US embassy cable - 05MADRID541

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP, American - Spanish Relations 
SUBJECT: SPAIN:  TIME TO DEFROST THE DEEP FREEZE? 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares; reasons 1.4 (B) 
and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  After a tumultuous year in our bilateral 
relations with Spain, the Mission is considering how best to 
establish a more productive relationship with the Zapatero 
administration.  The GOS scored early political points with 
the Spanish public by withdrawing Spanish forces from Iraq, 
attacking USG policy in Iraq, and breaking with the previous 
government's emphasis on transatlantic relations.  More 
recently, however, the GOS has recognized the high domestic 
and international cost of its confrontational approach 
towards the USG and has made clear its desire to improve 
bilateral ties.  We have insisted that such sentiments be 
backed up with actions, and the GOS responded by agreeing to 
participate in a PRT in Afghanistan, providing funds for the 
Iraq elections, agreeing to train Iraqi security officials in 
Spain, and toning down their criticism of USG foreign policy. 
 In return for these gestures, the Zapatero Government is 
hoping for USG acknowledgement that ties are on the mend, 
preferably through the positive optics that would be 
generated by high-level meetings in Washington. 
 
2. (C) We believe it makes sense to lock in the gains of the 
last two months by publicly recognizing Spain's positive 
steps, as we did through the meeting between Secretary 
Rumsfeld and DefMin Bono in Nice.   We also suggest moving 
forward on areas of particular bilateral importance, such as 
counter-terrorism cooperation.  Minister of Interior Jose 
Antonio Alonso and Minister of Justice Juan Fernando Lopez 
Aguilar have both requested meetings in Washington in early 
2005 for counter-terrorism discussions with USG counterparts 
and the country team strongly supports these requests. 
Similarly, we should encourage stronger military to military 
relations and commercial ties.  Important differences remain 
with the Zapatero government, including his overtures to Cuba 
and Venezuela and Spain's continuing refusal to allow Spanish 
forces assigned to NATO commands to participate in operations 
in Iraq.  We have also been frustrated by the sometimes 
erratic and uncoordinated nature of the Socialist 
administration, as demonstrated by the confusion surrounding 
DefMin Bono's recent visit to Venezuela. 
 
3. (C) Despite these lingering concerns, we believe the time 
is right for calibrated re-engagement with the GOS in the 
hope that we can establish a greater degree of influence on 
GOS policy and, when possible, steer them towards a more 
positive course.  Zapatero's domestic position has 
strengthened over the last year and his approval rating of 
63% suggests we will be dealing with his government for 
several years to come, so it is in our interest to improve 
the working relationship with him.  Alternatively, USG snubs 
could trigger a nationalist backlash in Spain and encourage 
Zapatero to withhold cooperation with USG initiatives.  End 
Summary. 
 
//A Tough Year// 
 
4. (C) The first ten months of the Zapatero administration 
have proven among the most difficult periods in U.S.-Spanish 
relations in many years.  Throughout the most frustrating 
episodes, the USG won points for sticking to the high road 
and refusing to be baited into public disputes with the GOS. 
Despite our efforts to keep productive ties on track, senior 
GOS officials continued to make unhelpful remarks throughout 
2004, particularly with respect to the U.S. role in Iraq. 
There was also friction regarding regional issues, such as 
Spain's leadership of an effort to ease EU restrictive 
measures against Cuba and Zapatero's engagement of Chavez in 
Venezuela.  Though Zapatero drew massive public support for 
his decision to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq (and his 
public approval rating remains high at 63%), he has been 
criticized for subsequent missteps that have soured relations 
with Washington. 
 
5. (C) The turning point in Zapatero's approach to the U.S. 
came when Ambassador Argyros declined to attend the October 
12 national day parade, putting the public spotlight on our 
disappointment with the tone and direction of Spanish foreign 
policy.  This episode undermined GOS assertions in the press 
that U.S.-Spanish ties had not suffered as a result of 
Spain's withdrawal from Iraq and forced the Zapatero 
administration to acknowledge tensions in one of Spain's most 
important bilateral relationships.  While polls consistently 
demonstrate widespread hostility among Spaniards towards U.S. 
foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, the public 
still expects the GOS to maintain healthy working relations 
with Washington.  The U.S.-Spanish rift left Zapatero open to 
withering opposition criticism that he had ruined that 
relationship and relegated Spain to second-class status in 
foreign affairs. 
 
//Spain Looking to Repair Relations// 
 
6. (C) Since November, GOS officials at all levels have made 
clear their desire to restore strong bilateral ties, most 
recently when the MFA's Director General for Foreign Policy 
(Under Secretary for Political Affairs equivalent) told 
Charg bluntly, "We want back in."  In responding to these 
overtures, we have noted that the Spanish Government's 
positions and public commentary since Zapatero took office 
have generated significant skepticism within the USG 
regarding Spain's readiness to work with us on the issues 
that matter most, such as in the War on Terrorism.  We told 
our GOS interlocutors that we were prepared to move ahead on 
issues of mutual importance and that unambiguous, positive 
actions by Spain would be the best signal to the U.S. 
Government that Spain too was ready to get past our 
differences. 
 
7. (C) In the last several weeks, the GOS has undertaken a 
series of measures that appear aimed at improving relations 
with the USG.  The most important of these is Spain's 
decision (not yet made public) to lead a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team and contribute to a forward support base 
in western Afghanistan (after months of prodding by USG 
officials, including numerous Embassy demarches).  Spain has 
taken other actions as well.  The Spanish Government 
contributed $20 million to the Iraq elections (part of its 
$300 million pledge made during the 2003 Iraq Donors 
Conference) and issued a positive public assessment of the 
elections themselves.  Prior to the vote, Spain had, at the 
USG's request, engaged Arab governments to urge them to press 
Iraqi Sunnis to participate in the elections.  The GOS also 
deployed King Juan Carlos to transmit positive messages, such 
as the King's January 13 declaration at a reception for the 
Madrid diplomatic corps that the U.S. was a "fundamental 
point of reference for Spanish foreign policy" and that the 
GOS desired "improved bilateral ties at every level." 
 
8. (C) The Embassy has welcomed these gestures, while making 
clear to our GOS counterparts that we are still troubled by 
mixed signals on issues we thought had been resolved.  For 
example, Zapatero canceled a planned stop in Caracas to meet 
with Chavez at our urging, but then dispatched Defense 
Minister Bono on a "secret" trip to Venezuela to promote 
sales of military and civilian equipment.  Also, on Iraq, FM 
Moratinos and other government and Socialist party figures 
still occasionally refer to the conflict as an "illegal war" 
and have joined like-minded EU leaders in pressing for a 
timetable for the U.S. to withdraw troops by the end of 2005. 
 
9. (C) Some issues, notably Cuba and to a lesser degree 
Venezuela, will likely remain points of friction in the 
bilateral relationship.  The driving force behind Spanish 
overtures to Castro and Chavez is a combination of the 
Socialists, desire to satisfy left-wing constituents who 
remain attached to romantic notions of Latin American 
revolutionary movements and a naive faith in Spain's ability 
to influence the two leaders in a positive direction.  We 
have made clear the USG's skepticism and concern regarding 
the Spanish approach and believe we may succeed in limiting 
GOS interaction with Caracas to commercial rather than 
political collaboration.  There is less cause for optimism on 
Cuba, where Zapatero's team appears intent on reviving 
"constructive engagement" at almost any cost. 
 
//Defining USG Objectives in Spain// 
 
10. (C) Despite our turbulent relations with Zapatero, we 
have continued to engage the GOS constructively at the 
working level on the issues that matter most to us, with 
positive results.  Most importantly, the Zapatero Government 
has not placed restrictions on U.S. forces access to Rota 
Naval Air Station and Moron Air Base, and has continued to 
issue blanket overflight clearances for U.S. forces 
transiting Spanish airspace, including to support operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
11. (C) Military to military relations are strong in other 
respects and the uniformed services are among our strongest 
proponents in the current government.  They are still 
smarting from their sudden and ignominious withdrawal from 
Iraq and have been forward leaning in recommending 
deployments to Afghanistan as a means of demonstrating their 
reliability as an ally and their commitment to the War on 
Terror.  We want to strengthen this important bilateral 
relationship, for example by fixing a date for High-Level 
Bilateral Defense Committee talks in Washington. 
 
12. (C) The USG also has a strong interest in deepening its 
counter-terrorism cooperation with the GOS, particularly 
given the large and dangerous presence in the country of 
extremist organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda.  In the 
wake of the March 11 train bombings, the GOS has clamped down 
on such organizations, leading to 117 arrests of suspected 
Islamic terrorists in 2004.  However, judicial and 
investigative gaps in the Spanish system and the burgeoning 
population of North African immigrants will make Spain an 
active front in the War on Terror for years to come. 
 
13. (C) Judicial and law-enforcement counter-terrorism 
cooperation with Spain is good and Attorney General Ashcroft 
visited in December to improve it further by signing the 
bilateral protocol to the U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance and 
Extradition Treaties.  Also in 2004, the GOS requested talks 
with the USG on forming a joint counter-terrorism 
investigative unit.  This would be difficult for the USG to 
implement for technical reasons, but a DOJ team met with 
Spanish counterparts in December to identify mechanisms for 
improving information sharing and judicial cooperation.  We 
can solidify our counter-terrorism relations by inviting 
Minister of the Interior Jose Antonio Alonso - a close friend 
of President Zapatero - to Washington at the earliest 
possible date.   Alonso's staff has made clear Alonso desires 
such an invitation.  Minister of Justice Juan Fernando Lopez 
Aguilar has also expressed interest in visiting Washington to 
discuss improved counter-terrorism cooperation. 
 
14. (C) We have strong commercial interests in Spain as well, 
with a business community that is staunchly supportive of 
U.S. investment and concerned that Zapatero's policies will 
lead to a decrease in U.S. business involvement.  At every 
opportunity, we work to cultivate relations with GOS trade 
officials and encourage them to maintain a business-friendly 
environment in Spain. 
 
//What Does Spain Want?// 
 
15. (C) The GOS has gotten the message that a conflictive 
relationship with the USG is not in its best interest 
domestically or internationally.  In the short term, they 
want a signal from us acknowledging their recent positive 
steps.  In the GOS view, this could take the form of meetings 
in Washington in the next few months for Defense Minister 
Bono, Foreign Minister Moratinos, and later in the year, 
President Zapatero.  Spain would also seek public statements 
recognizing its contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
reconstruction, and inclusion in U.S. councils with allies on 
issues such as the Middle East conflict, the Darfur crisis, 
matters related to the Greater Middle East, and other issues 
of mutual interest. 
 
16. (C) As an alternative to such high-level engagement, we 
could instead make a concerted effort at a lower level to 
acknowledge each Spanish gesture as a step in the right 
direction.  This could take the form of a letter or a phone 
call from a USG official to thank the GOS for a specific 
action, such as its participation in the PRT in Afghanistan 
and its donation of funds to the Iraq elections.  At a 
minimum, we strongly recommend agreeing to requests for 
meetings in Washington by Minister of the Interior Jose 
Antonio Alonso and Minister of Justice Juan Fernando Lopez 
Aguilar to discuss counter-terrorism cooperation.  The 
objective of this calibrated approach would be to note 
progress on issues of interest to the USG and create momentum 
for higher level meetings while not giving the GOS the 
impression that we will overlook remaining points of 
conflict, such as President Zapatero's possible visit to 
Venezuela in March. 
 
//Steering Relations Toward a Productive Course// 
 
17. (C) The USG will not re-establish with the Zapatero 
Government the deep and close relationship we had with the 
Aznar administration.  However, we are currently in a strong 
position to influence Zapatero towards a more productive 
course that achieves U.S. interests in Spain and other parts 
of the world.  We have insisted with our GOS contacts that 
improved relations mean more than photo opportunities and 
expressions of goodwill; a real partnership implies positive 
actions.  Those within the GOS who accepted this message 
counseled Zapatero to undertake the series of positive 
gestures described above.  We believe we should now lock in 
these advances and respond favorably to these gestures in 
order to steer Zapatero towards supporting other USG 
objectives. 
 
18. (C) This may be a gradual and sometimes frustrating 
effort, since Zapatero's political instincts and those of 
other Socialist leaders, combined with their lingering 
insecurity over the nature of their electoral victory, will 
at times tempt them to emphasize their differences with USG 
policies.  For the moment, the USG's balanced use of carrots 
and sticks with the GOS has gotten Spain pointed in the right 
direction.  It is our sense that this opening will not last 
much longer and that eventually national pride and 
humiliation over USG snubs will lead Zapatero to suspend 
Spanish overtures and turn a deaf ear to USG requests for 
cooperation. 
MANZANARES