US embassy cable - 05SOFIA283

S E C R E T SOFIA 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/15 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, PGOV, ETTC, IZ, AF, BU 
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN DEFENSE EQUIPMENT SALES TO IRAQ AND 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: 04 STATE 267024 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES PARDEW, FOR REASONS 
1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: We continue to support procurement of 
military equipment for the security forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as a major USG priority, but aspects of this 
process at the local level have raised concerns about 
potential weapons diversion.  Embassy has encountered at 
least one case where an identical End User Certificate 
(EUC) for weapons procurement for Iraqi Police Forces was 
presented both to the export control authorities in 
Belgrade and Sofia.  Post's concern is that the EUC for 
weapons purchased for legitimate end users could be used to 
buy a duplicate set of weapons that could be diverted to 
the grey market.  Post is also concerned about the number 
of contractors and subcontractors, some with shady 
connections. END SUMMARY 
 
2. (S/NF) Post received a copy of an EUC from the Bulgarian 
Interministerial Commission for Export Controls dated 22 
Sept 2004 from the Project and Contracting Office in 
Baghdad.  The GOB Commission asked Post to confirm the 
validity of the EUC (see reftel).  However, we discovered 
later that an identical EUC had been presented to the 
Serbian export authorities.  The U.S. contractor involved, 
Nico Trap Inc. D/B/A Golden Wings, and its local Bulgarian 
subcontractor, Trem Engineering, were eventually declined 
an export permit from the GOB in December, but the Golden 
Wings' Serbian subcontractor was approved in Belgrade in 
December.  In spite of the Serbian approval for the export 
of these weapons, Golden Wings president Tahsin Ammouri was 
requesting the GOB reverse their decision as late as 4 
January. 
 
3. (S/NF) In addition, the Bulgarian Intelligence Services 
have shared their concern with Post about the complexity of 
some weapon deals going to Iraq and Afghanistan, which 
often involve an American contractor, a Bulgarian broker, a 
Bulgarian defense manufacturer and often other 
international brokers and manufacturers. Bulgarian 
intelligence officials assert these complex deals reduce 
their ability to track the weapons effectively as they make 
their way out of Bulgaria and onward to Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  GOB officials continue to inquire why such 
deals cannot be done on a government-to-government basis. 
Such a basis would allow the GOB to gain some political 
benefits from these deals, which provide jobs to a hard-hit 
sector of the Bulgarian economy, and show the Bulgarian 
public the benefits of the country's military commitment in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
4. (S/NF) Post is also concerned that U.S. contractors have 
chosen to work with local subcontractors who have 
historically been involved in grey arms deals. For example, 
Delta-G, a Bulgarian broker for General Dynamics, was a 
major smuggler of arms to the Milosevic regime during the 
Yugoslav wars and reportedly is still involved illegal 
activities.  Post has warned General Dynamics repeatedly 
about this relationship. 
 
5. (S/NF) COMMENT: Many of the arms procurement 
transactions for Iraq are multinational, with parts and 
weapons coming from various countries. These deals are 
brokered through U.S. contractors and their local sub- 
contractors, making oversight more difficult for individual 
missions to grasp the entire picture. We have pursued 
requests from the GOB to confirm EUCs coming from U.S. 
Forces in Iraq with all due diligence, but we wish to raise 
concerns about the oversight of these often complex 
multinational transactions. 
 
6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.