US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI721

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000721 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR PATRICK HEFFERNAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015 
TAGS: IR, IZ, PTER, SA, TC 
SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR FRAN 
TOWNSEND'S MEETING WITH ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1 
.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: White House Homeland Security Advisor Fran 
Townsend met with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme 
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed 
Al Nahyan (MbZ) February 7 to discuss counter terrorism 
trends in the Gulf region, U.S.-UAE CT cooperation, and the 
threat of Muslim extremism.  Townsend and MbZ agreed on the 
need to enhance CT communication among GCC members.  Both 
expressed concern about the potential for another terror 
attack on the scale of 9/11.  While the UAE has undertaken to 
secure its borders and stem Islamic extremism by reforming 
its educational curriculum, MbZ emphasized that more needs to 
be done.  He welcomed CT cooperation from the United States. 
Hizbollah continues to pose a grave threat, Townsend 
stressed.  MbZ agreed that there was room for diplomatic 
approaches to Iran and Syria, Hizbollah,s principal 
supporters.  MbZ expressed sorrow over the loss of American 
life in Iraq, but counseled against a premature withdrawal of 
forces.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On February 7, White House Homeland Security Advisor 
Fran Townsend met with MbZ over dinner.  Others attending the 
meeting were Interior Minister Sheikh Saif bin Zayed (MbZ,s 
half-brother); senior representatives of the Directorate for 
Military Intelligence, UAE Special Forces, and State Security 
Directorate; MbZ aide Yousef Al Otaiba; Ambassador; Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Tony 
 
SIPDIS 
Wayne; NSC and S/CT staffers; and Embassy representatives. 
 
CT Cooperation and Threat Assessment 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Townsend provided a readout of her participation at 
the February 5-8 International Counterterrorism Conference in 
Riyadh.  She said that the lack of communication between GCC 
states on CT matters poses a major obstacle.  It seemed it 
was often easier for a GCC state to pass CT information to a 
fellow GCC state via the United States than to do so 
directly, she noted.  MbZ said Arab League Secretary General 
Amr Moussa,s proposal to locate an international counter 
terrorism center in Egypt or Saudi Arabia would &kill8 the 
idea because Egypt would dominate the process and stifle the 
dialogue.  MbZ noted he would favor placing a CT center in a 
smaller Middle Eastern country, similar to NATO,s decision 
to locate its headquarters in Brussels.  Townsend indicated 
that Bahrain was offering to host the center and MBZ agreed 
that would be positive. 
 
4. (C) MbZ and Townsend agreed that U.S.-UAE CT cooperation 
was on a sound footing.  &Helping you is helping us,8 MbZ 
said.  &We must stop terrorists or the UAE will be 
destroyed.8  In this context, Townsend raised with Interior 
Minister Saif the importance of cooperation on the Saeed 
export control investigation.  She stressed the value of U.S. 
access to additional data which the UAE has accumulated on 
other cases.  MbZ said future challenges loom, and the fight 
will be very different in five years.  He predicted that a 
bigger 9/11 incident was on the horizon and raised the 
possibility that Iran could send a terrorist with WMD as a 
way to respond to pressure on Tehran.  &We need to act now 
against a potential biological or nuclear terror attack.8 
Townsend concurred with MbZ,s assessment.  MbZ also voiced 
his belief that extremist groups already had access to WMD. 
 
The Hizbollah Threat and Iran 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Townsend expressed the view that Hizbollah remained a 
grave threat and, although the Hizbollah has not conducted 
attacks against U.S. targets recently, prior to 9-11 they had 
been responsible for more American deaths than al-Qaida and 
they likely would conduct more in the future.  Hezbollah and 
Iran were destabilizing forces in the region.  MbZ concurred 
with Townsend,s assessment of the threat presented by 
Hizbollah, and noted that about five years ago UAE 
authorities had identified and neutralized a Hizbollah 
presence in the UAE. Townsend stated that Iran must stop 
sponsoring terrorism, and that the international community 
must stand up and declare that it will not tolerate Iran,s 
nuclear proliferation nor its sponsorship of terrorism.  She 
affirmed that the U.S. is committed to a diplomatic solution 
vis--vis Iran, but GCC leaders must speak out publicly and 
not apply only diplomatic pressure on Iran while relying 
solely on the U.S. to provide public pressure. 
 
Iraq in the Aftermath of the Election 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) MbZ opined that it would have been better for Iraq,s 
Sunnis to have involved themselves in the recent election and 
cooperated with the U.S. rather than be ruled by the Shi,a. 
Iraq,s Sunnis showed they were &stubborn and stupid,8 he 
said.  In the meantime, Iran &stood by calmly8 to take 
advantage of the situation.  MbZ labeled the Iranians as 
&sneaky.8  MbZ asked how the USG evaluated Syria.  Syria 
could do more to cooperate with the U.S., Townsend said.  She 
agreed that the U.S. might have an opportunity to persuade 
the Syrians to change course.  MbZ said the U.S. needed to 
send a signal to Syria &that Syria,s generals would 
understand.8  MBZ counseled that the U.S. should not put 
Syria and Iran in the same category and that the U.S. should 
work to bring Syria to cooperate on CT, thereby forcing them 
away from an alliance with Iran. 
 
7. (S) On the question of how Coalition forces treat captured 
insurgents in Iraq, MbZ said there was obviously a difference 
in approach in the West from that of the Arab world, 
signaling that he would sacrifice international law and human 
rights considerations in the interest of security.  If it 
were it up to him, these insurgents would be treated in such 
a way as to deter others from taking part in the insurgency. 
 
8. (C) MbZ expressed sorrow for the losses the U.S. had 
suffered in Iraq.  &There are no words to explain our thanks 
to them and their families.8  That said, MbZ was convinced 
that U.S. troops should not withdraw from the region, &or 
all hell will break loose.8  He wished the UAE,s neighbors 
understood this.  &This is deadly serious business.8  (In a 
sidebar conversation, Ambassador asked MbZ about PM Iyad 
Allawi,s February 3-6 visit to the UAE.  The trip had been 
kept out of the media,s eye for security reasons, MbZ said. 
MbZ told Ambassador he had warned Allawi that it was likely 
to be a &bloody8 next four for five months.  The UAE wished 
to see Allawi as Prime Minister once again, MbZ confided, but 
&nobody8 was supporting him.  Allawi had done much to build 
up the new Iraqi army, police, and security services, MbZ 
said, but needed help.) 
 
Gulf security 
------------- 
 
9. (S) Townsend and MbZ reviewed trends in terrorism and 
security in the Gulf region, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and 
Kuwait in particular.  Turning to his Special Operations 
group commander, MbZ noted that the UAE had some 250 men in 
Afghanistan alongside Coalition forces.  Why was this, he 
asked rhetorically?  It was because two of the nineteen 9/11 
hijackers were Emirati nationals.  Fighting Al Qaida on the 
ground was something the UAE had no choice but to do. 
However, &another8 Gulf country (Saudi Arabia) counted 15 
of its nationals among the 9/11 hijackers, but &had had a 
different reaction.8    MbZ noted that the Saudis would have 
to win the war of extremism upon their own soil for the UAE, 
the Gulf, and the world to be free from terror.  Townsend 
noted that the Saudis have acknowledged that they have a 
long-term problem and have thus entered into a new phase in 
the fight against terrorism.  MbZ then asserted that Bahrain 
and Kuwait were in denial about the depth of their respective 
terrorism problems.  Mbz said the "Arabs" have to play a 
bigger role in countering extremism and terrorism but 
lamented the near term likelihood of common action. 
 
Border Controls 
--------------- 
 
10. (C) Townsend described post-September 11 efforts to 
improve U.S. border controls and to achieve a better balance 
between security and immigration, and she acknowledged that 
the current situation has often discouraged many people from 
coming to the U.S.  MbZ described the UAE,s own border 
control challenges.  He admitted it is still easy to smuggle 
explosives into the UAE by land or sea.  He said he would be 
more comfortable with the security situation once enhanced 
border security measures had been put in place by end 2005. 
 
Stemming Extremism 
------------------ 
 
11. (C) In addition to tougher border control measures, MbZ 
talked at length about his government,s efforts to stem 
Muslim extremism, particularly via reforms the schools.  To 
effectively combat extremism, MbZ said, the educational 
curriculum must not only address the basics of reading, 
writing and arithmetic, but also improve students, and 
teachers, knowledge of Islam.  Misinterpretation of the 
Koran is one reason why some extremists regard anyone who 
does not adhere to their narrow worldview as non-Muslim.  To 
illustrate his point, MbZ described how UAE Special Forces on 
patrol in Afghanistan heard villagers (influenced by the 
Taliban) asserting that the Emirati soldiers were 
&non-Muslims8 because their version of Islam and their 
practices differed from their own. 
Atmospherics 
------------ 
 
12. (C) The dinner, which was outdoors at a casual Abu Dhabi 
seafood restaurant, was informal and laid-back, with other 
patrons seated nearby and minimal security.  The conversation 
was free-flowing, and it was apparent that MBZ felt very 
comfortable and at-ease with Townsend and her delegation. 
While MBZ has relinquished his UAE Armed Forces Chief of 
Staff duties in favor of his new Crown Prince role, he 
continues to have an active hand in the UAE counterterror 
structure.  He remains a key UAE CT interlocutor on both 
civilian and military matters. 
 
13. (U) This cable has been cleared by Homeland Security 
Advisor Townsend and Assistant Secretary for Economic and 
Business Affairs Wayne. 
 
14. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
SISON