US embassy cable - 05ANKARA865

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AFGHANISTAN: TURKS RELAXED ABOUT MAZAR REJECTION

Identifier: 05ANKARA865
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA865 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-02-15 13:32:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR PREL PGOV TU AF UK
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000865 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2030 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PGOV, TU, AF, UK 
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TURKS RELAXED ABOUT MAZAR REJECTION 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 356 
     B. ANKARA 353 
     C. ANKARA 504 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) The subject of Turkey's interest in replacing the UK 
at its PRT in Mazar-e Sharif (refs A and B) came up during a 
meeting on another subject between MFA DDG for South Asia 
Aydin Evirgen and polmilcouns.  Evirgen understood that 
London was no longer interested in Turkey taking over the 
Mazar PRT and that others would be filling this role.  He 
said the important thing was that the job get done -- whether 
by Turkey or someone else was not important.  Given the great 
reluctance in Ankara for Turkey to do a PRT, Evirgen thought 
no one would be disappointed.  When asked to expand on the 
GOT's reluctance to lead PRTs, Evirgen explained that the 
concept was relatively new and not well defined.  How a joint 
civilian-military operation would be conducted was difficult 
for senior Turkish officials and politicians to grasp.  Each 
time Turkey has explored leading a PRT, it has only been with 
the reluctant approval of decision-makers. 
 
2. (C) Evirgen noted that ISAF stage 2 expansion seemed to be 
progressing well, with nations stepping up to take the lead 
in PRTs in the West.  Polmilcouns observed that stage 3 was 
still to come; he encouraged Turkey to consider contributing 
to that effort.  With the command of ISAF until August, 
Turkey's contribution is significant Evirgen responded. 
After that, Ankara would examine how Turkey could usefully 
further assist Afghanistan.  Meanwhile MFA was continuing to 
encourage the Turkish military to contribute to the training 
of the Afghan National Army, focusing on the war college (ref 
C).  The GOT was also planning some high-level visits: 
Foreign Minister Gul was supposed to attend the Feb. 13 ISAF 
change of command, but bad weather forced him to postpone to 
sometime in March.  Prime Minister Erdogan is planning to 
visit Kabul in April. 
 
3. (C) Comment:  The Turks understand that their taking over 
the PRT in Mazar is not in the cards.  The leadership's 
reluctance to embrace PRTs and the military's reluctance to 
take on a more robust combat role (the Turkish General Staff 
twice declined CENTCOM's requests in 2003 to contribute to 
OEF) suggest winning a Turkish contribution to ISAF's 
expansion into the south will not be easy.  The Afghanis will 
need to tell Gul and Erdogan that they would prefer Turkey to 
contribute to ISAF's move south if we are to convince the GOT 
to do so.  End comment. 
EDELMAN 

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