US embassy cable - 05PARIS879

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000879 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020 
TAGS: PREL, FR, IR, IZ, SY 
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN SECSTATE MEETINGS WITH 
FRENCH GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: KIEV 576 
 
Classified By: DCM Alex Wolff for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) In a February 10 meeting with MFA Cabinet Director 
Vimont (protect), DCM discussed follow up to issues raised 
during Secretary's meetings in Paris February 8.  Vimont said 
the French side had been pleased by the visit and the level 
of discussion with the Secretary.  Review of specific issues 
follows: 
 
China Arms Embargo 
------------------ 
 
2. (C) Vimont characterized the exchange between the 
Secretary and FM Barnier as not revealing anything new by 
 
SIPDIS 
either side.  Vimont said the French side understood better 
the vehemence of Congressional feeling on the matter.  DCM 
reiterated USG concerns, which he said were also strongly 
felt.  He noted that while the EU side seemed to be listening 
to our concerns, there was no indication they were doing much 
to address them.  Indeed, the decision to lift seemed to be 
on autopilot, with only the timing in question.  This was no 
way for an ally to deal with an issue of strategic and 
political concern to another.    Vimont acknowledged that 
European sensitivities to the strategic dangers were 
mitigated by the geographic distance between China and 
Europe.  He argued that the French had resisted pressure by 
the Chinese to obtain dangerous technologies, and would 
continue to do so.  He thought there was still an opportunity 
to discuss ways to assuage U.S. concerns, although he offered 
no details. 
 
ICC/Darfur 
---------- 
 
3. (C) Vimont said the French side understands the U.S. view 
on the ICC, but noted that France had its own domestic 
constituency to worry about in how it handles ICC issues.  He 
thought a way around our differences could be found if each 
side respected the position of the other.  DCM described U.S. 
approach as fully respectful of ICC member governments.  He 
noted that our effort to obtain Article 98 agreements with 
European governments reflected that respect since these 
agreements were consistent with the Rome Statute -- and had 
been suggested by the French earlier as a means for dealing 
with our concerns.  It was European resistance to such 
agreements that suggested lack of respect for the U.S. 
position.  Asked if France was prepared to discuss an Article 
98 agreement with the U.S., Vimont reiterated that the French 
were not opposed in principle, but offered no sign that the 
French position had changed.  He suggested that we take up 
the matter with the incoming MFA legal advisor. 
 
4. (C) Asked if France had any thoughts on how to address our 
differences over the Darfur/ICC issue, Vimont speculated one 
possibility could be to incorporate into any resolution a 
statement exempting U.S. nationals from ICC jurisdiction in 
this one case.  DCM noted that if France was prepared to do 
so on an ad hoc basis for Darfur, we did not understand why a 
blanket arrangement through Article 98 agreements with France 
and others that resolve the broader issue was proving so 
difficult. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
5. (C) DCM noted signs of internal French debate on the 
merits of announcing a deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal as 
a necessary element to help stabilize Iraq.  Vimont said the 
French position still favored such an announcement, although 
it need not be a fixed or firm commitment.  He reiterated 
familiar arguments about the need for a clearer sense of a 
departure timetable to promote greater participation by as 
many Iraqi elements, particularly Sunni, in the political 
process.  DCM reviewed arguments against announcing a 
timeline for withdrawal, emphasizing the boost this would 
give to terrorist and rejectionist groups.  Vimont accepted 
the point, but said the French view was that some sort of 
signal in this direction would be helpful.  DCM said U.S. 
statements indicating an intention to depart as soon as the 
conditions allowed were already pretty clear.  In this 
regard, DCM raised report that suggested FM Barnier was 
pleased by the decision by Kiev to withdraw Ukranian troops 
from Iraq (reftel) and asked if there was an explanation for 
such an impression being left.  Vimont expressed surprise at 
the characterization of Barnier's reaction.  He said the 
French position was that a staged orderly withdrawal of 
foreign forces was a good thing for all concerned, but this 
did not mean an uncoordinated, precipitate departure that 
endangered efforts to stabilize the country.  Vimont argued 
that, contrary to the allegations expressed by some in the 
U.S., France believes a U.S. defeat in Iraq would be a 
disaster for everyone.  He concluded that despite our 
difference over the war, U.S. and French expressed objectives 
for Iraq now generally coincide. 
 
Iran/IAEA 
--------- 
 
6. (C) DCM described tenor of the Secretary's discussion on 
Iran with French opinion leaders.  Asked if President 
Chirac's assessment of Iranian nuclear objectives and 
skepticism of success by the EU-3 were shared by the Foreign 
Ministry, Vimont acknowledged that Chirac's anti-Shia bias 
was deep-rooted.  Vimont also confirmed that the French were 
prepared to support referral of the Iranian case to the 
Security Council -- albeit in conformity with a formal 
process which would follow a report by the IAEA denoting 
non-compliance. 
 
7. (C) Vimont asked about U.S. views on El Baradei's 
succession.  He said the French did not want any conflict 
with the U.S. over the issue, but there was still no credible 
alternative candidate, and if taken to a vote, El Baradei 
would be re-elected by a large margin.  DCM suggested that 
Political Director Laboulaye discuss the issue with U/S 
Bolton next week in London. 
 
Syria/Lebanon/Hizbollah 
----------------------- 
 
8. (C) Recalling President Chirac's suggestion that we begin 
speaking about UN sanctions against Syria if Damascus did not 
comply with UNSCR 1599, DCM asked if the Foreign Ministry 
shared that approach.  Vimont confirmed that President Chirac 
was determined to put as much pressure on Syria as necessary 
to ensure its compliance, but admitted candidly that the 
MFA's traditional approach was to consider the effect of such 
a step on Syria's capacity to be an irritant in other areas. 
He concluded, however, that President Chirac's views would, 
again, determine the French approach, even if the MFA was not 
as enthusiastic. 
 
9. (C) DCM raised the unhelpful role of Hizbollah as another 
concern, asking whether French attitudes toward Hizbollah's 
role in terrorism had evolved, particularly in light of 
Palestinian President Abu Mazen's reference to support by 
Hizbollah for Palestinian terrorists.  Vimont confirmed that 
Abu Mazen had mentioned this to FM Barnier as well.  He said 
that President Chirac viewed Hizbollah primarily in 
connection with Lebanon, and until he was convinced that 
Hizbollah's activities threatened directly French interests 
in Lebanon, he doubted that Paris would be swayed even by Abu 
Mazen's statement. 
 
Afghanistan/PRT's 
----------------- 
 
10. (C) Noting growing interest on the part of the French 
defense establishment to consider French participation in a 
PRT or in a forward support base for PRT's, DCM asked if the 
French were ready to take such a decision well in advance of 
the Afghan elections this summer.  Vimont acknowledged signs 
of evolution in French thinking on PRT's but said a decision 
to participate would require an interagency decision to raise 
the matter again with President Chirac, but did not indicate 
any such decision was imminent. 
 
 
Guantanamo Detainees 
-------------------- 
 
11. (C) Vimont said the French response to our diplomatic 
note proposing the return of the three remaining French 
detainees in Guantanamo would include "quite similar" 
undertakings to those for the previously returned detainees. 
He said the response was still being cleared interagency and 
he anticipated no problems. 
 
12. (U) Bagdad minimize considered. 
 
Leach