US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI718

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HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR TOWNSEND MEETS WITH DUABI CROWN PRINCE SHEIKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID

Identifier: 05ABUDHABI718
Wikileaks: View 05ABUDHABI718 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2005-02-15 12:11:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: IR IZ PREL PTER SA TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  12/06/2006 02:54:55 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
C O N F I D E N T I A L        ABU DHABI 00718

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: AMB
    INFO:   DCM POL ECON

DISSEMINATION: AMB
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: CG:JDAVIS
CLEARED: ECON:ACURTIS DCM:RALBRIGHT

VZCZCADI204
RR RUEHC RUEHZM RHEHNSC
DE RUEHAD #0718/01 0461211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151211Z FEB 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8200
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000718 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR PATRICK HEFFERNAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015 
TAGS: IR, IZ, PREL, PTER, SA, TC 
SUBJECT: HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR TOWNSEND MEETS WITH 
DUABI CROWN PRINCE SHEIKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reason 
s 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 1. (C) Summary: In a February 7 meeting with Dubai Crown 
Prince (and UAE Defense Minister) Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid 
(MBR), White House Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend 
expressed appreciation for the UAE's contributions to our 
counterterrorism efforts.  Noting that it was a hopeful time 
for the Israel/Palestinian issue, Townsend warned against the 
danger posed by Hizballah, both in the region and from 
Hizballah "sleeper cells" in the U.S." MBR vowed to assist 
against Hizballah whether in Lebanon or Syria.  Separately, 
Townsend said that is was important that the USG find a way 
to be more welcoming to our friends and allies even as we 
become better at keeping out our enemies. End Summary 
 
2. (C) Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, 
accompanied by Ambassador, EB A/S Wayne, and CG Dubai, opened 
her February 7 meeting with Dubai Crown Prince (and UAE 
MinDef) Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashed (MBR) by noting that she 
had quoted him in a speech she gave at the Saudi 
Counterterrorism Conference she had just attended.  MBR's 
comment (at the Arab Strategy Forum in Dubai) that regional 
leaders needed to do more that sit around "arguing about the 
color of the tiger's stripes" had captured the essence of her 
own "deeds more than words" message perfectly.  MBR responded 
that "from day one" the UAE had been a partner in the fight 
against terrorism and money laundering; "we are 100 percent 
with you."  Townsend thanked MBR for the tremendous 
cooperation Dubai,s State Security Organization (SSO) had 
given DHS and US intelligence services. 
 
Fighting Terrorism with Words? 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) MBR said that when it came to prevent terrorism in 
Dubai, "our approach is to keep people occupied and busy; to 
allow them to live their lives."  Dubai had people from many 
nations, all trying to work and derive benefit from their 
presence in Dubai. "Our people are happy, and the people who 
work here are happy -- they can all do or say anything they 
want as long as they don't harm someone else."  If there were 
those who were unhappy and they formed groups that formed a 
threat, "we go to them, talk to them, so they don't disturb 
our guests."  Inevitably they were "half-educated," since 
anyone educated would know that "Islam doesn't say that," 
(i.e. espouse violence). MBR said that in some cases he would 
have the notables in a particular locale assemble such people 
together, and he would go have dinner with them, urging them 
to "go back to the Koran, and read it."  In this way 
potential violence was "defused."  In the case of a man 
arrested for plotting to blow up the Burj al-Arab hotel, MBR 
had gone to see him after he spent three days in custody. 
After speaking to him he had ordered him to "go home" to his 
family, which was well known.  Not only had the man ceased to 
be a threat, he had actually provided the name of an 
accomplice, boasted MBR. 
 
4. (C) Acknowledging that Dubai and the UAE had so far been 
"very fortunate," Townsend urged MBR to recognize that "you 
are vulnerable. It would be a mistake to "take peace" from 
the fact that, so far, nothing had happened.  It was 
important to take steps now -- as was being done in the 
Critical Infrastructure Initiative -- to reduce the 
vulnerability before something actually happened.  MBR agreed 
that it was important "not to take the easier way" by waiting 
until something happened and then reacting to it by "taking 
revenge."  That would only lead to an escalating cycle of 
violence. 
 
5. (C) Later in the meeting, SSO Director Al-Qamzi noted that 
there was a problem with those who remained "psychologically 
committed" to commit terrorism even after being spoken to. 
"After a period of time, you have to release them, and there 
is a risk, a danger."  The problem, he explained, was that 
these people were "brainwashed" into believing that 
committing terrorism would send them straight to heaven. 
There were intercepts of one terrorist telling another, en 
route to Mosul, that he was "lucky because he would get to 
heaven before" the other. Al-Qamzi reported that a network of 
Iraq insurgent fundraisers that the Dubai SSO had discovered 
"couldn't be prosecuted" (presumably due to lack of evidence) 
but that their visas had been canceled and they had been 
deported.  Other members of the network, because they were 
"inactive," remained in the UAE for now but would not have 
their visas renewed (and would thus be forced to depart the 
country at some future time). 
 
Israel/Palestinians/Hizballah/Iran 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Townsend said it was possible that we are currently at 
a "moment of hope" for the President's vision for 
Israel/Palestine, a vision of two states living side by side 
in peace and security.  But there was a danger that, as we 
moved forward, the people with the most to lose -- Hizballah 
and Iran -- would try to destabilize things.  Anything your 
service can to do to help our services in this regard would 
be appreciated.  MBR responded that "we can help," against 
Hizballah, whether in Lebanon or Syria, and that in fact the 
SSO had in the past provided information related to Iranian 
assistance to Hizballah. 
 
7. (C) MBR argued that the most important thing in terms of 
controlling Hizballah would be for Israel to give land to the 
Palestinians -- if they had land, and a state, there would be 
no excuse for Hizballah to fight, and the entire world would 
then be united against them.  Townsend responded that 
Hizballah was getting USD 40 million a year from Iran, as 
well as arms and training; the world should be "united in 
criticism" against that now.  "We want you to pressure Iran," 
MBR responded, "but please, please don't just go bomb them, 
because they would hit back, at your interests and ours." 
Townsend assured him that it was "our clear intention to deal 
with Iran diplomatically," and that we wanted the community 
of nations to join us in getting them to become a member of 
the community of nations.  SSO Director Al-Qamzi observed 
that "while we have good trade relations with Iran, their WMD 
program is not in our interests, so we use lists -- MTCR, 
IAEA, UN and more -- to stop WMD related shipments to Iran.8 
 Recently Dubai had closed down 11 of 15 companies affiliated 
with Iran's WMD program; the remaining four would also be 
closed down as soon as a case against them could be developed. 
 
Sleeper Cells 
------------- 
 
8. (C) MBR said he was worried about information from the 
British and the French about Al-Qaeda "sleeper cells" that 
might be present in Europe.  Townsend said that the U.S. 
shared these concerns.  There were supporters of Hizballah in 
the U.S. who were raising money and sending it back.  They 
weren't carrying out violent operations, but that was the 
definition of a sleeper cell.  We were working to undermine 
them. 
 
Facilitating Travel 
------------------- 
 
9. (C) Townsend told MBR that she and Secretary Rice were 
concerned that the focus on safeguards in the 3-1/2 years 
after 9/11 had led to a situation in which the coming 
generation in the region would not benefit from the same 
education and family ties to the U.S. that their parents had 
experienced.  There was going to be a review of US security 
procedures, and an attempt to refine them to better keep out 
those we didn't want, while being more welcoming to our 
friends and allies from the region. This was an issue that 
was important to President Bush personally. "As a good friend 
and ally, what do you think we should consider," she asked 
MBR. 
 
10. (C) Pointing to his advisors around the room (Sheikh 
Ahmed bin Saeed Al-Maktoum of Emirates Airlines; Sultan bin 
Sulayim of Dubai Ports, Customs, and Free Zone; and Mohammed 
Al-Qamzi of SSO), MBR noted that "most of my team studied in 
the U.S., but they are not going back as much as they used 
to."  Still, he said, his "only advice" was for the U.S. to 
"recognize its friends from its enemies" and that "we should 
feel from you that you appreciate our work with you." As for 
himself, he said, "I go every year to America because of my 
horses; nothing will stop me."  MBR said he was hearing that 
procedures at U.S. airports were getting more simple and 
routine, and Sultan bin Sulayem confirmed this. (As the 
meeting concluded, Sheikh Ahmed told CG that he had been 
pulled aside and questioned by airport authorities during his 
most recent trip; when asked to share his experience with 
Townsend, however, he quickly demurred, indicating that it 
wouldn't be appropriate to complain to a high-level guest.) 
 
Atmospherics 
------------ 
 
11. (C) The meeting with MBR was formal and a bit stilted at 
first, but MBR later relaxed and began sharing stories and 
anecdotes with Townsend.  At one point, he asked Sultan bin 
Sulayim to tell about an experience he had in the United 
States in the late 1970,s as a way to illustrate how people 
can get sucked into extremism.  While studying in the U.S., 
Sulayim met a group of Muslim students at a conference in 
Louisiana.  One of the men convinced Sulayim to join his 
group on a cross-country trip.  They stayed overnight in 
mosques along their route, but the hosts kept waking everyone 
up all night long to talk about Islam.  Upon arrival in 
Cleveland, they tried to convince Sulayim to go to Canada and 
continue studying Islam with them, but Sulayim refused. 
Sulayim inferred that extremists use such tactics ) tiring 
people to the point of exhaustion so that they can be 
brainwashed with religious material ) to recruit 
unsuspecting young Muslims.  MBR kept interrupting to add 
details to the story, adding his own spin to the tale.  While 
still grappling with how to go about countering the threat 
terrorism poses to busy, bustling Dubai, MBR has assembled a 
small, trusted team around him, including two key advisors, 
Sultan bin Sulayim and, increasingly, SSD Director Mohammed 
Al-Qamzi. 
 
(U) This cable has been cleared by Homeland Security Advisor 
Townsend and Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business 
Affairs Wayne. 
SISON 

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