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| Identifier: | 05DUBLIN177 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05DUBLIN177 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Dublin |
| Created: | 2005-02-11 16:14:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EAIR PREL ETRD |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 111614Z Feb 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000177 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 TAGS: EAIR, PREL, ETRD SUBJECT: U.S.-IRISH DISCUSSIONS ON OPEN SKIES PROSPECTS Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mary Daly; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 1. (C) Summary: In informal bilateral discussions on February 7, Ireland indicated its intent to decide in the next several weeks on the possibility of establishing Open Skies with the United States. Transportation Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary John Byerly and DOT International Aviation Director Paul Gretch told Irish counterparts that the USG was prepared to pursue an Open Skies "arrangement" that would not entail formal amendments to the existing bilateral air transport agreement. This unprecedented approach would aim to sidestep the legal impediments posed by the November 2002 judgments of the European Court of Justice and the mandate subsequently given to the Commission to negotiate with the USG on behalf of Member States. Irish Transport officials said that the GOI could immediately accept nearly all the elements of Open Skies, but preferred a transition on the Shannon stop requirement as well as a possible delay in implementing full fifth-freedom rights, given likely Commission opposition. Byerly and Gretch noted that fifth freedoms were central to Open Skies, but indicated a willingness to consider a transition that would allow for implementation of fifth-freedom rights and cargo seventh-freedom rights in a year as part of an overall Open Skies arrangement, inclusive of a Shannon phase-out. Irish officials committed to respond shortly and recommended that the two sides avoid designating possible follow-on talks as "formal," since this would trigger legal difficulties for the GOI with the Commission. Separately, Byerly expressed USG support for Ireland as ICAO's selected site for the international registry under the Capetown Convention, despite recent attempts by Canada, a losing bidder, to revisit the selection. On February 8, Byerly addressed a Dublin seminar on trans-Atlantic aviation that fleshed out conflicting Irish views on the need for a multi-year phase-out of the Shannon stop. End summary. 2. (C) On February 7, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation Affairs, John Byerly, and U.S. SIPDIS Department of Transportation Director for International Aviation, Paul Gretch, met with Irish counterparts to discuss possibilities for establishing a bilateral Open Skies relationship. Irish participants included: John Murphy, Department of Transport (DOT) Director General for Civil Aviation; John Lumsden, DOT Assistant Secretary for Roads (and Murphy's immediate predecessor); Brendan Lyons, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Assistant Secretary for Bilateral Economic Relations; Robin McKay, DOT Principal Officer for Aviation Regulation and International Relations; Doreen Keaney, DOT Principal Officer for Aviation Security; Colin Hunt, Special Advisor to the Minister of Transport; and, Micheal O'Mealoid, DOT Assistant Principal Officer for Aviation Regulation and International Relations. A Way Forward on Open Skies --------------------------- 3. (C) Byerly noted the USG's willingness to consider an "arrangement" with Ireland that would establish Open Skies without formally amending the existing bilateral air transport agreement -- an approach that would aim to sidestep the legal impediments posed by the ECJ judgments and the Commission's mandate to negotiate with the USG on behalf of Member States. This approach would require an explicit GOI political commitment to implement the Open Skies arrangement in the form of a Memorandum of Consultations (MOC). Byerly explained that the MOC would have an attached text of U.S.-proposed amendments needed to transform the bilateral agreement into an agreement containing the essential elements of Open Skies. The amendments would incorporate liberalized routes (including fully open fifth-freedom rights and desirable all-cargo seventh-freedom rights for scheduled and charter service) as well as Open Skies model provisions on customs, operational flexibility, fair competition, codesharing, user charges, commercial opportunities, safety, and security. Moreover, the MOC would note that the GOI was not prepared to amend formally the existing bilateral agreement, but that the two governments would apply the proposed changes on the basis of comity and reciprocity. Byerly added that the U.S. proposal attached to the MOC would reflect U.S. industry input and could include, if the GOI desired, a "transitional annex" for a phase-out of the Shannon stop requirement and a phase-in of new U.S. points for Irish carriers. 4. (C) To proceed with this approach, the USG needed a definitive signal from the GOI on its willingness to establish Open Skies, Byerly emphasized. He cited several bilateral exploratory discussions held since mid-2004, and he noted that there would be no value in further informal consultations. Byerly added that an unequivocal "yes" to Open Skies would trigger a process in Washington involving the scheduling of bilateral talks, the preparation of texts, and necessary USG consultations with U.S. industry. He observed that the USG had not yet discussed the specifics of the MOC idea with U.S. industry, which would have definite views on the package to be offered Ireland. Lumsden and Murphy concurred with Byerly that additional exploratory talks would not be useful. 5. (C) Byerly and Gretch explained that reliance on an MOC, a non-legally binding document under international law, would constitute an unprecedented approach to the establishment of Open Skies. They noted that the approach had raised some concerns on the U.S. side, since the two sides would not have recourse to arbitration if the arrangement were violated. Murphy asked whether the USG had considered using this approach with other Member States, given the impasse in the U.S.-EU negotiations. Byerly replied that the anti-trust immunity sought by Iberia for its relationship with American Airlines would probably only be approved in the context of a legally binding Open Skies agreement with Spain. He added that there was probably insufficient demand for trans-Atlantic air services for most new Member States to consider incurring the ire of the Commission, which would not welcome this method of sidestepping Commission competence. Irish Difficulties with Fifth Freedoms -------------------------------------- 6. (C) Murphy said that the GOI could immediately accept nearly all the essential elements of Open Skies, but preferred a transition on Shannon as well as a delay in the implementation of fifth-freedom rights. The GOI also needed to review the possibility of all-cargo seventh-freedom rights. (Note: Murphy did not express opposition to third-country codesharing.) To concede fifth/all-cargo seventh-freedom rights bilaterally at this point in the U.S.-EU talks, said Murphy, would be unacceptable to the Commission (which seeks to withhold such rights as perceived leverage in seeking greater access to the U.S. market for EU carriers). He added that the GOI wished to allow the U.S.-EU negotiations to proceed to a point of clarity on whether a trans-Atlantic agreement was reachable. Lumsden elaborated that the GOI did not seek indefinite postponement of fifth-freedoms, but rather a delay that would enable Ireland to argue later that "the Commission had had time to do a deal with the United States, but had failed, leaving Ireland no choice but to act bilaterally." 7. (C) Byerly and Gretch responded that the USG sought immediate implementation of fifth-freedom rights as a central part of any Open Skies agreement, with very few exceptions in unique cases for economic reasons. Moreover, Ireland's withholding of fifth freedoms would play into false arguments that the Commission should hold back such rights to counterbalance the lack of market access (cabotage rights) faced by European carriers in the United States, relative to U.S. carriers in Europe. Byerly said, however, that the USG would be willing to consider two options for a transition. The first option had the following steps: (1) on day one, there would be easing of the Shannon stop requirement, additional U.S. points for Irish carriers, and the implementation of all elements of Open Skies, except for fifth and all-cargo seventh freedoms; (2) in a year, Ireland would grant full fifth freedoms and all-cargo seventh freedoms, with further easing of the Shannon stop requirement and additional U.S. points for Irish carriers; and, (3) at an end-point subject to negotiation, the Shannon stop would end completely, and Irish carriers would have full access to the U.S. market. Under the second option, the entire arrangement could be delayed for a year, but there could be no transition on fifth-freedom rights. Murphy said that this methodology, broadly speaking, seemed acceptable, and he indicated that the Irish side might be partial to the second option. Next Steps ---------- 8. (C) In terms of next steps, Byerly said that the U.S. side would await a final GOI decision on moving to Open Skies, preferably within the next two weeks. With the GOI's green light, the USG would begin consultations with U.S. industry on the U.S.-proposed Open Skies amendments to the bilateral. This proposal would not include provisions for a transition on Shannon, U.S. points for Irish carriers, and fifth/all-cargo seventh-freedom rights. Upon receiving the proposal, the Irish side would introduce the transition provisions and return the updated package to the USG for review with U.S. industry. The two sides would then move to formal negotiations to work out final details, after which the Irish side would announce "a failure," in the sense that it was not prepared to amend the bilateral formally. The GOI would then agree to implement the amendments on a comity and a reciprocity basis and would sign the MOC with the amendments and transitional annex attached. 9. (C) Murphy responded that this approach sounded reasonable, and he committed to obtain Transport Minister Cullen's final decision on whether to move to Open Skies. Murphy, however, recommended against a U.S. request to enter into formal negotiations, as this would trigger notification requirements to the Commission for the Irish side. Rather than negotiate formally and "fail," the GOI preferred to have discussions that would not be designated as "formal." Government delegations of the customary size as well as industry representatives could nonetheless participate as usual. Ireland might also envision an MOC that incorporates the agreed new arrangement rather than have the text as a U.S.-proposed (and Irish-rejected) text of formal amendments. Byerly and Gretch signaled U.S. willingness to consider this approach. They also cautioned that Ireland should expect strenuous Commission opposition to whatever approach was chosen, and he urged that Minister Cullen communicate his decision to the U.S. side as soon as possible. Ireland and the Capetown Convention Registry -------------------------------------------- 10. (C) Byerly said that ICAO Council President Kotaite had expressed concerns on the margins of a recent Washington conference that Canada was pressing to revisit the selection of Ireland, its rival bidder, as the site for the international registry under the Capetown Convention. According to Kotaite, Canada claimed that it was able to secure USD 200 million in insurance to cover the liability of the registry for negligence/mistakes, while Ireland had only been able to obtain USD 10 million. Irish DOT Principal Officer for Aviation Regulation and International Relations, Robin McKay, responded that he had been involved in the PrepCom discussions on the registry and that Canada was acting as a sore loser. He remarked that there was no way to confirm Canada's claim about the amount of insurance it had secured, since the insurance company involved protected this information as confidential. The key to countering Canada's tactics, McKay explained, was to un-block that confidentiality. Byerly pointed out that the USG continued SIPDIS to support Ireland's selection as the registry site, and he ventured that Dr. Kotaite had raised the issue to confirm the U.S. position. Lumsden said that the GOI would discuss the issue directly with Dr. Kotaite and PrepCom. Public Discussion on the Shannon Stop ------------------------------------- 11. (SBU) A February 8 seminar in Dublin on trans-Atlantic aviation hosted by the Institute of European Affairs and addressed by Byerly provided for lively discussion on the U.S.-Ireland bilateral agreement and the Shannon stop requirement. In prepared remarks, Byerly cited the U.S. goal of eliminating outdated restrictions in the bilateral in order to establish Open Skies, and he noted U.S. willingness to phase out these restrictions, including the Shannon stop, over a reasonably short period. As the local press reported the following day, recently resigned Aer Lingus CEO Willie Walsh said that the Shannon stop was inimical to national interests, and he recommended that the requirement be abolished without any transition. Walsh elaborated that the Shannon stop raised fares in Dublin, prevented new carriers from entering the market, and had prompted Aer Lingus' announcement that it would end Baltimore/Washington service (effective this May). Representatives of the Shannon Airport Authority (which will be split from the Dublin Airport Authority this summer) countered that Shannon Airport was preparing business plans in anticipation of the stop's elimination, but that these plans envisioned a five-year phase-out. Walsh replied that five years was too long to make projections for the aviation industry, and he added that the Shannon community had already had 15 years to prepare for the transition. 12. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Byerly. KENNY
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