US embassy cable - 05CARACAS471

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, VE 
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ-URIBE MEETING STILL PENDING 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D) 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C)  Summary:   The dispute between Venezuela and 
Colombia over the capture of senior FARC official Rodrigo 
Granda remains on hold after Colombian President Alvaro 
Uribe's postponement of the February 3 scheduled meetings. 
Venezuelan press, distracted by a holiday weekend and 
destructive local weather, has all but dropped the Granda 
issue but will likely devote attention to it again as the 
February 15 date for a new meeting approaches.  In a series 
of communiques, Caracas tempered its anti-Colombian rhetoric 
and Bogota appeared to accede to one of President Hugo 
Chavez's demands--a pledge that such events would not 
reoccur.  While Uribe has declared the matter resolved, 
Chavez has contradicted himself over whether a meeting with 
Uribe was still necessary to settle final issues.  Chavez 
appears to be trying to put the issue behind him, but his 
administration's aggressive, impertinent diplomacy coupled 
with GOV elements' support for illegal armed groups will 
ensure that clashes between the two countries continue to 
arise.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had planned to host 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe in Caracas February 3 to 
resolve the crisis surrounding the capture of FARC leader 
Rodrigo Granda in Caracas.  Information Minister Andres 
Izarra announced publicly that Uribe was not coming because 
he was sick.  The meeting was postponed until the following 
day, and is now scheduled for February 15, according to 
Izarra. 
 
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Communiques and Spin 
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3.  (U)  Prior to February 3, Venezuela and Colombia issued 
communiques referring to each other as "brother" and "sister" 
countries.  Venezuela's statement on January 26 shifted the 
blame for the dispute entirely onto the United States; 
indeed, it did not refer to Colombia except to assert that 
the country was mature enough to solve its own problems.  In 
a rhetorical shift from Colombian Foreign Minister Carolina 
Barco's statement January 27 that there would be "no 
apologies," Colombia on January 28 expressed an intention to 
investigate the facts of the matter and pledged that any 
events Venezuela found objectionable would not happen again. 
The communique concluded by noting the Venezuelan government 
had approved of the statement and thus declared the crisis 
"settled."  The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry followed with a 
communique on January 29 hailing the Colombian statement as a 
"positive gesture," rejecting the presence of armed groups in 
Venezuela, and expressing its willingness to overcome the 
crisis in a meeting between presidents. 
 
4.  (U)  At the time the statements were issued, Uribe in 
public began describing the crisis as having been resolved. 
Chavez called the Colombian communique a "rectification."  He 
demanded from Colombia what the statement had already 
promised; that is, he "insisted" that Bogota investigate and 
ensure that such actions would not be repeated, according to 
the pro-Chavez press.  Nonetheless, he issued contradictory 
public statements over whether the conflict would be resolved 
without a meeting of the two chiefs of state. 
 
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Ambassadors Back to Work 
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5.  (U)  Chavez sent Venezuelan Ambassador to Colombia Carlos 
Rodolfo Santiago, whom he had recalled because of the Granda 
capture, back to Bogota January 31.  On 3 February, Chavez 
finally allowed Colombian Ambassador to Venezuela Enrique 
Vargas Ramirez to present his credentials after leaving him 
hanging since October.  Chavez had canceled plans to accept 
Vargas's credentials February 2, commemorating instead the 
anniversary of his 1992 coup attempt. 
 
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Additional Arbiters 
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6.  (U)  Before Chavez and Uribe decided to meet, third 
parties continued to mediate the dispute.  The press reported 
on 28 January that Cuban leader Fidel Castro had been calling 
Uribe and Chavez to try to resolve the crisis.  President of 
the Dominican Republic Leonel Fernandez also had been 
discussing the matter with both parties, and Chile, Spain, 
and Guatemala joined the list of countries offering their 
services of arbitration, according to press reports. 
Brazil's President Lula da Silva, who was involved almost 
from the beginning, urged the two leaders "not to fight over 
secondary matters."  In a more diplomatic tone than that used 
by the GOV, Andean Community of Nations secretary general 
Allan Wagner recommended that the United States not involve 
itself in the dispute. 
 
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Comment 
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7.  (C)  The Chavez administration is adept at inventing 
crises to distract the public from its failures.  This time, 
mother nature provided a ready-made solution:  the Venezuelan 
press has all but forgotten the Granda affair after the 
four-day Carnival weekend and unseasonable rains triggering 
floods and landslides along the country's coastal mountains. 
 Chavez appears to be maneuvering for a face-saving exit on 
the Granda case nonetheless.  His public remarks, demanding 
what Colombia has already offered, sound tough to Venezuelans 
unfamiliar with the details of the dispute.  He walked 
himself into a box by asserting that the crisis was not 
resolved until the presidential meeting, only to have Uribe 
postpone the meeting 12 days due to health. 
Venezuela-Colombia tensions do not end with the resolution of 
the Granda crisis.  (On January 26, Venezuelan Attorney 
General Isaias Rodriguez said he was considering requesting 
the extradition of Colombian Defense Minister Jorge Uribe.) 
Nor have the FARC and ELN vacated Venezuelan territory or 
curtailed their relationship with the GOV.  But the publicity 
given to their presence by the Granda case, and the 
dissuasive value of his involuntary departure from Venezuela, 
may get them to lower their profile for a while. 
Brownfield