US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK1169

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001169 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV. HQ USPACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, TH, TRT - Thai Rak Thai, US-Thai FTA, Southern Thailand, POL/MIL 
SUBJECT: THAILAND:  THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PM 
THAKSIN, FEBRUARY 14, 2005 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason:  1.4 (b, d) 
 
 1. (C) The Ambassador met with Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra at Government House on February 14, 2005. 
Although this meeting was billed as an official "courtesy 
call," the Ambassador had met with Thaksin several times 
since his arrival January 2 with the many high-level visits 
for the tsunami relief effort and other events.  PM Thaksin 
was warm and friendly from the onset of the meeting, 
welcoming the Ambassador back to Thailand, and recalling how 
they had talked about the country's future during the 
Ambassador's previous assignment to the Embassy.  The 
Ambassador congratulated Thaksin on his election landslide; 
Thaksin expressed his appreciation for the President's 
congratulatory telephone call.  The PM said he looked forward 
to hosting former Presidents Bush and Clinton in Phuket on 
February 19.  During discussion of the regional humanitarian 
aid effort staged out of Utapao, Thaksin stressed his strong 
support for bilateral cooperation and strengthening the 
special relationship that the United States and Thailand 
enjoy. 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador asked Thaksin about next steps and 
policy initiatives now that Thai Rak Thai (TRT) is solely in 
control of the Lower House of Parliament.  Thaksin said that 
the House will reconvene on March 4 and, after selecting a 
new Speaker, will officially choose a prime minister.  The 
new cabinet will be in place by March 18.  He said that in 
his second term, the economic emphasis will be more on 
"supply and efficiency,"  and refined market-oriented 
policies. 
 
3. (C) On the FTA, Thaksin said that, with the election 
campaign now behind us, the talks could proceed.  He reminded 
the Ambassador twice that it was he, Thaksin, who had 
proposed the FTA in the first place.  Thaksin said he had 
promised the President that the FTA would be comprehensive. 
The Ambassador spoke about the need to educate the Thai 
public on the benefits that would derive from an FTA. 
Thaksin said that he preferred the use of the word 
"discussion" to "negotiation" because it carried more of an 
image of equals working together.  (Note:  Finance Minister 
Somkid Jatusripitak introduced this concept in the 
Ambassador's meeting with him two weeks ago.  End Note.) 
Pansak Vinyaratn, one of the PM's close advisors, interjected 
that, while official Thai negotiators had been named, it was 
time now to "empower" discussions with Somkid and his team. 
(Note:  Somkid may not retain the Finance portfolio, but 
seems headed for an economic management and policy oversight 
role.  End Note.)  Pansak implied that the Somkid discussions 
would be a parallel track with the actual primary negotiating 
team.  Thaksin expressed interest in the shift of USTR 
Zoellick to State, asking whether Zoellick would retain 
interest in the FTA talks as Deputy Secretary if confirmed. 
 
4. (C) Thaksin began assessed the violence in the South in 
familiar terms.  He complained about the spread of bad 
Islamic theology through some pondoks (Islamic schools).  He 
said more arrests would be made to break up the network of 
false teachers.  He asserted an Indonesia connection, noting 
that some separatists traveled to Medan.  At one point, 
Thaksin characterized the situation as "all political," in 
which even some members of Parliament were involved in 
fomenting problems.  Even some candidates from his own TRT 
party who lost in the election, bent on revenge, could 
complicate matters, he said.  Thaksin acknowledged that some 
change in his southern strategy was needed, but described it 
only as more of a focus on "peacekeeping."  (Note:  The 
Thaksin administration is continuing plans to beef up the 
number of military troops in the deep South, claiming that 
their primary responsibilities will be civic affairs.  End 
Note.) 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador raised the Ford case and Thaksin said 
it had some legal ramifications.  Pansak interjected that the 
Thai government was trying to make accommodations and come to 
an agreement.  He said that the emphasis was on forging a 
settlement and not prosecuting Ford.  However, since Ford had 
acted on bad legal and tax advice and done something wrong, a 
solution that takes into account those actions was necessary. 
 However, a lower fine would be possible, he said. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador also brought up the Thai fighter 
aircraft purchase, called for transparency in the decision, 
and spoke about the capabilities of the F-16, which is 
already in Thailand's inventory.  Thaksin said the priority 
is not so much on the aircraft itself as a policy to 
"expedite exports."  This led to a brief discussion of 
chickens and countertrade.  The Ambassador argued that 
interoperability, military capabilities, and long-term costs 
should be primary considerations, but Thaksin stayed with his 
emphasis on the importance of export implications. 
 
7. (C) On another advocacy issue the Ambassador raised, the 
Engine Alliance (Pratt & Whitney and GE) interest in 
supplying engines for the new Thai Airbus purchase, Thaksin 
seemed confused on the facts of the bid.  He assumed that 
Pratt & Whitney was somehow out of the picture, and spoke of 
a possible teaming up of GE and Rolls Royce (the key rival). 
 
8. (C)  The Ambassador raised the matter of a follow-on Thai 
military contingent in Iraq, noting that we looked forward to 
a positive decision on that issue.  Thaksin indicated only 
that it was still under consideration. 
BOYCE