Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 05HARARE228 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05HARARE228 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Harare |
| Created: | 2005-02-14 14:58:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ZI ZANU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000228 SIPDIS AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2010 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, SOCI, ZI, ZANU-PF SUBJECT: ZANU-PF DINOSAURS, DISSENTERS EXPOSE RULING PARTY VULNERABILITIES Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 1. (C) SUMMARY: During the Ambassador's February 7-9 trip to Bulawayo and Masvingo, ZANU-PF "Old Guard" figures Thenjiwe Lesabe and Dumiso Dabengwa excoriated the party's younger generation for their unseemly disregard for "liberation values," in their view, the basis for ZANU-PF's right to rule. Highly regarded party outsiders Dzikamayi Mavhaire and Eddison Zvobgo, Jr., lamented the party's deepening ossification in the wake of recent purges, but suggested that the supplanting of hard-liners by more moderate Old Guard figures in Mugabe's inner circle could open opportunities for the opposition and the West. The dissidents predicted that intra-party bitterness could cut into the party's election returns and yield surprising dividends for the opposition. END SUMMARY. ------------ Dinosaurs ------------ Lesabe: Liberation Credentials Underlie Party Authority ---------------------------------------- 2. (C) At a February 7 meeting at her family home near Bulawayo, ZANU-PF Women,s League Chairperson and Politburo member Thenjiwe Lesabe denied having been involved with the controversial Tsholotsho meetings last year and asserted that her name had been included on the "Young Turks'" alternative presidium ticket without permission. She blasted Information Minister Jonathan Moyo and other Young Turks for their unseemly disregard for the wishes of the party,s senior leadership. Rejected by the party, Moyo was now desperately trying to play the ethnic/tribal card -- a strategy destined to fail as it had with others in the past. (N.B. Mtabeleland is the heartland of Zimbabwe,s largest minority, the Ndebele, who comprise roughly fifteen percent of the country,s population.) Lesabe said Moyo had managed to attract support from younger elements in the party, but he and his supporters lacked the respect for the party,s liberation values that would be required of the party,s next generation of leadership. Lesabe told the Ambassador that she remained on the Politburo but, with the President,s permission, was reducing her public profile to attend to her ailing 90-year old husband. 3. (C) Lesabe declined the Ambassador,s invitation to assess ZANU- PF,s prospects in the upcoming election. She acknowledged a generational division in Matabeleland, with youth attracted to the MDC while the older generation remained loyal to the ruling party. Lesabe described the atmospherics in the region generally as calm; there were some "rougher elements" in the cities but rural areas were orderly. The retired teacher maintained that Matabeleland had not been left behind other regions in development, but later acknowledged that the region had suffered from its people,s reluctance to commit support to the government. Dabengwa: Uncompromising on Young Turks, Opposition, Outside World --------------------------------------------- ---------------- 4. (C) Over dinner on February 7, Politburo Member Dumiso Dabengwa elaborated on recent ferment in ZANU-PF. He asserted that Jonathan Moyo was finished in the party. Moyo appropriately recognized the party,s weaknesses in Matabeleland -- the legacy of massacres in the 1980s and the region,s lagging development -- but had tried to combat them in an unseemly manner. He had been profligate in spending and had alienated the leadership in trying to sidestep them with his so-called "Tsholotsho Declaration." Dabengwa said he and others in the Old Guard overcame Moyo and his allies through manipulation of the party,s gender parity resolution, specifically by having provincial committees declare the seats of certain individuals as reserved for female candidates. As an aside, Dabengwa noted that he was largely responsible for bringing Moyo into the ruling party camp as a result of an encounter at a regional conference on governance held at Robben Island in 1999. 5. (C) Dabengwa dismissed suggestions that alienation of the "Young Turks" would cost the ruling party, and added that they would be welcome back into the fold if they admitted their mistakes, as some already had. For its part, the opposition had no record on which to run, according to Dabengwa. He chastised the opposition parliamentary delegation from Matabeleland for not taking up his offer to collaborate on the Zambezi River Project in which he had played a prominent role. Nonetheless, he complimented some of the opposition as conscientious and emphasized the importance of a vibrant opposition to Zimbabwe,s future -- including a possible ZANU-PF opposition some day. 6. (C) Dabengwa confirmed ZANU-PF plans to change the constitution after the parliamentary elections, with the collaboration of the opposition if necessary. The new arrangement would create a Senate and a new office of Prime Minister. Far from fueling a divisive fight like that precipitated by the recent presidium election, the new rash of positions would enable the ruling party to better balance competing factions. 7. (C) Dabengwa rehearsed familiar criticism of US "sanctions policy" and perceived double standards, and blamed the ruling party,s chaotic approach to land reform on purported US and British reneging on promises to support land reform compensation. The Ambassador clarified US policy and corrected Dabengwa's historical mischaracterizations. Dabengwa bristled at the Ambassador,s challenging of GOZ policies and concluded that Zimbabwe would "find its way" regardless of what outsiders thought. Echoing others in the ruling party, Dabengwa was contradictory on US sanctions, suggesting at once that they were causing Zimbabweans to suffer but not hurting him personally. ------------- Dissenters ------------- Mavhaire: President in Charge of Dysfunctional Party ------------------------------------------- 8. (C) ZANU-PF elder statesman and former Politburo member Dzekimayi Mavhaire told the Ambssador over dinner on February 8 that the ruling party was paralyzed by a lack of meaningful debate. The Tsholotsho debacle and the manipulation of primaries reinforced President Mugabe,s unquestioned grip on the party. Ironically, though, Mugabe,s triumph on those fronts could cost the party in parliamentary elections - many disaffected party leaders and supporters would likely stay home on election day. The party,s repression prevented ZANU-PF from competing effectively with the opposition -- the ruling party had little idea what the opposition stood for much less how it was doing with the electorate. Moreover, ZANU-PF continued to kill the economy by stifling the private sector and encouraging public dependency on the ruling party. In sum, ZANU-PF was digging itself into a hole. 9. (C) Mavhaire, who was suspended from the party leadership when he called for Mugabe's resignation in 1999, predicted that the election would produce some surprises. The ruling party was devoting a lot of resources to reclaiming the one Masvingo seat it lost in 2000; it could take it back. On the other hand, the rural masses "were not as sleepy as one might think:" and even though the financially crippled opposition had no record on which to run, resentment of the poverty wrought by ruling party policies was growing. Disaffection among the ZANU-PF troops over recent purges was an additional factor. The MDC could therefore make inroads into some of the ruling party's traditional rural strongholds. 10. (C) Mavhaire dismissed the potential significance of high profile Masvingo factional divisions -- the President would continue to manipulate their leaders with prospective punishments and rewards measured by loyalty to him. Mavhaire described Vice President Msika and retired General Solomon Mujuru as the system,s only "untouchables." Fallen heir apparent Emmerson Mnangagwa would continue to be potentially significant, but only insofar as his ability to get others to tow the line, not in his ability to stand up to the President. Should a post-election constitutional amendment create a Prime Minister,s position, Mavhaire predicted that the cowed party would not suffer the kind of competitive ferment it experienced in the run-up to last year,s presidium contest -- the President would simply name his choice and that would be that. Zvobgo: Don't Give Up on Zimbabwe ------------------------------------ 11. (C) Eddison Zvobgo, Jr., son of the late Masvingo political giant, forcefully echoed Mavhaire in forecasting potential trouble for the ruling party in the coming elections. The party would suffer for its "disastrous" primaries and the abuse of gender diversity objectives. Bringing women into the leadership was a laudable goal, but it had been disingenuously pursued for cynical political advantage. Zvobgo added that the ascendant Old Guard would be less effective than the recently purged Young Turks at delivering the vote. He said that the MDC had meaningful chances not only to hold Masvingo,s urban seat, but to claim two to three new rural ones as well. The opposition would remain strong in urban areas nationally as well as throughout Matabeleland. He thought the MDC could win as many as 62 seats, and probably at least 55 if the ruling party did not engineer too violent a crackdown. However, if the leadership recognized its vulnerability, it would unleash violence at the local level, although the SADC microscope might serve to contain the scale to some extent. 12. (C) For his part, Zvobgo said his disappointment over being excluded from the parliamentary race would not drive him from politics. He said he and other younger elements in the business community had long eschewed politics, preferring to wait until the system changed more to their liking. In the past year, however, he and others had decided to be more proactive, and despite recent failures, they would bide their time until the opportunity came to make a more forceful contribution to change in Zimbabwe. Zvobgo would not facilitate the ruling party in its national campaign but would maintain his party credentials by campaigning for fellow Young Turk Walter Mzembi in his father,s old constituency and by contributing to regional development. He recently founded the Masvingo Press Club and was working on ways to bring investment and revenue to the area, such as the re-opening of Masvingo airport to commercial traffic and a road toll concept (N.B. Masvingo is on the main trucking route from South Africa). 13. (C) Looking ahead to post-election Zimbabwe, Zvobgo said that if the MDC won at least 50 seats, ZANU-PF would have to adopt a more engaging posture in order to effect its priority of constitutional change. In any event, hard-liners Jonathan Moyo and Patrick Chinamasa would be sidelined and atmospherics would likely soften after the election. 14. (C) Zvobgo emphasized that the United States was in a position to make important contributions to Zimbabwe,s political development but expressed concern that we may be giving up on Zimbabwe. The ascendancy of "moderates" at the expense of hardliners in recent purges presented us with an opportunity. Old Guard moderates like Nkomo, Shamuyarira, Gono, and even retired General Solomon Mujuru were in a position to influence Mugabe positively, but needed to be able to show him that a more moderate approach at home and abroad could bring advantages: "The ice needs to melt before they can get their heads above water." The international community could exert positive influence on key issues, like the NGO bill, with proper care. Shrill denunciations and public demands only provoked more rigid resistance and fortified a sterile anti-imperialist posture. As an aside, Zvobgo asserted that we should not count on South Africa for any decisive influence -- Mugabe had correctly assessed that there were no conditions under which Mbeki would be willing to stand up to him or exert any meaningful pressure on the GOZ. Comment ----------- 15. (C) The contrasting accounts offered by dinosaurs Lesabe and Dabengwa and dissenters Mavhaire and Zvobgo underscore the ruling party's most glaring vulnerability: its increasing brittleness and internal divisions. Representative of many in the ascendant Old Guard, Lesabe and Dabengwa seemed thoroughly out of touch with the bread and butter priorities central to the lives of most Zimbabweans -- food security, education, health care, employment. Their denial of ethnic tensions in historically marginalized Matabeleland is at odds with the accounts we heard from opposition members and civil society in the region (to be reported septel). The sole basis of their claimed legitimacy to lead -- devotion to the liberation struggle -- is increasingly irrelevant to most of the electorate, half of which was "born free" after liberation. 16. (C) The alienation of figures sidelined by Tsholotsho and the primaries -- including a majority of provincial chairmen, many of the party's most dynamic backbenchers, and a number of prominent businesspersons -- could dent the party's considerable systemic advantages going into the elections. Certainly, the absence of these figures from the party's inner circles will likely leave the party more moribund in outlook and less nimble in responding to changing events. That said, the sacking of influential hard-line Young Turks might also lead to more moderate domestic and foreign policies, especially economic, and may give us an opening to increase our influence with and leverage over the regime. Interestingly, none of our disaffected interlocutors or their alienated colleagues appear even to consider the possibility of "defecting" to the opposition. They apparently calculate that ZANU-PF remains the vehicle best-suited to address their personal priorities for now, even as they bide their time for a change in leadership they desire but are unwilling to fight for. DELL
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04