Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 05HARARE229 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05HARARE229 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Harare |
| Created: | 2005-02-15 05:04:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC ZANU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000229 SIPDIS AF/S FOR BNEULING NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2010 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC, ZANU-PF SUBJECT: MATABELELAND RESTIVE AS CAMPAIGNS COMMENCE Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 1. (C) SUMMARY: During the Ambassador's visit to Bulawayo February 7-8, MDC and civil society figures reviewed the election environment in surrounding Matabeleland, a historically marginalized region that is the principal home to Zimbabwe's leading minority Ndebele tribe (about 15 percent of the population). In contrast to other areas of the country, police in the region were reported to be stepping up efforts to restrict public assembly. However, opposition and civil society interlocutors said they were proceeding with public meetings with or without official approval. Consistent with national trends, ruling party militia and war veteran elements were maintaining low profiles and anti-MDC violence was markedly reduced compared to prior pre-election periods. Most predicted that, unless the GOZ engineered a violent anti-opposition crackdown, ZANU-PF would not win more than six or seven seats out of 21 in Bulawayo, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. Some complimented the Secretary's designation of Zimbabwe as an outpost of tyranny and asked what its implications were for U.S. policy. END SUMMARY. Violence Down; Fear Remains ------------------------ 2. (C) The Ambassador met on February 7 with a group of MDC MPs from Matabeleland: Moses Mzila-Ncube, Thokozani Khupe, and Abednico Bhebhe. On February 8 he met with a civil society group: Peter Khumalo, a prince of the Ndebele royal family and businessman; Nigel Johnson, Catholic priest and Station Manager of Radio Dialogue; and George Mkhwananzi, member of the National Constitutional Assembly -- all three officers of the USAID-funded Bulawayo Agenda. The MPs offered an optimistic appraisal of the party,s election prospects in Matabeleland on the heels of the party,s official re-entry into the race the previous week. The MPs and civil society prepresentatives agreed that anti-opposition militia and war veteran activity in rural districts were markedly less than earlier campaigns and continued not to be a problem in urban areas. The MPs reported that some war veterans and village headmen were being discreetly supportive of the MDC despite relentless GOZ efforts to co-opt them with perks and pledges of assistance. 3. (C) Mzila-Ncube described the atmosphere in his rural South Matabeleland constituency as notably more restive over the weekend, however, with people fearing a possible escalation of violence consistent with past contested elections. Local ruling party structures were conflicted: their leaders consistently called for non-violence and tolerance, but they feared certain election defeat if they were not allowed to resort to intimidation as in the past. All agreed that there remained an atmosphere of fear, particularly in the rural areas, as most of the electorate remained skeptical of the ruling party's public commitment to non-violence. Indeed, they all forecast a sudden "snap" of violence in rural areas if ZANU-PF leaders began to think it was in real danger of losing. However, all were confident that Bulawayo was too public a venue and too solidly pro-opposition to experience any significant violence. Public Assembly Occurring Despite Constraints -------------------------------------------- 4. (C) The three MPs asserted that police and the CIO in Matabeleland were playing an increasingly disruptive role in their efforts to reach the people. Khupe was scheduled to appear in court February 10 to answer charges associated with her arrest last month with 80 supporters for an alleged violation of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). Bhebhe was late for the lunch because he had to meet with police in connection with their "investigation" of his attendance at a "Burial Society" meeting, also a possible POSA violation. Still, all agreed that some junior police supported the MDC and many more were sympathizers; senior levels, however, were pro-ZANU-PF and thoroughly politicized and all levels were constrained by career considerations. Mzila-Ncube emphasized that official harassment in any event was hardly insurmountable and cited the courage of Iraqis voting last month as an inspirational example for Zimbabweans in enduring and overcoming their own obstacles to democracy. 5. (C) Given constraints posed by police restrictions and the party,s lack of access to the media, the MDC MPs said their party was being creative in its efforts to connect to the people. In addition to approved rallies at established venues, unauthorized meetings were led from the back of pick-up trucks, which allowed for quick dispersal if necessary. Meetings at the homes of constituents were popular and could accommodate as many as 50 people at a time. In rural areas, business centers and pubs were gathering areas that could be used for political communication on an impromptu basis. House-to-house canvassing was important, albeit risky, and Khupe said she was planning an ambitious personal letter campaign. All emphasized the importance of VOA's "Studio 7" (an hour-long Zimbabwe-specific program), which they said was widely heard in rural areas, and were pleased with the Ambassador,s news that it would be expanded to include two programs per day for the pre-election period. 6. (C) The civil society interolocutors said civil society groups were also managing to meet publicly in spite of official obstacles. Khumalo said Bulawayo Agenda organized about one public forum per month, bringing together party and community figures to address topical issues. Police often denied applications for meeting authorizations, sometimes on specious grounds. They imposed conditions to reduce participation, such as requiring meetings be conducted during working hours, and typically sent police representatives to monitor each meeting. Ruling party figures were invited but rarely showed up, presumably because they were barred by their superiors or feared a hostile audience. In any event, people were quite outspoken during the meetings and did not appear to suffer retribution. Personal relationships were important as NGOs pursued their objectives, according to Fr. Johnson, and some NGOs, including Bulawayo Agenda, were tentatively building relationships of growing two-way trust with selected authorities. Town Square Test ---------------- 7. (C) The three Bulawayo Agenda participants agreed that President Bush's "town square" test could be met in some parts of Zimbabwe but not others. In Bulawayo, the urban masses were sufficiently numerous and unanimous in their loathing of the government that one could speak relatively freely. Group expressions of speech could be exercised without retribution -- but often only with official approval. Rural areas were a different story altogether, and even in Harare the atmosphere seemed considerably more chilled, perhaps because there was so much traffic between ZANU-PF-dominated Mashonaland and the city. In any event, the well-publicized arrests of people for innocuous criticism of the President in public areas made people think twice, even if they were not common occurrences. Ever-restrictive laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), and the pending NGO bill similarly chilled free speech even if they were not enforced rigidly. Campaign Issues --------------- 8. (C) The three MDC MPs reported that they would be pushing GOZ failure to address basic needs - food, health, shelter, jobs - in its campaign. ZANU-PF,s threat to individual security based on its historical reliance on violence also would be highlighted. Convincing people that their vote was secret and mattered would also be an important campaign SIPDIS priority. The opposition also would expose land reform as a fraud, although Mzila-Ncube conceded that the party had not fully come to grip with how to address the diverse challenges of land reform. People understood the ruling party,s effort had been a complete failure but the MDC had not offered a coherent, comprehensive alternative. The civil society group warned that hunger was a growing problem; children on the Hwange Road were now hand-signalling their hunger to all passers-by and the situation was even worse in the remote areas around Binga. "Opposition Will Win Matabeleland" --------------------------------------- 9. (C) The MPs and civil society representatives were confident that recent ZANU-PF turmoil would boost opposition prospects in the election. The MPs lamented the removal of more constructive ruling party elements from the ZANU-PF parliamentary slate but asserted that many of the discarded MPs were actively working against their successor candidates. At a minimum, their supporters would be less inclined to vote even if they would not go as far as supporting the opposition. Any who ran as an independent (as Jonathan Moyo is rumored to be considering) would divide the ZANU-PF vote, further enhancing opposition prospects. Civil society figures agreed that support for the MDC in Matabeleland still stemmed primarily from opposition to ZANU-PF more than the appeal of any MDC platform. All agreed that the opposition would lose no more than six or seven seats of 14 in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South and would sweep Bulawayo's seven seats. Ethnic/Tribal Resentments Festering -------------------------- 10. (C) The MPs and civil society leaders asserted that the contrast between heightened police disruption in Matabeleland with documented trends of greater openness in Shona-dominated areas reflected the ruling party's deep-seated fear of Ndebele rebelliousness. Some emphasized the continuing deep resentment felt by the Ndebele at large over the massacres of the 1980s and the region's economic and political marginalization by the GOZ ever since. They maintained that the Ndebele were so used to oppression that no amount of intimidation would make many vote ZANU-PF. Still, they conceded that discredited hard-line Information Minister Jonathan Moyo had achieved inroads among the Ndebele by delivering tangible goods -- computers, blankets, clinics -- to populations that heretofore had gotten nothing from the ruling party but intimidation. ZANU-PF had shot itself in the foot by punishing his success and reasserting the dominance of ZANU-PF's Ndebele heavyweights such as John Nkomo and Dumiso Dabengwa, who were loathed as sell-outs by most Ndebele, according to our interlocutors. 11. (C) Mkhwananzi asked the Ambassador why the USG was not more sensitive to and supportive of Ndebele resistance against the Shona-dominated GOZ. He argued that ethnic resentments presented the USG with an opportunity that it should exploit in trying to press for change in Zimbabwe. Drawing on the lessons of history, the Ambassador explained that the USG saw no advantage to fanning ethnic divisions in Zimbabwe or elsewhere. The key to resolving the plight of the Ndebele and many other suffering Zimbabweans lay in good governance and establishment of a government that reflected the will of all of its people. Mkhwananzi nonetheless later pressed the issue again, asserting that no Shona-dominated government, regardless of party, would ever treat the Ndebele fairly. Appreciation for USG Engagement ----------------------------------------- 12. (C) The MPs and civil society leaders expressed strong appreciation for the Secretary,s public characterization of Zimbabwe as an outpost of tyranny and stressed its importance as an emotional boost to a despondent populace that was beginning to re-energize. Several asked what the statement would mean in terms of future USG commitment of resources. The Ambassador stressed the depth of USG commitment to liberty as exemplified by the Secretary's and President Bush's recent public statements and the USG's ongoing work with democratic forces in Zimbabwe. Comment --------- 13. (C) Matabeleland may be where ZANU-PF suffers most for its Tsholotsho and primaries debacles -- whatever local loyalty Moyo may have bought with his aggressive sales job appears to have been for naught. Ndebele resentment of the ruling party is much more apparent from within Matabeleland than it is from Harare. While the MDC does not appear to be actively exploiting that ethnic tension, it no doubt will continue to benefit from it. We also got the sense that the local MDC MPs are more in touch than many in either party's national leadership with the bread and butter issues -- hunger, education, health, jobs -- that are central to the suffering of their constituents. Deeply resentful of the government, the alienated electorate may produce a surprise result March 31. However, overt opposition momentum may lead the ruling party to resort to violence, which could also prove a key factor in this part of Zimbabwe. DELL
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04