US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1262

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001262 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREF, PREL, IN, NP, BT, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: GOI WITHOUT PLAN "B", HOPING NEPAL KING WILL 
RESPOND TO DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The Ambassador used the return to New Delhi 
of Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee as an opportunity to discuss 
with the GOI the current strategy on Nepal.  During the 
February 16 meeting, also attended by MEA Joint Secretary 
(Nepal/Bhutan) Ranjit Rae, Polcouns and Poloff, Mukherjee 
expressed hope that the King would respond to international 
pressure within the next two weeks by restoring a democratic 
government, but implied that New Delhi does not have a 
contingency plan if this does not occur.  Mukherjee and Rae 
stated that neither the Maoists nor the Royal Nepalese Army 
(RNA) have the strength to defeat the other militarily, and 
that a political solution must be found.  They indicated a 
Maoist victory would be unacceptable and implied India will 
quickly adjust its arms embargo if the RNA begins to suffer 
substantial losses.  Mukherjee expressed support for the idea 
of a joint US/UK/India demarche when the three ambassadors 
return to Kathmandu, but cautioned this would require 
political-level approval.  He concluded that it is unlikely 
there will be any significant progress on the issue of the 
Bhutanese refugees during the current power struggle.  End 
Summary. 
 
Return to Democracy 
------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query regarding the 
GOI strategy, Mukherjee indicated that the GOI hopes King 
Gyanendra will respond to international pressure in a short 
period of time, possibly within the next eight to ten days, 
and make moves towards restoring democracy in Nepal.  He 
predicted that the possibility of losing aid from donor 
countries and military assistance from India, and the 
increasing diplomatic pressure will force the King to change 
his policy.  However, when the Ambassador asked what would 
happen if the King does not restore democracy, Rae reiterated 
that he expected the King to do so, demonstrating that it is 
unlikely the GOI has developed a contingency plan if the 
current efforts fail.  Mukherjee stressed the importance of 
the King developing a road map for the return to democratic 
rule and that "he must do it quickly."  He commented that the 
GOI is not demanding the King re-establish democracy in a 
given way (such as restoring the previous government), only 
that it happens. "If he makes the right kind of gestures, it 
could be business as usual," Mukherjee stated. 
 
Maoists 
------- 
 
3.  (C) Neither the Maoist nor the RNA has the ability to 
defeat the other in combat, Mukherjee stated.  Rae commented 
that the Maoists do not have the firepower to take Kathmandu 
or any of the larger towns with a significant RNA presence, 
although their writ runs free in the countryside.  Mukherjee 
added that the Maoists can sustain the insurgency 
indefinitely and "to avoid this the King must respond to our 
actions and come back to the (negotiations) table."  He 
expected that the RNA could maintain operations for about 3 
to 4 months before supply problems would hamper their 
activities and allow the Maoists to make headway.  If the 
Maoist succeed in making early progress, Mukherjee commented, 
the GOI would have to rethink its strategy.  India's foremost 
objective, he added, is to prevent a Maoist victory. 
 
Diplomatic Efforts 
------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Mukherjee expressed support for a joint US/UK/India 
demarche to demonstrate to the King that the international 
community is committed to its demand for a return to 
democracy after the Chief's of Missions return to Kathmandu 
(Mukherjee plans to go back on February 20).  While calling 
this a "very pragmatic step," he also noted that it would 
need to be blessed at political levels of the GOI.  He added 
that he was glad most of the interested countries had been 
firm and on-message, with the exception of Pakistan, China 
and Russia.  Mukherjee agreed with Polcouns that further 
Mil/Mil information sharing between the US and India 
regarding the ground situation in Nepal could be beneficial. 
 
Bhutanese Refugees 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Mukherjee noted that the political upheaval in Nepal 
has put the issue of the Bhutanese refugees on the back 
burner.  He added that nothing was happening before the 
King's action and it is very unlikely the Royal Government of 
Bhutan will be willing to resume the Joint Verification 
process during this time of uncertainty in Kathmandu.  When 
questioned about Maoist activity in the camps, he commented 
that the UNHCR has reported the Maoist are present in the 
area, but does not see it as a major danger. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) This discussion was helpful insofar it confirmed GOI 
agreement regarding the imperative of preventing a Maoist 
victory, but worrisome in its exposure of the GOI's "hope for 
the best" diplomatic strategy.  Given what we understand is 
the low likelihood of the King yielding to US/UK/Indian 
pressure for a return to full democracy, we may wish to begin 
a serious dialogue with the Indian Government about fleshing 
out a fallback plan. One opportunity for doing this would be 
a visit to New Delhi by Ambassador Moriarty in connection 
with his return to post. 
MULFORD