed out that his party has cooperated 
with the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) and People's War (PW) 
since before the declaration of the Nepalese "people's war" 
in 1996, and that "the Nepalese revolution is part of the 
world revolution."  Despite this cooperation, Prachanda 
derided his Indian comrades as "adventurists with no vision." 
 He insisted that Indian Naxalites have fruitlessly spent 25 
years attempting to establish a "guerrilla zone," without 
realizing that this is only "transitional."  He urged Indian 
Naxalites "to seize, to capture, base areas," and govern 
them, as his party has done in Nepal, noting that this is not 
possible without "strong mass support."  While this interview 
is now some five years old, it is still viewed here as among 
the most reliable windows into the views of Nepal's Maoist 
leaders. 
 
War Against India 
----------------- 
 
9.  (U) Prachanda insisted that as his movement becomes 
successful in Nepal, India will commit its armed forces to 
counter-insurgency there, saying "that when the Indian Army 
comes in with thousands and thousands of soldiers, it will be 
a very big thing.  But we are not afraid of the Indian Army, 
because, in one way, it will be a very good thing.  They will 
give us lots of guns.  And lots of people will fight them. 
This will be a national war."  As part of its strategy of 
preparing for war against India, the CPN (Maoist) has been 
working with the Naxalites to build a strong Indian support 
base to tie down Indian security forces and hinder the Indian 
Army from successfully prosecuting war in Nepal.  He 
predicted that after the Indian Army is defeated, the CPN 
(Maoist) will declare a Peoples Republic of Nepal. 
 
The Indian Revolutionary Corridor 
--------------------------------- 
 
10.  (U) The CPN (Maoist) was the principal agent in the 
creation of a Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and 
Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) in 2001.  The 
Committee includes the CPN (Maoist), the CPI (Maoist) and the 
Communist Party of India - Marxist Leninist - Janashakti 
group, as well as three Bangladeshi Maoist parties and one 
from Sri Lanka (Ref B).  The Janashakti ("people's power") 
Group claims that it no longer participates in peoples war 
and has run candidates for elective office.  In September 
2004, with the reported support of CCOMPOSA and Nepalese 
Maoists, the MCC and PW united to form the Communist Party of 
India (Maoist), which is modeled after the CPN (Maoist) and 
has adopted an almost identical ideology and strategy.  The 
CPI (Maoist) has since expanded its activities to new areas 
of India in the hope of creating a "revolutionary corridor" 
extending from Nepal across eight Indian states, including 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and 
Madhya Pradesh, Uttaranchal and Karnataka.  This region is 
called the "compact revolutionary zone (CRZ)" in Maoist 
jargon.  In some areas of these states Naxalites have 
established parallel administrations which extract 
"revolutionary taxes," run schools, and administer justice. 
 
The Bihar Stronghold 
-------------------- 
 
11.  (C) The CPI (Maoist) is strongest in Bihar, where it is 
active in 30 of the state's 40 districts.  The Indian Home 
Minister told Parliament on December 14, 2004 that Maoists 
had killed 513 people across India in 2004.  Of these, 155 
were killed in Bihar.  Although press reports indicate that 
Naxalites are active in 16-18 of neighboring Jharkhand's 22 
districts, Consulate Calcutta sources claim that Naxalites 
are active at some level in the entire state.  Dr. Ajai Sahni 
of the Institute of Conflict Management (ICM) provided a 
number of reasons why Naxalism has found a home in Bihar. 
The state is dominated by an unusually rigid caste system in 
which the upper castes oppress and exploit the Dalits and 
tribals and violently resist social change.  To maintain 
their stranglehold on power, Bihar's upper castes fund an 
army of criminals (the Ranvir Sena) armed with over 16,000 
weapons, including automatic rifles and grenade launchers. 
The Ranvir Sena has carried out several massacres of Dalits 
in the state and is patronized by all the political parties 
except the Left.  Sahni argued that this has resulted in 
"extreme distress" of the state's tribals and dalits, who 
turn to the Naxalites for protection and justice. 
 
Life in Bihar 
------------- 
 
12.  (C) A journalist who recently returned from an extended 
stay in Bihar described to Poloff how the Naxalites function 
in the state.  He maintained that they have a virtual "shadow 
government" in parts of Bihar, and collect taxes from 
virtually every business (sic) in the countryside and erect 
barriers at night to collect tolls from truckers.  One 
businessman in Jharkhand described how he routinely added 
extra amounts to his contract bids to pay off the Naxalites, 
who would not otherwise allow his projects to proceed.  The 
journalist claimed that most people in Bihar, including the 
Naxalites, no longer view the insurgency as an ideological 
struggle, but rather as a way of life, and that some Naxalite 
leaders are making a good living from it.  The reporter 
claimed that the Bihar Naxalites do not provide a better way 
of life or infrastructure to the state, but bring a measure 
of justice to the poorer classes and castes, in that the high 
castes no longer interfere in the lives of the low castes in 
areas where Naxalites are active. 
 
13.  (C) Another journalist told Poloff that the Bihar police 
have long stopped trying to battle the Naxalites, preferring 
to make their own separate arrangements with their leaders. 
Under the agreements the two sides agree not to fire on one 
another.  The police then fire off their ammunition in the 
jungle once every month and claim it was used in "encounters" 
with the Naxalites.  The journalist asserted that police are 
killed by the Naxalites only when they have not yet realized 
the arrangement, and insist on conducting anti-Naxalite 
patrols.  Those officers who survive quickly "get smart" and 
adjust to the system, he maintained. 
 
Bihari Police Assessment 
------------------------ 
 
14.  (C) In a February 10 meeting in Patna, Director General 
of Police (DGP) M.R. Sinha (protect) told Poloff that "key 
Maoists" from Nepal and Bihar are working together. 
Commenting that interrogations of "hundreds of Naxalites" 
during the past few years demonstrated increased 
Naxalite/Maoist activity along the border with Nepal, Sinha 
credited increasing cross-border cooperation to the growing 
strength of Nepali Maoists, and their desire to create a 
"grand liberation zone" (sic) stretching from the Indian 
Ocean to the Himalayas.  The Nepalese Maoists believe they 
must work with their Naxalite counterparts in India to 
realize their dream, he stated. 
 
15.  (C) Sinha affirmed that while Sitamarhi, Darbhangha, 
Bettiah and Bagaha are the four Bihari districts with the 
most Naxalite activity, 30 of the state's 40 districts have 
some Naxalite presence.  According to Sinha, the police are 
well-aware that the Naxalite problem on the Nepal border has 
grown worse over the last four years, but have only been able 
to launch a few operations against them.  He commented that 
he had "been there and walked the border many times" and the 
terrain favors the Maoists, especially because the police 
forces are undermanned.  Complaining that a 2001 proposal to 
triple the number of police in the region was never 
implemented, Sinha confirmed that there are currently only 
enough officers to post one man about ever kilometer along 
the border, and this is not nearly enough to inhibit 
Maoist/Naxalite movement.  He asserted that very few Maoists 
and Naxalites he had interrogated knew or cared about the 
movement's politics and ideology, and were only involved to 
earn money.  This makes it easy to recruit informants, he 
maintained, since the police can easily double a Maoist 
fighter's daily wage of about 50 rupees (about usd 1.25). 
 
The Impact of Elections 
----------------------- 
 
16.  (U) State elections are currently taking place in Bihar 
and Jharkhand.  According to the GOI, the CPI (Maoist) 
launched a series of attacks on police after calling on 
voters in both states to boycott these elections.  While 
Naxalite/police violence has caused casualties on both sides, 
the CPI (Maoist) has denied the boycott call, saying that the 
Indian security forces are using the election as an excuse to 
intimidate the Maoists.  One Maoist leader argued that the 
CPI (Maoist) could easily have enforced a total boycott, but 
are too busy "sorting out organizational issues following the 
merger of PW and MCC" to bother with the election. 
 
Nepal-India Nexus 
----------------- 
 
17.  (U) The GOI also attributes the recent upsurge in 
Naxalite activity to infiltration from Nepal, saying that 
King Gyanendra's February 1 crackdown could lead CPN (Maoist) 
leaders flee to India and join forces with the Naxalites. 
Local media have reported that Nepalese Maoist leaders are 
already in India, including Baburam Bhattarai, considered to 
be number two in the CPN (Maoist) hierarchy after Prachanda, 
and the movement's ideological/intellectual leader.  Despite 
these assertions, there is no evidence that Nepali Maoists 
have joined the fighting in India.  According to Prakash 
Singh, a former Director General of the Border Security Force 
(BSF), "Nepalese Maoists come here, get arms and ammunition 
from their counterparts and return to their original bases in 
Nepal." 
 
18.  (C) Bihar DGP B.R. Sinha argued to Poloff that a Royal 
Nepalese Army (RNA) crackdown on the Maoists would only make 
the situation in Bihar worse if rebels seek shelter in India. 
 He dismissed this as "unlikely," however, as the RNA was not 
strong enough to combat the Maoists, and would spend most of 
its resources attempting to secure the Kathmandu Valley.  He 
commented that, if pressed by the RNA, Maoists would more 
likely retreat further into the Nepalese jungle, which they 
already control. 
 
South Also Simmering 
-------------------- 
 
19.  (U) Naxalite violence also continues unabated in South 
India, which has been wracked by tit-for-tat killings, as 
Naxalites ambush the police, who then kill Naxalites in 
"encounters."  Andhra Pradesh (AP) is the only state which 
has negotiated a "cease fire" with the Naxalites, which 
resulted in a seven month suspension of violence.  The 
conflict resumed in January, however, (Ref A) after police 
allegedly killed a number of Maoists in "encounters," and the 
Naxalites responded with attacks on police, politicians, and 
property.  The CPI (Maoist) asserts that it was forced to 
retaliate after police picked up unarmed Naxalites, murdered 
them, dumped their bodies in the forest and claimed they were 
killed in gunfights.  Chief Minister YS Rajashekhara Reddy 
has asserted that the CPI (Maoist) has taken advantage of the 
peace process to rearm and consolidate.  While the police 
insist they will challenge Naxalites carrying arms, the state 
administration, eager to get the Maoists back to the 
negotiation table, is urging both sides to exercise restraint. 
 
20.  (U) Noted terrorism expert Ajai Sahni claims that 
lopsided economic liberalization in AP has increased Naxalite 
popularity, as former Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu's 
development policies were urban centric and ignored economic 
problems in the countryside.  As a result, many of the 
state's farmers were put into "extreme distress" and provided 
support to Naxalite groups, he stated.  Nihar Nayak, a 
research associate at the Institute for Conflict Management, 
assessed that "over the past five years, Naxalite activities 
have increased in the districts surrounding Bangalore city - 
India's 'Silicon Valley,'" and that "the economic impact of 
the Naxalite rampage is potentially devastating." 
 
Former Insider's View 
--------------------- 
 
21.  (C) Anand Swaroop Verma has been a Communist and 
Naxalite sympathizer since the 1970s.  Although no longer 
active in any Communist organization, Verma reportedly 
continues to be trusted by the various Naxalite factions and 
has entree to their leadership.  Writing primarily in Hindi, 
Verma is the author of several books on Nepali Maoists, and 
is the Convenor of the Indo/Nepal People's Unity Forum, an 
Indian support group for Nepali Maoists.  The works of Verma 
and other Naxalite supporters can be read at 
www.revolutionarydemocracy.org. 
 
22.  (C) Verma pointed out to Poloff that the CPI (Maoist) 
describes the current Indian state as "a criminal nexus in 
which politics and crime have become irrevocably 
intertwined."  The Party has no illusions that it will have 
sufficient armed force to overthrow the state over the short 
term, but plans to use violence to establish a secure base 
and compel the "ruling class" to negotiate its demands.  The 
CPI (Maoist) believes its rural, peasant-based revolution 
will eliminate feudalism and neo-colonialism from the 
countryside and capture the cities in the revolution's final 
phase.  It plans to enact radical land reform, break up the 
estates of big landholders, divide the property among 
landless laborers, implement minimum wage laws, and end 
bonded labor. 
 
23.  (C) Verma recently pointed out to Poloff that Indian 
Naxalites have split into two contending factions: The 
Communist Party of India (Maoist), and a group of 
above-ground Maoist parties with the same goals, but which no 
longer espouse armed struggle and "people's war."  Verma 
noted, however, that the above-ground Maoist parties retain 
their arms and have clashed with the CPI (Maoist) on several 
occasions.  Both factions believe that the Indian state is 
the principal enemy, but advocate different revolutionary 
models.  The CPI (Maoist), like its counterpart in Nepal, 
describes India as a "semi-colonial" state that is becoming a 
de-facto colony of the US and its Indian supporters. 
However, it prefers a "New Democratic Revolution" based in 
the countryside and carried out by the peasants.  The 
above-ground parties call for a non-violent, urban-based 
"Socialist Revolution," led by the working class, and 
centered around opposition to "Neo-liberalism," which it 
describes as another variant of "American imperialism." 
 
Not Just a few Peasants with Guns 
--------------------------------- 
 
24.  (C) Verma described the Naxalite movement as "very 
strong," pointing out that it started in Bihar and Andhra 
Pradesh (AP), but has since spread to Madhya Pradesh (MP), 
Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh (UP), and Jharkhand.  He could 
not or would not quantify how many Naxalites are under arms. 
Agreeing that the CPN (Maoist) is the model for India's 
Naxalite groups, Verma noted that the ideologies of Communist 
parties in China and Cuba do not apply to South Asia.  Nepali 
Maoists are providing support, but no state provides aid, he 
claimed. 
 
25.  (C) Verma also conceded that some of India's Naxalites 
are "adventurists" who are carrying on "class war without a 
purpose."  He claimed that without proper "training" 
guerrillas carry out "aberrations" such as extortion, murder, 
torture, and disfigurement in the name of "class struggle." 
In order to gain legitimacy, he said, Indian Naxalites will 
have to declare "liberated zones," such as those that exist 
in Nepal, and administer them fairly.  Such a move will "win 
the sympathy of the rural masses."  While such zones do not 
exist today, there are plenty of rural areas that Naxalites 
"rule at night" and where no representative of the Indian 
state dares to go. 
 
The GOI Increasingly Worried - Changes Tack 
------------------------------------------- 
 
26.  (U) Reflecting a series of increasingly worried 
statements by DefMin Mukherjee and PM Manmohan Singh, the GOI 
response to the rising tide of Naxalism has been to adopt a 
carrot and stick approach.  On February 7, Home Minister 
Shivraj Patil said that the GOI "encourages the states to 
form unified commands, under the respective Chief Ministers, 
comprising state police and central paramilitary forces to 
deal with the naxal menace."  He pointed out that New Delhi 
had provided 23 battalions of paramilitaries to those states 
affected by Naxalite violence.  However, Patil noted, police 
measures alone would not provide a long-term solution to the 
problem, only "social justice, the removal of economic 
disparity, development and a fresh initiative" by the state 
governments would work.  Patil added that the GOI would 
provide "special schemes in naxal-hit areas, especially in 
the forest and the development-starved regions" in the next 
five year plan.  This was echoed in PM Singh's recently 
announced "Action Plan" for the next six months, which lists 
"Monitor Naxalism with a view to improve the situation," as 
one of its primary goals. 
 
27.  (C) The GOI prefers that the Naxalite issue be addressed 
by state governments and their security forces, an approach 
which has prevented effective coordination of security 
efforts.  The repeated complaint of the West Bengal 
Government, for example, is that the Naxalites cross from 
Jharkhand to conduct attacks and then return to their 
safe-havens, and that the Jharkhand government is not doing 
enough (or anything) to prevent it.  The ineffectiveness of 
this approach was demonstrated by a February 11 Naxalite 
attack in Karnataka.  The Naxalites assembled in AP, crossed 
the state border into Karnataka, attacked a police station 
and retreated into AP immediately thereafter.  Speaking in 
Jharkhand on February 13, PM Singh pledged that the GOI 
"would soon come out with a comprehensive strategy to cope 
with the Naxal problem."  He noted that "Naxalism is a 
problem Jharkhand is already grappling with, but it requires 
greater coordination between the state and the center to curb 
it." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
28.  (C) It is difficult to quantify the extent of support 
for the Naxalite cause in India's rural areas, but all 
evidence suggests that it has grown considerably over the 
past two years.  This is partly due to encouragement by 
Maoist gains in Nepal, and partly to the inability of the 
Indian state to counter it effectively.  The Maoists operate 
in remote, isolated areas with largely tribal and/or lower 
caste populations that are poor, underdeveloped and alienated 
from the central government.  These regions provide fertile 
soil in which Naxalism can grow, but are not found throughout 
the country.  Even fairly alarmist Indian analysts concede 
that Naxalism does not take root in cities, and only in 
rural, agricultural areas experiencing "extreme stress," 
which suggests that the insurgency may have geographical and 
socio-economic limits.  While poverty is widespread in India, 
the large numbers of poor in other areas of the country are 
more likely to respond to the non-violent variants of 
Communism propounded by the above-ground parties (septel), 
than to the Naxalites' calls to violent revolution. 
 
29.  (C) The GOI approach to Naxalism has been marked by 
inconsistency, swinging between defining it simply as a 
law-and-order problem and declaring it a symptom of a much 
deeper social/economic malaise.  Different states have also 
defined the problem differently.  These varying approaches 
have prevented the emergence of a clear and consistent policy 
and provided the Naxalites with breathing space to expand 
their movement. 
 
30.  (C) Naxalism is likely to endure, however, because the 
GOI does not have the ability or the will to address it 
effectively.  The "carrot and stick" approach laid out by 
Home Minister Patil has slim chance of success.  The strong 
nexus between corrupt politicians and organized crime in the 
areas where Naxalites have taken root, prevents development 
programs from being implemented.  In these areas, political 
parties, criminal organizations, and the police work together 
to monopolize power and maintain the status quo.  This often 
leaves the Naxalites as the only organized group perceived by 
the poor as defending it from exploitation. 
 
31.  (C) Likewise, security forces in these areas tend to be 
poorly trained, poorly motivated, poorly equipped, and 
riddled with corruption.  It would take years of training and 
major investments to rebuild the police from the ground up 
and shape them into an independent and effective force 
capable of ensuring basic law and order in the districts 
where the Naxalites are active.  There is no indication that 
the GOI intends to undertake such a program.  In their 
present state, the police cannot provide the stick that will 
force the Naxalites to give up violence and come to the 
negotiating table. 
 
32.  (C) Despite assistance from Nepalese Maoists, India's 
Naxalites cannot defeat the security forces, or establish the 
"base area" they need to demonstrate their ability to govern. 
 After 25 years of waging insurgency, they have accomplished 
little more than to render parts of their self-declared "CRZ" 
ungovernable and to rule the night in remote areas.  With 
neither the Naxalites nor the authorities in a position to 
prevail, the prognosis is an indefinite stalemate. 
 
33.  (C) The mainstream Communist parties favor an end to the 
insurgency, and would like to absorb the Naxalites or to see 
them convert their organizations into Maoist political 
parties.  However, open hostility between the Naxalites and 
the mainstream Communists has prevented this from coming 
about.  For the Naxalites, India's Communist parties are too 
close to Congress and its "neo-liberal" economic policies, 
considering then "deviationist."  Naxalites have demonstrated 
that they have a sufficient base of support in some areas to 
win election to local offices and state Legislative 
Assemblies, but they refuse to join mainstream politics as 
long as they face the prospect of death at the hands of local 
political mafias after emerging from the underground. 
 
34.  (C) We will address the relationship between the Maoists 
and the Communists parties backing the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) septel. 
MULFORD