US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK1233

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, TH, BM, BURMA, Southern Thailand 
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRIVY COUNCILOR 
GENERAL SURAYUD, FEBRUARY 16, 2005 
 
REF: BANGKOK 8629 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
US INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN UNREST 
 
1. (S) On February 16, 2005 I, met with Privy Councilor 
General Surayud Chulanont former Supreme Commander of the 
Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and Royal Thai Army (RTA) 
Commander-in-Chief.  The meeting, held at Surayud,s request, 
took place at his residence in the Eastern suburbs of Bangkok 
and lasted about two hours.  Surayud, a soft-speaking and 
quiet personality, had just returned from a trip to Yala 
province, where he met with a local Imam (unnamed) who told 
him that rumors were circulating about CIA involvement in the 
surge of violence that has plagued the deep South for over a 
year.  I denied any such U.S. involvement, to which Surayud 
replied, &well, that's the rumor.8  Surayud said the Imam 
claimed that former Ambassador Johnson had been to the South 
three times and &offered to help8 in any way possible, a 
proposal to which the Imam demurred.  I told Surayud that I 
had no current plans to go to the deep South.  Surayud said 
that, in his view, it was not a good idea for me to travel 
there, and mentioned a recent "troublesome" trip by an 
Embassy "political officer.8  (Note:  Ambassador Johnson 
never traveled to the far southern provinces of Yala, Pattani 
and Narathiwat, although he did visit Phuket and Nakhon Si 
Thammarat.  The embassy officer Surayud referred to is 
probably our RSO who, during an initial security survey of 
the South in December 2004, was "ambushed" by local 
journalists.  Per reftel, their news stories distorted the 
purposes of his trip and fed the kind of conspiratorial 
thinking reflected by the Imam's comments to General Surayud. 
 Various Embassy officers travel frequently to Thailand's 
deep South.  End Note.) 
 
2. (S) Surayud stated his support for Thailand's role in 
sending troops to Afghanistan and Iraq but noted that a 
redeployment in either country now would be ill-advised and 
could be used by rabble rousers in the South to portray the 
RTG as eager to get involved in anti-Muslim activity, prodded 
by the U.S. 
 
THAKSIN,S SOUTHERN SECURITY STRATEGY 
 
3. (S) Surayud commented on the volatile situation in the 
deep South.  He said that when General Prem Tinsulanonda (now 
President of the Privy Council) was prime minister, he had 
established a security structure in the South, the Southern 
Border Peacekeeping Center, which was continued into the 
second administration of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai.  That 
Center was organized as a combined civilian, police and 
military command structure to pool intelligence, but also to 
serve as a legitimate means for citizens to send in 
complaints.  PM Thaksin dismantled the Center in 2002. 
Thaksin's explanation to Surayud at the time was that there 
were &only 35 rebels hiding in the woods with guns" and the 
Royal Thai Police (RTP) alone could handle the situation.  In 
fact, Surayud suspected, Thaksin had dismantled the Center, 
thereby effectively shelving Thai military involvement, 
because of his own police background and sympathies towards 
the RTP, and as part of a plan to win the South back from the 
opposition Democrat Party (DP).  Surayud summarized the 
problems in the South as complex, and therefore needing a 
complex solution.  He said the government must learn more 
about the local culture, needs to invest in education, and 
should not resort to new southern command structures that 
rely on the Ministry of Defense for authority and 
accountability. 
 
4. (S) Surayud noted his amazement that Agriculture Minister 
Wan Muhamad Noor Matha's Wadah faction candidates were 
defeated in the recent general election, given Wan Noor,s 
central prominence for years in the South, with a variety of 
political parties. 
 
5. (S) Commenting on HM Queen Sirikit,s speech in November 
2004 where she spoke about the plight of Buddhist villagers 
in the South, Surayud said that he had suggested to the Queen 
before the speech not to go into too much detail about the 
South.  I told Surayud that the Queen's remarks seemed to 
reflect general views of most Thai people about Thai Muslims 
in the South.  Surayud agreed, adding that her comments had 
not been helpful.  Furthermore, Surayud surmised that the 
King's silence on matters in the South in his December 5 
birthday speech was one result of the Queen's remarks.  The 
King had different views on the South than did the Queen, but 
was not about to make that publicly evident.  Surayud agreed 
with me that most moderates in the south just want to be left 
alone, but are caught between an onslaught of globalization 
and a sense of increasingly imposed &Thainess8 from Central 
Thailand and a swan song of radical Islamist efforts locally. 
 
BURMA POLICY TOO SOFT 
 
6. (S) I asked Surayud about the current RTG policy of 
"constructive engagement" with Burma.  Surayud's assessment 
was that it was &too soft8, because the SPDC never listens. 
 He said that the government should return to the policy of 
the second Chuan administration, which had used a harsher 
rhetoric and kept closer to Thailand's national interests. 
Surayud stated that as RTA Commander-in-Chief he had 
emphasized the importance of education and going after the Wa 
if the SPDC didn,t.  He recounted that Thaksin had initially 
agreed with this approach and Surayud had moved forces to the 
North of Thailand (disguising them as maneuvers from the 
Northeast).  While he was in Washington giving a speech on 
Capitol Hill, Surayud said he had learned that Thaksin was 
expressing strong opposition to the troop movements,  even 
though they had already discussed them in apparent agreement. 
 Surayud speculated that about that time the Shin satellite 
deal with Burma was being fixed and had trumped his moves 
against the Wa.  After that, Thaksin had tried to sideline 
him, if not remove him altogether. &I was too independent,8 
Surayud summarized.  (Note: Surayud was promoted to Supreme 
Commander in 2002 -- a move regarded in Thailand as being 
kicked upstairs, away from real authority -- and retired in 
September 2003.  End Note.)  Surayud also commented that the 
Thaksin Administration's highly publicized and controversial 
"war on drugs" -- which began in early 2003 -- has not been 
successful, even if it appears to be popular. 
Methamphetamines are still widely available in Thailand. 
Thaksin, he said, only eliminated the &small fry8 along the 
border and didn't go after the Wa, the producers.  (Surayud 
also said he thought many innocent people had been killed in 
the drug suppression efforts in southern Thailand.) 
 
FINAL NOTE ON THE CROWN PRINCE 
 
7. (S) I asked Surayud about the heir to King Bhumhibol, 
Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn.  Surayud replied that he 
had tutored the Crown Prince some 20 years ago and surmised 
that &He'll never measure up8 to the present monarch, but 
"somehow the Thai people will make do." 
BOYCE