US embassy cable - 05PARIS890

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000890 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE FOR OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY; NNSA; STATE FOR T, NP; AC; 
EUR; DOD FOR OSD; DETROM; DEPT PASS NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2025 
TAGS: ENRG, PTER, KNNP, RU 
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIAN DISCUSSION OF U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT 
JOINT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR SECURITY, FEB 11, 2005, PARIS 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR LINTON BROOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY.  Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and 
National Nuclear Security Administrator Linton Brooks held 
fruitful meetings with Director of the Federal Agency of 
Atomic Energy (Rosatom) Alexandr Rumyantsev to discuss a 
possible U.S.-Russian joint statement on counter terrorism 
and preventing the spread of WMD to be issued at the time of 
the Presidential Summit in Bratislava. The discussion was 
based on the US draft joint statement Secretary Rice gave to 
Foreign Minister Lavrov in Ankara. Possible joint statement 
topics discussed include expanding efforts to: secure civil 
nuclear facilities, convert research reactor cores from 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) 
fuel, exchange nuclear security best practices, respond to 
nuclear emergencies, combat terrorism, and complete joint 
nuclear warhead and material security work by 2008.   The 
Russians opposed a joint statement on nuclear security, but 
may be willing to include a brief statement on nuclear 
security issues as a part of a larger summit document. 
 
2. (SBU) The Secretary was accompanied by an interagency team 
from the Departments of State, Energy and Defense.  Director 
Rumyantsev was accompanied by representatives of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and Rosatom. 
 
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ONE-ON-ONE 
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3. (SBU) Secretary Bodman and Director Rumyantsev met 
separately in a private meeting prior to the main discussions 
and will be reported separately SEPTEL to follow.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
------------------ 
 
4. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed cooperation in the 
area of emergency response and consequence management. 
 
5. (S) The Russian side felt that this was not a new 
initiative because we had ongoing collaboration in this area 
and stated it was not suitable for the Summit statement. They 
did, however, respond positively to the idea of increasing 
current cooperation in this area. In particular, they pointed 
out the Rosatom transportation exercise at Sarov in the fall 
of 2003 and the MoD exercise conducted in Murmansk in late 
2004 as examples of successful exercises conducted by the 
Russian Federation and attended by representatives of the 
USG. Both sides agreed that discussing mutual problems in the 
area of emergency response and consequence management was 
extremely beneficial. 
 
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NUCLEAR SECURITY AT CIVILIAN FACILITIES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed increased 
collaboration in the area of security at civilian nuclear 
facilities through exchange of technical experts, best 
practices and threat information. 
 
7. (S) The Russian side responded positively to this 
proposal. They noted that significant cooperation was 
underway already, but want to increase the number of joint 
table-top exercises and other exchanges.  In particular, the 
Russians have unilaterally begun to work on such issues. 
They have conducted psychological studies, for instance, to 
examine the insider threat. They conduct an exercise each 
year at one of their ten nuclear power plants. Such exercises 
last two to three weeks. They also noted with concern the 
issue of vulnerabilities at civilian sites from aircraft 
attack and would like to exchange views on this.  The Russian 
Duma is considering legislation to close airspace over such 
plants to facilitate air defense operations. The Russian side 
cautioned that information from this kind of exchange was 
extremely sensitive and should be protected accordingly to 
avoid revealing vulnerabilities to possible terrorists.  All 
agencies encouraged future work in this area. The U.S. side 
said that it would provide concrete proposals in this area. 
 
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RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL CONVERSION 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed establishing a Joint 
Coordinating Committee to oversee development of new LEU 
fuels to replace HEU fuels currently in use in U.S. and 
Russian research reactors.  The U.S. also proposed 
accelerating repatriation of both U.S.- and Russian-origin 
HEU spent nuclear fuel. 
 
9. (S) The Russian side agreed that it was in our mutual 
interest to continue efforts to develop alternative LEU fuels 
to convert existing research reactors.  The Russian side did 
not believe that it would be technologically possible to 
develop alternative LEU fuels for all research reactors, 
particularly high-flux reactors.  The Russian side was 
uncomfortable with describing schedules as "accelerated," and 
felt that the pace of the work was adequate, adding that the 
word "acceleration" had a negative connotation to the 
Russians; they associate the word with the programs of 
"acceleration and perestroika" of the Gorbachev era, and not 
in a favorable way.  On an encouraging note, when Brooks 
pushed for a timetable because "we don,t have a great deal 
of time left" to get this work done, Rumyantsev noted that we 
both have only four years to complete all of our work. 
 
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NUCLEAR SECURITY WORK 
--------------------- 
 
10. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed establishing firm 
deadlines to complete cooperative security upgrades at 
Rosatom and Ministry of Defense nuclear material and warhead 
storage sites by 2008. Brooks noted that the proposed dates 
did not have to be made public, but that we must set a 
schedule by which this work will be completed.  Brooks 
further noted that to complete work at Rosatom sites, the 
U.S. technical teams would have to be granted access to the 
last remaining sites to be secured, the serial production 
enterprises (SPEs). 
 
11. (S) The Russia side indicated that the SPEs were "pretty 
secure" already and Rosatom had adequate technology and 
funding for site security.  Therefore, Russia no longer felt 
U.S. assistance was necessary at the last two SPEs.  The 
Russians noted that no foreigner had ever visited the two 
active SPEs but he did offer to seek authority to allow U.S. 
personnel access to the "living areas" of one SPE in order to 
verify that security was sufficient.  When pressed, the 
Russians could not guarantee access, but have already begun 
working with the appropriate agencies to allow such a visit. 
 
12. (C) With regard to MOD sites, the Russians agreed to 
provide the U.S. with a list of sites that required security 
upgrades by mid to late summer. 
 
13. (C) The MOD also mentioned that they would like true 
reciprocity of visits and mentioned that if, for example, we 
went to see five of their sites, they would want to visit 
five of ours.  Because the 12th Main Directorite sites lay 
outside any existing agreement, the Russians suggested the 
U.S. sites must also be sites that had not previously been 
subject to visits. 
 
14. (S) It was clear that GOR had national security concerns 
and intelligence concerns and requested that the two sides 
conclude an information security agreement. 
 
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EXCHANGE OF BEST PRACTICES AND NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
15. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed a workshop or 
series of exchange on nuclear security best practices in 
which experts from the Departments of Defense Energy and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission would discuss common problems 
and solutions in the area of nuclear security.  The U.S. 
mentioned that it has had such dialogues with other countries 
with advanced nuclear programs. Perhaps best practice 
discussions with Russia could evolve into multilateral 
discussions in the future. 
 
16. (S) The Russian delegation, particularly Antonov of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very positive about the 
prospect of exchanging best practices between the two 
governments and even more enthusiastic about involving other 
countries in such a dialogue.  In his view, the United States 
and the Russian Federation know the most about securing 
nuclear material and should share that information.  The 
Russians said that the proposed G-8 nuclear security summit 
was out of the question.  They felt that it was stressful 
enough to host a G-8 meeting and surviving one without 
enduring a heart attack would be the ultimate in "security." 
Antanov did think it was a good idea to mention the tenth 
anniversary of the G-7 nuclear safety summit in Moscow and to 
come out with a statement on nuclear security at that regular 
G-8 meeting. 
 
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Rumyantsev raises a new approach to plutonium disposition 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
17.  (SBU)  In response to a request for any Russian ideas on 
broadening cooperation, Rumyantsev said he had a new idea 
that was actually an old idea.  Several years ago Russia had 
expressed interest in burning weapons plutonium in fast 
reactors, but the United States had been uninterested.  In 
five years, nothing has happened on the mixed oxide (MOX) 
program while Russia had fast reactors that had burned an 
unspecified amount of weapons plutonium. Using their own 
funds Russia had completed 20% of the BN-800 fast breeder 
reactor.  Russian plutonium disposition should be recast to 
focus on fast reactors.  Brooks promised to study the 
proposal and respond at a later date. 
 
18. (C) In the same context, Rumyantsev said that his biggest 
concern of all was the absense of an agreement on Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy. 
 
SIDE DISCUSSIONS: 
 
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MAYAK FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGE FACILITY 
--------------------------------------- 
 
19. (C) In a side conversation with Rumyantsev, Dr. Dale 
Klein of the U.S. Department of Defense brought up the issue 
of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility.  The 
facility, built with DoD funds, remains empty of fissile 
material.  Rumyantsev stated that the reason the facility has 
not become operational is inherently bureaucratic in nature. 
He promised that a letter would be provided to DoD in the 
near future stating that the DoD had fulfilled its 
obligations and turned over a functioning facility.  It would 
then go on to say that the onus is on Rosatom to address the 
problem of moving material into the facility and lays out a 
schedule for doing so. 
 
 
Antonov on plutonium disposition liability 
------------------------------------------ 
 
20.  (C)  In a side discussion with Brooks, Antonov said that 
the recent U.S. proposal on plutonium disposition liability 
would not form a basis for an agreement.  Antonov said U.S. 
draft was essentially the previous U.S. position with the 
right for the Russians to request an exception if they had 
proof about a specific individual.  Putin had personally 
approved the Russian position on liability and the Russians 
could not go far beyond it.  Russia already was being 
pressured by Europeans that if the United States were to get 
new liability provisions the Europeans would expect the same. 
 Finally, Russia already had several different sets of 
liability provisions, including CTR, MNPR and the soon to be 
ratified Vienna Convention. 
 
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Talking points passed to Antonov 
-------------------------------- 
 
21.  (SBU)  At the conclusion of the meeting Brooks told 
Antonov that the need for the Russians to depart for the 
aircraft had left no time for a closing statement.  Brooks 
passed over the text of draft closing remarks he would have 
made, noting that they did not fully reflect the discussions 
that had taken place. 
 
BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS: 
 
The United States still believes that there should be a joint 
statement issued at Bratislava that notes that the two 
Presidents renewed their commitment to cooperative work in 
nuclear security.  It is certain, at least for our President, 
that this topic will be discussed extensively.  We know that 
you will be preparing your President for these discussions as 
well.  This exchange between our Presidents should be 
reflected in a public document.  Both Presidents have made 
nuclear security a priority and the world will not understand 
their failure to note that fact. 
 
We believe that the best statement to issue would be the text 
provided you by Secretary Rice.  We understand, however, that 
some of our suggestions will require additional analysis by 
our Russian colleagues.  We hope the clarifications provided 
today will help with that analysis. 
 
Given this need, the United States suggests that Joint 
Statement containing the first three paragraphs of the draft 
provided by Secretary Rice and a commitment to accelerate our 
joint work with Rosatom and the Ministry of Defense on 
warhead and nuclear material security might be a suitable 
outcome at Bratislava.  A fact sheet alone, as some have 
suggested, appears to us not to capture the personal 
involvement of the two Presidents.  Naturally, were we to 
agree on a joint statement, the United State would also be 
prepared to work on a fact sheet.  We hope you take this 
suggestion back to Moscow and consider it carefully. 
 
We also believe that the Presidential checklist should commit 
the two sides to follow up on the agreement to accelerate our 
joint work, and to reach agreement on a broader nuclear 
security initiative, based on the suggestions we have 
discussed today and any other proposals the Russian side 
might make.  The checklist should commit us to a deadline to 
agree on the content of a new nuclear security initiative 
that the two Presidents can approve when they meet in Moscow 
in May of this year. 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS. 
Leach