US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE451

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TO THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SOBEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2025 
TAGS: PREL, NL, EUN, NATO 
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER BOT 
 
REF: 04 THE HAGUE 3350 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL FOR REASONS 1 
.4 (B) and (D) 
 
Madam Secretary: 
 
1. (C) Foreign Minister Bot requested this meeting to discuss 
a wide range of U.S.-EU issues prior to the President's visit 
to Europe, which he is prepared to help ensure is a success. 
Although a longtime former Dutch PermRep to the EU with a 
pro-European reputation, Bot demonstrated his support for 
strong transatlantic links throughout the Dutch presidency. 
On several key issues -- e.g., Iraq, Ukraine, China and 
Turkey -- Bot leveraged his understanding of European 
politics and institutions to advance a solidly transatlantic 
agenda.  His candid assessments of internal European 
decision-making at critical moments also proved invaluable. 
Bot very much wants to remain a player, and is seeking to 
stake out a clear role for the Dutch (and for himself) in the 
post-Presidency environment.  Although we and Bot could not 
secure a further extension of Dutch troops in AlMuthanna 
province in Iraq, he is committed to supporting the 
stabilization and reconstruction effort.  This meeting 
provides an excellent opportunity to take advantage of Bot's 
credibility and experience to refine our message to Europe, 
while encouraging Bot to assume a more active leadership role 
in key areas.  I believe Bot would welcome such a challenge. 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
2. (C) Bot personally made Iraq a high priority during the 
Dutch EU Presidency.  He should continue to press the EU from 
within to assume greater responsibilities in Iraq, and to 
move quickly to establish a physical presence on the ground 
in particular.  The decision -- which Bot fought vigorously 
in cabinet -- to withdraw the Dutch bilateral military 
presence from AlMuthanna next month is unfortunately 
irreversible.  This decision was largely a function of 
domestic politics as opposed to ideological disagreement with 
the Iraq engagement.  Despite the pending withdrawal, the 
Dutch were among the first to commit personnel (25) to the 
first phase of the NATO Training Mission and have indicated a 
willingness to provide up to 100 in later phases -- but want 
to use this as leverage to get other allies to contribute. 
It would be useful to remind Bot that while we appreciate 
Dutch efforts to press allies to be more forthcoming, basing 
Dutch contributions on strict definitions of 
"proportionality" would be counterproductive. 
 
3. (C) The Dutch have never ruled out additional missions in 
Iraq, and Bot in particular may be receptive to ideas for how 
the Dutch could fill important "niches."  For example, the 
Dutch could be asked to consider expanding bilateral support 
to Iraqi institutions such as the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs (the Dutch are currently training one class of junior 
Iraqi diplomats in The Hague) and Justice (the Dutch last 
year hosted a successful conference of Iraqi jurists in The 
Hague) or to sponsor specific reconstruction and development 
projects in the AlMuthanna area to take advantage of existing 
links to the local community. 
 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) In a recent meeting with former New Jersey governor 
and 9/11 panel co-chair Tom Kean, Bot emphasized his interest 
on improving transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation. 
Bot considers this a key element of the Dutch EU presidency 
in which they pushed hard for EU terrorist financing reforms 
and greater information and intelligence exchanges between 
the EU and the U.S.  He may wish to raise this subject with 
you.  We also understand that PM Balkenende may want to 
discuss counter-terrorism during the President's upcoming 
meeting with EU leaders in Brussels.  If he does, he will 
likely draw attention to such U.S.-Dutch programs as the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI), DOE's Megaport 
Initiative (the first installation of radiological detection 
gates in Europe at Rotterdam), the Immigration Advisory 
Program (IAP) at Schiphol Airport and development of an 
International Registered Travelers (IRT) pilot program 
between Schiphol and JFK Airports. 
 
 
EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO 
--------------------- 
 
5. (C) Bot started the Dutch presidency resigned to lifting 
the EU China Arms Embargo, but ended it determined to prevent 
a lift "on his watch."  He can continue to provide useful 
insights into how the issue is being handled within EU 
circles, and should be pushed to keep the EU focused on its 
commitment -- which the Dutch insisted on inserting into the 
December 17 Council declaration -- not to increase sales to 
China "in quantity or quality."  The Dutch have made clear 
that they will take their lead on this issue from the 
British, and that they will not stand alone to prevent a 
lift, but they may be able to help us find and exploit 
potential cracks in the EU's consensus.  Bot should also be 
left with no illusions about the likely consequences of a 
lift, including potential complications in U.S.-European 
defense trade. 
 
CUBA 
---- 
 
6. (C) The Dutch continue to represent the EU Presidency in 
Havana (since Luxembourg has no mission there) and have deep 
concerns about the human rights situation there.  The Dutch 
have so far not been as active as the Czechs or Poles in 
pressing the EU to maintain contacts with dissidents as it 
improves relations with Havana; Bot could and should do more 
in this area.  For example, he could instruct the Dutch 
Embassy in Havana to respond positively to our request that 
U.S. representatives be invited to the monthly coordination 
meetings on human rights held by EU missions in Havana. 
 
TURKEY/CYPRUS 
------------- 
 
7. (C) As a former Ambassador to Turkey, and the man under 
whose watch the Turks finally got a date to begin accession 
talks, Bot has a personal interest in facilitating Turkey's 
bid to accede to the EU.  The Dutch MFA plans to establish a 
regular bilateral forum for discussing EU accession issues 
with Turkey along the lines of their previous successful 
"coaching" relationship with Poland; this relationship may 
prove useful in identifying and resolving problems as October 
3 approaches.  The Dutch can also provide useful insights 
into EU thinking regarding Cyprus, and are keenly aware that 
a failure to resolve the current impasse over Berlin-plus has 
serious implications for NATO. 
 
ICC/SUDAN 
--------- 
 
8. (C) Bot has said that there is a firm EU consensus in 
support of referring war crimes in Sudan to the ICC.  As the 
host of the ICC, the Dutch are uniquely committed to seeing 
it succeed.  (While the Dutch were willing to look seriously 
at options for an Article 98 Agreement during their 
presidency, in the end they judged it would not fly within 
the EU.)  Nevertheless, Bot believes we should quietly 
explore ways to lower the temperature on the ICC and may be 
open to brainstorming on how the Darfur case might help lead 
to a compromise.  At a minimum, we can ask Bot to be helpful 
and tone down the rhetoric and activities of Dutch 
representatives in New York, Brussels, and elsewhere opposing 
alternatives to the ICC.  As a pragmatist, Bot understands 
that a public spat over this issue does nothing either to 
promote the transatlantic agenda or to bring the perpetrators 
to justice.  The Dutch, and Bot personally, have been heavily 
involved in Darfur (the Dutch, for example, paid over half of 
the EU's contribution to the AU mission) and do not want to 
jeopardize a potential resolution over technicalities. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
9. (S) In the debate over the AlMuthanna withdrawal, the 
Dutch government cited commitments in Afghanistan -- 
including a possible deployment of special forces to OEF and 
heading up a new PRT in ISAF's Phase III -- as one reason for 
leaving Iraq.  These commitments are useful and appropriate, 
but you may want to set down a marker that they should not be 
seen as substitutes for contributions in Iraq -- both are 
high priorities.  The Dutch have made available a marine 
battalion for SACEUR's SRF and have publicly indicated it may 
be deployed to Afghanistan to support upcoming elections. 
They have privately balked however, at the prospects of 
deploying the more substantial current Dutch NRF contribution 
(approximately 4,000 troops) in support of the elections, 
arguing that the NRF is not intended for such a mission. 
While NATO has not yet determined which force, if either, 
should be deployed for this mission, Dutch efforts to 
predetermine the outcome are not helpful. 
 
MIDDLE EAST 
----------- 
 
10. (C) Last November, Bot was eager to transform his 
successful hosting of the EUROMED conference in The Hague 
into a prominent role in the Middle East Peace Process.  So 
far, however, he has been unable to carve out an appropriate 
role for himself or the Netherlands either within the EU or 
bilaterally.  Bot correctly judges that there is broad public 
support (including from the main opposition parties in 
parliament) for increased engagement in the Middle East, but 
he will not insert himself into the process without being 
asked but plans to meet in Washington with NSC Senior 
Director Abrams to explore whether he can be helpful at some 
future point.  He has expressed support for a possible NATO 
peacekeeping role in the region, if it comes to that. 
 
AFRICA 
------ 
 
11. (C) Already heavily involved in Africa -- the Dutch are 
the fourth largest donor of aid to the continent -- Bot is 
under constant pressure from the Dutch parliament (and Dutch 
Development Minister Agnes van Ardenne) to "do more."  The 
Dutch uniquely include a major focus on peace and security in 
their African development policy, and have expressed interest 
in greater coordination with the U.S., especially in the Horn 
and Great Lakes Regions.  In fleshing out possible areas of 
increased cooperation in Africa, we should remain cognizant 
of the fact that in the Netherlands, African initiatives have 
sometimes been portrayed as alternatives to missions in Iraq 
or Afghanistan; we will need to make clear in any discussion 
where our top priorities lie. 
 
BOTTOM LINE 
----------- 
 
12. (C) Bot's experience and credibility make him a useful 
European interlocutor and an effective advocate for the 
transatlantic agenda.  During the Dutch presidency, he 
repeatedly demonstrated a talent for translating 
transatlantic objectives into the language of Europeanism, 
and for discreetly managing difficult issues (such as Turkey 
or China) to successful conclusions.  It would be in our 
interest to find creative ways to harness his skills as a 
coalition builder and his newly-deepened transatlantic 
orientation in the post-presidency environment as well. 
 
 
13. (C) One final point you may want to stress in your 
discussion is that the concept of "proportionality" creeping 
into many Dutch debates (on Iraq and Afghanistan, for 
example) is misguided.  The value we place on our partnership 
is not based on whether or not the Dutch contribute their 
"fair share" to any given operation, but rather reflects the 
trust developed over a long history in which each side 
demonstrated its willingness to do whatever was needed to 
achieve shared objectives. 
SOBEL