US embassy cable - 05ANKARA810

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UPDATE: CESIUM 137 CONFISCATED AT THE TURKISH/GEORGIAN BORDER

Identifier: 05ANKARA810
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA810 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-02-11 15:22:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: AM ASEC KCRM MNUC PARM PINR PTER TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000810 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015 
TAGS: AM, ASEC, KCRM, MNUC, PARM, PINR, PTER, TU 
SUBJECT: UPDATE: CESIUM 137 CONFISCATED AT THE 
TURKISH/GEORGIAN BORDER 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 779 
     B. YEREVAN 154 
 
Classified By: Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Timothy Betts, reason 1 
.4 b/d. 
 
1.  (C) EXBS Advisor met with MFA Energy Department First 
Secretary Basak Tug on February 11 to discuss the truck that 
 
SIPDIS 
was stopped at the Turkish/Georgian border due to the 
presence of cesium 137 in the scrap metal it was carrying. 
Tug confirmed the facts presented previously in ref A.  Tug 
also provided the following additional information: 
 
A.  (C) The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was 
informed of the detainment of the truck by Customs.  TAEK 
dispatched a technician to the Sarp Border gate who confirmed 
that the substance was cesium 137.  The TAEK representative 
instructed the customs official to hold the truck and cargo 
until a proper determination of action could be developed. 
 
B.  (C) TAEK submitted all appropriate reports concerning the 
incident to IAEA shortly after the incident occurred.  In 
late December, TAEK contacted the appropriate counter parts 
in Georgia to assist in determining the origin of the 
substance and to develop a plan of disposition.  The Georgian 
officials informed TAEK that the shipment originated in 
Armenia and thus Armenia should be responsible for 
appropriate disposal.  Georgia agreed to try to assist Turkey 
in coordinating disposal with Armenia. 
 
C.  (C) In early January, Georgian officials attempted to 
contact Armenian officials concerning the cargo.  Georgia 
agreed to allow the truck to pass back through Georgia to 
Armenia, if Armenia would agree to allow it back into their 
country.  Armenia would not accept responsibility for the 
cargo. 
 
D.  (C) In mid-January, Turkey contacted IAEA through their 
mission in Vienna to request assistance in coordinating the 
disposal of the cesium with Armenia.  IAEA informed Turkey 
that while Armenia has an obligation to take back the 
contaminated cargo, the IAEA can not force Armenia to accept 
the cargo back into Armenia.  IAEA officials have attempted 
to work with Armenia to coordinate some type of cooperation 
concerning the disposal of the cargo. 
 
2.  (C) Tug informed EXBS Advisor that the contaminated cargo 
has been moved from the Sarp border gate to their nuclear 
waste holding area in Istanbul.  Due to the lack of 
diplomatic relations with Armenia, Turkey is hoping that one 
of the intermediaries, Georgia or IAEA, will be able to work 
with Armenia to properly dispose of the cargo. Tug agreed to 
notify EXBS Advisor if there are any new developments in the 
situation. 
 
 
EDELMAN 

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