US embassy cable - 05PARIS888

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000888 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR T, NP, EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2015 
TAGS: KNNP, PARM, TRGY, AORC, FR, IAEA 
SUBJECT: FRANCE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN 
THE IAEA 
 
REF: STATE 21700 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1 
.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) On February 10, Hugues de Longevialle, MFA disarmament 
specialist responsible for IAEA issues, provided us with 
initial feedback on our initiative to strengthen the IAEA 
(reftel), which we had conveyed earlier in the week. 
Longevialle cautioned that a more formal French reaction was 
still under interagency discussion; nonetheless, he wanted to 
provide us with some "preliminary" MFA comments, given our 
request for comments by the upcoming G-8 Senior Group meeting 
in London. 
 
2. (C) Longevialle observed that France was in general 
agreement with us on the substance of our "terms of reference 
for the IAEA Special committee on Safeguards and 
Verification."  We are broadly in sync on the substance, he 
stated.  He also added that the G-8 had already agreed at Sea 
Island on the formation of a Special Committee.  While the 
French agree with us on the importance of getting more 
countries to sign and implement the IAEA Additional Protocol, 
as well on the need to reinforce verifiability and the 
criteria on non-compliance, they retain some questions and 
comments on the terms of reference text: 
 
--  The issue of how best to identify emerging threats from 
non-state actors and how to assist Member States to identify 
sensitive nuclear equipment and material should be handled in 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).  The NSG is better set up 
to deal with countries that are non-members of the NSG. 
Similarly, the NSG, unlike the IAEA, is better equipped to 
deal with export control issues. 
 
--  The French would refine the U.S. proposal to allow the 
Special Committee to make recommendations to the IAEA Board 
of Governors (BOG).  The MFA suggests that the text be 
revised to emphasize or make explicit the priority of the BOG 
over the Special Committee in making such recommendations. 
The BOG has a "wider margin of appreciation" of the issues 
than would the Special Committee, Longevialle explained. 
 
--  With respect to the references for "building on the 
experience in implementing the Additional Protocol," 
Longevialle observed that we should be careful not to be seen 
as adding a new additional protocol, because such a 
perception might discourage non-signatory countries from 
signing on to the Additional Protocol itself.  He was 
specifically referring to our language that suggested we 
"identify new strengthening measures that may be needed to 
enhance the effective enforcement of compliance with 
safeguards." 
 
--  Longevialle made the same point about not discouraging 
potential signatories of the Additional Protocol when 
discussing the terms of reference that suggests the potential 
need "for further expansion of the IAEA's legal authority for 
its verification and inspection activities to better address 
the challenges now posed to the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime." 
 
--  On the recommendation for a State to recuse itself from 
Special Committee decisions should it find itself under 
investigation, the French agree with the concept, but 
recommend we add language that would emphasize the voluntary 
nature of the recusal.  The idea of a State recusing itself 
from decisions is a political concept because normally 
decisions are taken on a consensus basis, according to 
Longevialle.  The likelihood of recusal is strongest when the 
decision is seen as voluntary.  Additionally, if the decision 
for recusal is not voluntary, there might be legal issues 
surrounding the question of how the BOG might make a decision 
on who should remain a member of the Special Committee. 
 
3. (C) Longevialle highlighted one area which France sees as 
very problematic.  He said the recommendation that a 
non-nuclear weapon state "which has or is pursuing enrichment 
or reprocessing activities, should expect a considerably more 
intrusive inspection regime," is redundant given the IAEA's 
existing mandate and could be seen as discriminatory.  The 
IAEA already is authorized to determine the level of 
inspections based on the nature of a state's activities. 
France therefore would strongly recommend deletion of this 
term of reference paragraph from the draft text. 
 
4.  (C) On the plus side, Longevialle emphasized French 
concurrence with our proposed language on the life span of 
the Special Committee.  We feel that reference to "an 
indefinite duration" represents good compromise language, 
which would allow the IAEA and the Special Committee to 
determine when the latter has achieved its objectives, he 
stated.  Longevialle said the MFA was also supportive of our 
language pertaining to "the modalities for special 
inspections."  This formulation fits well with the objectives 
of the Special Committee and the IAEA's own language in 
paragraph 73 of the "Model Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement 
of the IAEA." 
 
Leach