US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1114

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: SARAN URGES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON NEPAL, WILL 
RECALL AMBASSADOR 
 
REF: A. STATE 25168 
 
     B. STATE 24949 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford.  Reasons 1.5. (B,D) 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  See para 9. 
 
2.  (C) Summary: As instructed reftels, the Ambassador 
advised Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran on February 11 of the 
USG position on assistance to Nepal and our intention to 
withdraw our Ambassador as early as February 14.  Arguing 
that the RNA had enough supplies for some time, Saran pressed 
for a postponement of US military assistance.  Following the 
meeting, MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S Jaishankar called 
Polcouns requesting a formal reassurance from Washington that 
the US would not fill the gap created by the GOI and UK 
suspension of military supplies, given the "centrality of 
this issue."  Saran said India would also recall its 
Ambassador, but the timing and duration might not be 
identical with ours.  The GOI had been thinking along similar 
lines, and the MEA will revert to us on exact timing.  Saran 
reported that sources in Kathmandu have told the GOI that the 
King is looking for a way out of the crisis and has sent an 
intermediary to New Delhi for discussions.  The Foreign 
Secretary offered to provide more specificity after he meets 
 
SIPDIS 
that person on February 12.  End Summary. 
 
3.  (C) In a late afternoon meeting on February 11, the 
Ambassador underlined to Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran our 
desire to remain in close consultation with India over the 
crisis in Nepal, but drew attention to slight differences in 
our positions on military assistance (Ref B).  Saran was 
aware that the USG intends to review its assistance programs, 
but pressed for a postponement of military assistance.  He 
understood our desire not to embolden the Maoists, but 
emphasized that India also did "not wish to give satisfaction 
to the other side."  The UK had also drawn this line, he 
noted, and the next few weeks would be crucial.  He did not 
agree with the argument that the RNA could collapse as a 
result, observing that they had enough arms to carry them 
over for some time.  We need to build on the pressure, he 
said.  The King is feeling the heat, and "if we let up it 
will disappear." 
 
4.  (C) The Ambassador responded by pointing out that the 
differences between our positions seemed mostly semantic: 
India has a major arms supply relationship that it has 
suspended, but does not wish to announce that it has done so. 
 In contrast, the US does not have such a relationship, and 
the USG does not wish to make a public statement, because 
there is nothing to stop right now. 
 
5.  (C) Saran replied that "the King should know that we will 
not open the floodgates, and will not send masses of 
equipment.  He should not get that satisfaction from us," and 
urged the US to be "clear about what we say."  Following the 
meeting, MEA J/S (Americas) S. Jaishankar called Polcouns 
requesting a formal reassurance from Washington that the US 
will not attempt to fill the military supply gap created by 
the Indian (and UK) suspension of military supplies.  That is 
"the key signal at this point," Jaishankar emphasized, adding 
that he "hopes we understand the centrality of this issue" 
for the GOI. 
 
6.  (C) As instructed Ref A, the Ambassador then informed 
Saran that the United States may recall its Ambassador as 
early as February 14, and urged India to join with us and the 
UK in order to send the strongest possible message to the 
King.  The Foreign Secretary responded that India was also 
planning to recall its Ambassador for consultations, but that 
the timing and duration might not be identical with ours. 
The step would follow in the next several days, he stated. 
Jaishankar told Polcouns after the meeting that India shares 
our view on the withdrawal of Ambassadors, and was thinking 
along the same lines even before our approach.  MEA J/S 
(Nepal) Ranjit Rae will revert on the specific timing, but it 
will be "sooner rather than later."  Saran would be happy to 
meet with Ambassador Moriarty if he comes through Delhi on 
his way out of Kathmandu. 
 
King Looking for a Way Out? 
-------------------------- 
7.  (C) Saran then reported that highly reliable sources in 
Kathmandu have told the GOI that the King is looking for a 
way out of the crisis.  The King is aware that India did not 
agree with his recent actions, and has sent an intermediary 
to New Delhi for discussions.  The Foreign Secretary said he 
would meet that person on February 12, and could provide more 
specificity after they meet. 
 
8.  (C) During the last several days, very reliable sources 
had also told the GOI that the King had timed his takeover to 
coincide with the SAARC Summit, in the hope that he would 
present the grouping with a fait accompli.  He thought he had 
a foolproof plan, but has now realized he miscalculated, and 
that his scenario was unravelling.  The King is not suicidal, 
Saran observed, which makes it all the more important for us 
to keep up the pressure. 
 
9.  (C) Action Request: Given the importance of remaining as 
close as possible to India and the UK on Nepal, Mission 
requests a formal Washington reassurance that the US will not 
attempt to fill the military supply gap created by the US and 
UK suspension of military supplies, as well as guidance 
regarding the exact state of the US military supply pipeline 
to Nepal.  A reply by OOB February 12 before the expected 
February 13 encounter between NSA Narayanan and Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld at Wehrkunde would be appreciated. 
MULFORD