US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE448

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
IO FOR SWIGERT, LAGON; IO/SHA FOR LUCAS; DRL FOR SICADE, 
MEHRA, MCKEE; USUN FOR ZACK; GENEVA FOR DANIES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, NL, AORC, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: DUTCH 
THOUGHTS ON COUNTRY RESOLUTIONS AND REFORM 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Nathaniel Dean for reasons 1. 
4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)   SUMMARY:  At the upcoming Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR) in Geneva, the Dutch want a resolution on Sudan 
regardless of the status of UNSC action.  They expect no AU 
action on the DRC, which means the EU will likely have to 
sponsor a resolution.  They think an EU resolution on 
Zimbabwe is unlikely.  On Cuba, the Dutch expect the EU to 
support a USG-tabled resolution, while anticipating a hard -- 
and perhaps successful -- challenge from Cuba.  The Dutch do 
not foresee Canada tabling a resolution on Iran.  On 
Uzbekistan, the Dutch expect the EU to support an Item 19 
approach.  On Belarus, the Dutch think the USG should lead. 
The EU will discuss Chechnya with Russia at an upcoming 
Ministerial, then decide how to proceed at Geneva.  The Dutch 
report that Portugal seems to favor having an East Timor 
resolution.  The Dutch remain undecided how to approach the 
effort to scale back the numerous, bad Israel resolutions. 
On CHR reform, the Dutch favor universal membership, prefer 
keeping the UN Third Committee, and remain skeptical about 
using a Democracy Caucus at the CHR.  The Dutch hope to work 
closely with USG counterparts this year and to avoid the 
problems the USG had with the EU negotiations last year.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Anneke Adema (MFA, Director of the Human Rights 
office) and Guillaume Teerling of her office met Poloff 
February 14 for a wide-ranging discussion of current Dutch 
thinking regarding country resolutions at the upcoming UN 
Commission on Human Rights.  She reacted to USG proposals for 
CHR reform now circulating. 
 
SUDAN 
 
3.  (C)  The Dutch feel strongly about taking action on Sudan 
in Geneva regardless of the status of UNSC action.  Adema 
emphasized "the situation deserves attention and merits a 
country resolution."  Recalling the debacle at the end of 
last year's CHR on the Sudan resolution, Adema revealed she 
had been embarrassed by how the EU concluded the negotiations 
and all but promised that she would do her best, within EU 
councils, to ensure that the USG and EU stayed in sync this 
year.  "That was Spring last year," she said, referring to 
the atmosphere in Geneva that produced the unwelcome result, 
"and since then we've had the Summer and Fall," she added, 
referring to the deterioration in the situation on the 
ground.  (Note: The MFA will augment their Mission during the 
CHR by sending Sonja van der Meer for weeks one to three and 
Guillaume Teerling for weeks four to six;  both Adema 
promised that both Teerling and van der Meer are prepared to 
work closely with USG counterparts to help avoid last minute 
problems in negotiations.  End note.) 
 
4.  (C)  Adema said the Dutch prefer that the AU "takes its 
responsibility for Sudan, as well as for the DRC and 
Zimbabwe" and, in this regard, she reported the EU is 
demarching in Africa on all three cases for the AU to act. 
 
DRC AND ZIMBABWE 
 
5.  (C)  In addition to Sudan, the EU hopes African States 
will take more responsibility for the human rights situation 
in the DRC and Zimbabwe.  However, the EU remains realistic, 
Adema indicated, saying that the EU might sponsor a 
resolution on the DRC should the AU not. 
 
6.  (C)  Zimbabwe presents a complex situation for the EU; 
the UK and Dutch are wary after recent setbacks, Adema said. 
The fact that Zimbabwe has elections scheduled for the end of 
March could support those in the EU who question the 
propriety of criticizing them before they have taken place, 
Adema noted.  The EU thinking seems to be that tabling a 
Zimbabwe resolution too soon could antagonize the AU and 
negatively affect EU efforts on Sudan or DRC.  Adema said one 
strategy option under discussion would be to tell the AU that 
they would forego a Zimbabwe resolution in exchange for the 
AU's agreement to work with the EU on the DRC and Sudan. 
 
CUBA 
 
7.  (C)  Adema said that Cuba viewed its narrow defeat last 
year, when the Cuba resolution passed by only three votes, as 
an improved result from prior years and that Cuba would try 
to build on a momentum they see going in their favor. 
Recalling the no action motions that proliferated in the 
recent UN Third Committee, she predicted they would become 
more prominent in Geneva this year.  Notwithstanding resent 
EU changes to its Cuba policy, she said she expected the EU 
to support a USG-sponsored Cuba resolution. 
IRAN 
 
8.  (C)  Adema expected no new Canadian action on Iran.  She 
said Canada seemed pleased with the outcome of the Iran 
resolution in the Third Committee and was hesitant about 
proceeding in Geneva.  She was not sure if the EU could be 
convinced to push that hard on a resolution should Canada 
table one and it would be up to Luxembourg to organize 
support.  As an aside, Adema indicated she put little faith 
in Luxembourg's ability to organize such an effort. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
 
9.  (C)  Adema said the EU is still discussing what approach 
to take on Uzbekistan.  She anticipated the EU would support 
an Item 19 approach, which she said "should of course be 
contingent on a positive Uzbeki attitude, which she 
personally doubted." Nevertheless, she expected the EU 
consensus to form around the Item 19 option. 
 
BELARUS 
 
10.  (C)  Adema firmly suggested the USG should table a 
Belarus resolution that the EU would then support.  She 
rebuffed Poloff's suggestion that the EU should show the flag 
on an issue relating to its near neighbor.  She noted the EU 
team in Geneva would have enough to do with the resolutions 
it plans to table and that it was her opinion that it would 
be better for "others" (the USG) to lead on Belarus. 
 
CHECHNYA/RUSSIA 
 
11.  (C)  The EU has a "general dialogue" scheduled with 
Russia soon, where Chechnya is on the agenda, Adema noted. 
Thereafter, depending on the results, the EU will consider 
whether they would support CHR action. 
 
EAST TIMOR 
 
12.  (C)  The Portuguese are handling East Timor for the EU 
and they seem to want to have a resolution, Adema said.  The 
EU will not do anything more generally on Indonesia this 
year, she added. 
 
ISRAEL 
 
13. (C)  When urged by Poloff to support a reduction in 
repetitive, one-sided resolutions against Israel, Adema said 
the MFA's Director General was at this time considering how 
the Dutch would address the question and she refused to be 
drawn on specifics. 
 
CHR REFORM 
 
14.  (C)  Finally, Adema offered some thoughts on CHR reform. 
 
 
a)  Universal Membership:  The Dutch do not oppose. In EU 
councils, Adema reported that partners rate the idea rather 
coolly -- as "an interesting thought"; however, no one has 
said they oppose and it will prove difficult to have a 
consensus EU opinion on it soon, she added.  As for the 
Dutch, they feel universal membership would raise the profile 
of CHR action for all UN Member States, which would all have 
the right to participate (and by inference, ignore at their 
peril).  Though incidents of no action motions might increase 
in a universal membership setting, nothing would diminish the 
large effect on public opinion of having a country resolution 
actually tabled against a human rights violator, she 
suggested.  Moreover, universal membership would eliminate 
all the problems now associated with elections. 
 
b)  Eliminating the Third Committee:  Adema would not 
support; she said it had not been discussed in EU councils as 
far as she knew.  She saw benefits to New York/UNGA and Third 
Committee review of Geneva's work.  Moreover, Third Committee 
review of the CHR had the practical, positive effect of 
holding two human rights discussions annually, thereby 
raising the profile of the human rights agenda. 
 
c)  Democratic Caucus:  Adema said the MFA remains hesitant 
about the DC since the rules for selecting members remain 
problematic;  it would be easier to know who not to include, 
she observed.  She asked which countries the USG could 
foresee participating in a Democratic Caucus at the CHR.  She 
added that it seemed the USG was trying to "upgrade the 
purpose of the DC from what was originally intended for it. 
She said it was her impression that the goals of the 
Community of Democracies had not included working together in 
a forum like the CHR. 
SOBEL