US embassy cable - 05PARIS1041

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001041 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025 
TAGS: PREL, FR, SY, IR, LE, NATO 
SUBJECT: STOCKTAKING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENCY DIPLOMATIC 
ADVISOR 
 
REF: STATE 27178 
 
Classified By: DCM Alex Wolff for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  DCM spoke with President Chirac's Diplomatic 
Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) February 17 to 
review French position on key issues in advance of President 
Bush's February 21 meeting with President Chirac and the 
subsequent meetings with NATO and EU leaders. 
Gourdault-Montagne said the French side was preparing for the 
meetings in the spirit of cooperation and was convinced all 
three would be successful.  He said there would be no 
surprises from the French side, and hoped none would come 
from ours.  On specific issues, Paris is taking a more timid 
approach to Syria than ours; there is no shift in France's 
cautious approach toward Hizbollah; there is some hope for a 
French contribution to NATO's trust fund for Iraqi training; 
and Paris is willing to consider an ISAF-OEF merger.  End 
Summary. 
 
Syria 
----- 
 
2. (C) DCM reviewed steps the U.S. had taken with Damascus 
and Beirut following the death of former Lebanese PM Hariri 
(reftel), noting that we had not seen signs of similar 
actions by the French.  Clearly uncomfortable with being 
pressed on this point, MGM eventually affirmed that the 
French would not recall their Ambassador and had not yet 
delivered a strong message to the Syrians.  DCM said that 
Washington and Paris had maintained a common approach to the 
Syrians up to this point, but now there seemed to be growing 
distance in our respective responses to the latest 
developments.  MGM insisted that France remained committed to 
UNSCR 1559 and wanted to ratchet up pressure.  At the same 
time, it had only been a few days since Hariri's death and it 
was important to think carefully about next steps and to act 
deftly with Damascus in order to be effective.  He added that 
President Chirac would want to discuss the situation with 
President Bush, and to explore the questions of sanctions, 
particularly how the Syrian Accountability Act was being 
applied. 
 
Hizbollah Designation 
--------------------- 
 
3. (C) DCM emphasized the importance of designating Hizbollah 
in the context of the latest developments in Lebanon and 
asked if the French position would now change.  MGM said 
there would be no change in the French position.  Recent 
events, he explained, demonstrated how fragile the situation 
was in Lebanon.  The Shia element was extremely important: 
any such measures targeting Hizbollah would be useless and 
would contribute to further destabilization.  He concluded 
that President Chirac would explain his reasoning to 
President Bush. 
 
NATO Trust Fund for Iraqi Training 
---------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) DCM pushed for a French contribution to the NATO Trust 
Fund for training Iraqi security forces, noting that France 
was the only country yet to contribute to the collective 
effort.  MGM responded by citing the French offer to train 
1,500 Iraqis, at a cost of 15 million Euros, and support for 
a proposed EU training program for administrative personnel. 
He claimed that France's contribution in both these efforts 
would make it the single largest European contributor to 
Iraqi training, and could not be compared with modest amounts 
paid by other European countries to the NATO effort.  DCM 
said we were not interested in comparing contributions, but 
ensuring that there was solidarity among the allies in this 
effort.  He reiterated that France was the only government 
not doing its part in the NATO effort and it would be 
important in connection with the President's visit to show 
transatlantic unity through a program that involves all 
allies.  MGM, acknowledging that the French side had not yet 
made a decision whether to contribute said "we'll see," 
adding that there were still five days before the Brussels 
meeting to consider this further. 
 
5. (C) MGM returned to the French offer to train 1,500 
Iraqis, questioning why there had been no response from 
Baghdad taking up the offer.  He said this continued to 
puzzle the French government, which was beginning to wonder 
if there was any outside influence telling the Iraqis not to 
respond.  DCM stated that if by "outside influence" MGM was 
suggesting the U.S. had any role in the matter, he could 
categorically deny it.  We, too, were puzzled by the absence 
of an Iraqi response and were seeking further insights from 
our experts.  Perhaps, DCM concluded, we were all 
underestimating how much residual anger existed among Iraqis 
toward France for its perceived relationship with the former 
regime.  But the U.S. remained supportive of French efforts 
to help Iraq. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
6. (C) MGM said the French position on further contributions 
to Afghanistan had not changed since Defense Minister 
Alliot-Marie addressed the issue at the Nice Defense 
Ministerial.  There was no shift in France's position on 
PRTs.  Paris was considering the proposal to merge ISAF and 
OEF, but would want guarantees that U.S. forces would not 
leave Afghanistan.  (He said the French would welcome similar 
guarantees regarding U.S. forces in the Balkans.)  DCM 
responded that the U.S. had no intention of leaving in an 
uncoordinated manner when the situation eventually allowed 
for our departure. 
No Surprises for the President 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) DCM referred to U.S. concerns about elements of 
Chancellor Schroeder's Munich speech.  As we were headed 
toward a series of extremely important meetings next week in 
Brussels, how did the French perceive the situation?  MGM 
said we shouldn't exaggerate Schroeder's comments, noting 
that there was a "big fuss over very little".  DCM noted that 
we had an important opportunity next week to build on recent 
efforts by both sides to improve both the tone and level of 
cooperation between us.  MGM said the meetings were bound to 
be a success since both sides wanted this very much:  "There 
would be no surprises from the French side."  By the same 
token, he continued, he hoped there would be no surprises or 
pressure from the U.S. side that would emerge at the last 
minute as an unexpected test of Allied fidelity:  "give the 
Allies breathing space; its better when the Allies have 
breathing space; the Allies like breathing space".  He 
reiterated that the French side was approaching the meetings 
in the same good spirit that characterized Secretary Rice's 
visit and the Nice Ministerial.  MGM concluded that the 
French side would be working to prepare for the meetings 
through the weekend.  DCM asked that the French side keep us 
apprised of any decisions that might have an effect on the 
meetings. 
 
 
Leach