US embassy cable - 05MADRID569

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000569 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/WE, WHA/AND, EUR/ERA, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, SP, CO, VE 
SUBJECT: ZAPATERO VENEZUELA POLICY PERPLEXES SPANISH MFA 
OFFICIALS 
 
REF: STATE 25063 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
chief official for Andean countries informed poloff February 
9 that a majority of officials at the MFA are as perplexed as 
the U.S. is at President Jose Luis Rodriquez Zapatero's 
policy of building closer relations with Venezuela's Hugo 
Chavez.  Juan Carlos Sanchez (please protect) explained 
Zapatero's Venezuela policy is being run from Moncloa and the 
MFA is left to try to influence the policy as much as 
possible.  Most MFA officials, according to Sanchez, see no 
benefits and only downsides for Spain in closer relations 
with Venezuela.  They understand Zapatero's moves do not work 
to promote democracy or stability in the region and will only 
serve to further strain relations with the U.S., Colombia and 
other countries in the region.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Poloff met February 9 with Sanchez, the MFA's Deputy 
Director General for the Andean Community (DAS-equivalent) to 
discuss Spain's policy toward Venezuela and Colombia. 
(Sanchez replaced Ernesto de Zulueta as the Andean DDG in 
December 2004).  Poloff began the meeting telling Sanchez 
that in general the U.S. was extremely perplexed at Spain's 
developing relationship with Venezuela and Hugo Chavez, and 
believed the Spanish government was on the wrong side of the 
equation in terms of promoting democracy in the region and 
avoiding conflicts between Venezuela and Colombia. 
 
3.  (C)  In a surprisingly frank reply, Sanchez (please 
protect) said he and "the great majority" of his colleagues 
in the Foreign Ministry were "equally perplexed" at 
Zapatero's moves to build closer relations with Chavez.  He 
specifically noted (again, please protect) that more senior 
officials involved with Latin American affairs at the MFA 
share this view.  Sanchez, who has served in Caracas, 
explained that neither he nor many others in the MFA saw any 
benefit accruing to Spain from Zapatero's policy, rather 
quite the opposite:  Zapatero's cozying up to Chavez will 
only needlessly anger the United States and Colombia.  "We 
don't understand the policy or the reason for it," remarked 
Sanchez. 
 
4.  (C) On Zapatero's canceling of a planned stop in Caracas 
during his recent visit to South America, Sanchez said the 
MFA strongly urged Zapatero not to make the stop, believing 
it would be a serious mistake, but in the end it was 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's direct intervention with 
Zapatero (somewhat heated, according to Sanchez) that 
ultimately led Zapatero to cancel the stop.  Sanchez said he 
and his MFA colleagues were at a loss to explain why Zapatero 
then "secretly" sent Minister of Defense Bono to Caracas.  If 
the purpose of the visit was to lobby Chavez to purchase 
military ships from Spain's ailing Izar shipyards, the 
prevailing view at the MFA is that placating, probably only 
temporarily, Izar's agitated ship workers was not worth 
damaging Spain's relations with the U.S., Colombia and 
others. 
 
5.  (C)  Moreover, Sanchez emphasized, selling any kind of 
armaments to Venezuela at this time "makes no sense at all," 
particularly in light of the Zapatero government's decision 
in 2004 to cancel the sale of "a few second or third hand 
tanks" to Colombia, purportedly because Madrid was concerned 
the sale could upset the military balance between Venezuela 
and Colombia.  "If Bono had justified canceling the sale 
based on the idea that tanks are not well suited to fighting 
an insurgency, that would be one thing," said Sanchez, "but 
having canceled the sale supposedly to avoid tipping the 
military balance in the region, we at the MFA understand how 
incongruous discussions with Venezuela about purchasing 
armaments from Spain now look." 
 
6.  (C) Sanchez said that Venezuela policy is being run out 
of Moncloa (the presidency) and that the MFA is left trying 
to influence the policy as much as possible.  "The MFA wants 
relations with the U.S. repaired, not further damaged by a 
policy of building closer relations to Hugo Chavez, which 
produces no tangible benefits for Spain," said Sanchez.  The 
MFA understands the U.S. also strongly disagrees with Spain's 
Cuba policy, but the MFA feels it can articulate a reasonable 
basis for the Zapatero government's position on Cuba.  "There 
is no reasonable basis for our Venezuela policy," said 
Sanchez.  The MFA understands Spain should be on the right 
side of democracy and regional security, and that Venezuela 
is going in the wrong direction.  The MFA is doing its best 
to persuade Moncloa of this. 
 
7.  (C)  Poloff said the U.S. strongly urges Zapatero not to 
visit Caracas in March as we understand he is tentatively 
planning to do.  Sanchez replied that the MFA understands the 
U.S. position and is seeking to postpone the visit.  At a 
minimum, the MFA wants to see Zapatero visit Bogota on the 
same trip if Zapatero does go to Caracas in March. 
 
8.  (C) Poloff's conversation with Sanchez took place before 
we received reftel concerning Venezuelan attempts to purchase 
certain armaments.  We will follow up with both the MFA and 
Moncloa on the arms question, and more generally on further 
developments in the Zapatero government's evolving policy 
toward Venezuela. 
 
MANZANARES