US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1224

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INDIA RIDING HIGH ON POST-TSUNAMI WAVE OF GOOD WILL; BIG PLANS FOR SRI LANKA

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI1224
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI1224 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-02-16 10:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL EAID ETRD CE IN Tsunami Relief India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, ETRD, CE, IN, Tsunami Relief, India-SriLanka 
SUBJECT: INDIA RIDING HIGH ON POST-TSUNAMI WAVE OF GOOD 
WILL; BIG PLANS FOR SRI LANKA 
 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: As a concrete demonstration of India's 
magnanimity and competence, New Delhi's recent large-scale 
assistance to its tsunami-stricken neighbors had illustrated 
the country's standing as a regional and emerging world 
power, according to observers here.  India is particularly 
proud of its efforts in Sri Lanka, which it views as a sign 
of the strong bilateral relationship that Prime Minister 
Singh will play up during his planned March visit to Sri 
Lanka.  One MEA contact described the GOI goal as "an EU kind 
of relationship" with Sri Lanka.  From the Indian 
perspective, the tsunami has proved an overwhelming 
diplomatic success -- within South Asia, outside the region, 
and bilaterally with the US.  End Summary. 
 
Tsunami Public Diplomacy 
 
SIPDIS 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Without a hint of bashfulness, six weeks after the 
disaster, the MEA published a polished, glossy review of 
India's relief efforts at home and abroad titled "Bridging 
the Ocean: India Leads Relief Measures in Tsunami-hit Areas." 
 In a country-by-country overview of India's external aid, 
punctuated with photographs of Indian military personnel and 
hardware delivering assistance, the MEA explained that 
because of "a natural sense of affinity and...confidence in 
its capabilities," India was the first country to come to Sri 
Lanka's aid.  The booklet, clearly intended for foreign 
audiences (one well-informed MEA interlocutor did not even 
know it existed), concluded that India's "management" of the 
tsunami has led to "a changed perception of the country in 
 
SIPDIS 
the eyes of the international community." 
 
"Elephant Underground" 
---------------------- 
 
3.  (C) South Asia expert Professor SD Muni commented to 
Poloff recently that India's aid for Sri Lanka further 
strengthens that relationship, as it was part of "a trend 
that was building all along."  Muni did not attach much 
significance to the fact that India's relief in Sri Lanka was 
the country's first large-scale military deployment there 
since the unsuccessful 1989 Indian Peace Keeping Force 
action.  The Indian armed forces were the logical choice 
because of their capabilities to accomplish such a mission, 
he countered, adding that in 2003 the Indian military also 
provided flood relief to its island neighbor.  Institute for 
Peace and Conflict Studies researcher N. Manoharan offered a 
similar assessment, remarking that the military response was 
a "natural" one. 
 
4.  (C) Manoharan observed that although there was an 
"inherent power projection" in India's relief effort in Sri 
Lanka, Colombo was very appreciative.  On the long term 
prognosis for India-Sri Lanka relations, he predicted that 
there will always be a view in Sri Lanka that India is the 
"elephant" in the neighborhood, and while that feeling is 
"underground" now, it may return.  Following the tsunami, the 
sense in Sri Lanka was overwhelmingly positive, he concluded. 
 
In Step With Colombo 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (C) As evidence of the positive momentum between New 
Delhi and Colombo, MEA Joint Secretary (SAARC) V. Ashok 
highlighted to PolCouns and Poloff on February 16 the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that he 
expects the Prime Minister will sign during his March trip to 
Sri Lanka.  The CEPA, he explained, builds on the existing 
free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries.  It 
will include a reduction in the outstanding negative lists on 
both sides, the addition of trade in services, and harmonized 
standards and customs procedures.  Describing this as phase 
two of the India-Sri Lankan partnership (with phase one 
having been the FTA) Ashok animatedly mapped out next stages 
after the CEPA, which would include national treatment for 
each other's investors, and the movement of professionals 
between the two countries, as well as the integration of 
electric and transportation grids.  Describing the end point 
as "an EU kind of relationship," Ashok praised Colombo's 
ability to consider economic development on a separate plane 
from the GOSL's political difficulties. 
 
Tiger Watching 
-------------- 
 
6.  (C) While MEA Director (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) TS Sandhu, 
in a January 7 conversation with PolCouns, had hoped for 
cooperation between the GOSL and LTTE in countering the 
tsunami, a month later he expressed concern that Sri Lankan 
 
SIPDIS 
President Kumaratunga may miss an opportunity to engage with 
the Tigers.  Although he thought the February 7 attack on 
LTTE political leader E. Kausalyan did not bode well, Sandhu 
ventured that both the Tigers and government may be too 
exhausted to fight, possibly creating an opening for talks. 
Prominent foreign affairs commentator Maj. Gen. (retd) Ashok 
Mehta echoed Sandhu's dimming optimism on the 
tsunami-prompted prospects for peace in Sri Lanka.  On 
 
SIPDIS 
February 10, he told Poloff that Kausalyan's death supported 
his belief that the common tragedy would not bring the GOSL 
and LTTE closer together.  Gloomier still, the IPCS' 
Manoharan predicted that amidst claims of ethnic 
discrimination from Sri Lankan Tamils whom aid was not 
reaching, the tsunami had resulted in further division, 
rather than been an opportunity. 
 
Regional Power 
-------------- 
 
7.  (C) Local strategists have also looked to capitalize on 
the perception that India "stood its ground" with the US, and 
asserted its own primacy in South Asia.  In its tsunami 
relief publication, the MEA took care to point out that the 
Indian Navy arrived within hours of the disaster "at least a 
week before the US Marines reached there."  Professor Muni 
argued to Poloff that despite the MEA's reassurances that the 
US and India coordinated successfully in Sri Lanka "eyebrows 
were raised" at the US' involvement in what the GOI considers 
"its soft belly."  Muni paternalistically asserted that the 
GOI's position that New Delhi did not need foreign tsunami 
assistance, but would request it if that assessment changed, 
applied to Sri Lanka as well. 
 
8.  (C) Despite these barbs from some in the strategic 
community, the MEA, publicly stressed its close coordination 
with the US, highlighting New Delhi's selection for the Core 
Group as evidence of the country's equivalence with Japan and 
Australia: "recognizing the key role that India can play in 
the region, it was invited to be a part of the Tsunami Core 
Group put together by the United States."  One senior MEA 
official complained to us in this context that academics like 
Muni will never believe the new reality of Indo-US 
partnership.  Likewise, in a February 15 meeting with USAID 
Assistant Administrator Douglas Menarchik, MEA Joint 
Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar made the point that the 
 
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"real test of US-India partnership will be our ability to 
coordinate in third countries." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) From the Indian perspective, the tsunami has been 
both a terrible tragedy and a diplomatic success -- within 
South Asia, outside the region, and bilaterally with the US. 
The Indians proved themselves to be effective at managing 
their relief efforts abroad, as well as their coordination 
with foreign governments.  At the working level, MEA 
officials were cooperative and surprisingly forthcoming with 
information.  New Delhi's strong performance during the 
disaster is the kind of evidence India has been looking for 
to support its claim that it is an international power and a 
benevolent neighbor.  This role is particularly welcomed here 
with reference to Sri Lanka -- a country that India views as 
a model neighbor, with trade and other ties accelerating 
rapidly.  In this context, the Indian Navy's exemplary 
performance in Sri Lanka is evidence that the ghosts of 
India's unsuccessful 1989 military intervention have now been 
laid to rest. 
MULFORD 

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