US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI1075

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ECIN, ENRG, BG, IN, India-Bangladesh 
SUBJECT: INDIA: SAARC DECISION SENT A MESSAGE TO DHAKA 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 878 
 
     B. NEW DELHI 877 
     C. NEW DELHI 876 
     D. NEW DELHI 874 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The GOI remains unapologetic about the last 
minute cancellation of the SAARC Summit and the resulting 
unhappiness in Dhaka.  In this context, on February 9, the 
MEA urged PolCouns not to underestimate the extent to which 
developments in Bangladesh influenced India's decision not to 
attend the SAARC Summit.  With no apparent sense of urgency 
to make things right with Dhaka, the MEA explained that the 
GOI's decision was intended to send a message to the BDG. 
Despite India's strong stand, our interlocutor reiterated the 
Foreign Secretary's unconvincing line on the importance of 
SAARC to New Delhi, and added that other interactions would 
continue.  In support of this assertion, press reports 
indicate that the Indian Cabinet has given the Petroleum 
Minister approval to enter into gas pipeline negotiations 
with Bangladesh.  Dhaka's High Commissioner complained to the 
DCM about Indian mistreatment.  We should look for 
opportunities to continue this dialogue and press for real 
information sharing.  End Summary. 
 
A Message for Dhaka 
------------------- 
 
2.  (C) MEA Director (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) Taranjit Singh 
Sandhu told PolCouns and Poloff that in light of increasing 
intolerance in Bangladesh and "sustained anti-India 
sentiment" there, India needed to bring pressure to bear on 
Dhaka.  Describing a "clarity of thought" on Bangladesh 
throughout the GOI, he urged PolCouns not to "lessen the 
importance" of events there in New Delhi's decision not to 
attend the SAARC Summit.  Sandhu underlined that the King's 
takeover in Nepal was not the sole motivator for India's 
change of heart, asserting that developments in both 
countries took place independent of each other.  The Director 
added to his list of Bangladeshi offenses that "sitting 
ministers" and senior politicians have made statements 
against India recently, with the intention of raising 
passions, and concluded that this is not the "SAARC spirit." 
 
3.  (C) While maintaining that it was about time New Delhi 
sent a message to Dhaka, Sandhu countered that the signal was 
not necessarily a negative one, rather it was meant to 
encourage Bangladesh to be "introspective."  India is not 
trying to fault the BDG, but wants them to realize the danger 
to themselves from leaving certain issues unchecked, he 
argued. 
 
"The US Doesn't Get It" 
----------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Somewhat incredulous that the USG continues to ask 
for concrete evidence to support India's claims regarding 
creeping "Talibanization," Sandhu said that even a layman 
could see what has been going on, and cited recent US press 
coverage of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh, such as the 
January "New York Times Magazine" expose.  PolCouns pointed 
out that the information presented in the reftels had all 
been reported in the press, which the Director argued only 
further proved his point.  PolCouns noted that an FBI agent 
for the legatt office in New Delhi was on his way to Dhaka to 
help on the January 27 attack, and added that we had made 
very clear US concern about half-hearted investigations of 
these politically motivated attacks.  Sandhu remained 
skeptical of US investigators' ability to get results in 
Bangladesh.  PolCouns offered, in the interest of maintaining 
US-India dialogue on this issue, to come back with our 
further insights on the situation in Bangladesh. 
 
Still Neighbors 
--------------- 
 
5.  (C) While he did not convey any sense of GOI urgency 
about stopping the backward slide in bilateral relations, 
Sandhu attempted to express optimism that initiatives already 
in the works, such as gas pipeline discussions, would 
continue, and that New Delhi remained committed to regional 
cooperation in SAARC.  Sandhu insisted that economic 
interaction between the two countries would not stop, but 
added that India needs to see the BDG pay attention to New 
Delhi's political and security concerns.  While refuting the 
suggestion that India was at a dead-end with Bangladesh, the 
Director noncommittally predicted the SAARC Summit would 
happen "sooner or later."  Contrary to the criticism that New 
Delhi had acted in the opposition Awami League's favor in 
sinking the Summit, Sandhu asserted that India's decision 
"had nothing to do with parties."  He added that India should 
not be seen as a bully, emphasizing that someone needed to 
call attention to what was going on in Bangladesh. 
 
High Commissioner Cries Foul 
---------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) In a lunch with the DCM, the Bangladeshi High 
Commissioner Hemayet Uddin vented his frustration and anger 
at the way India quashed the SAARC Summit.  Uddin claimed 
that the GOI made its announcement on February 2 without 
first notifying either the Ministry in Dhaka or the High 
Commission in New Delhi, and was especially stung that in his 
statement, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran singled out 
Bangladesh as a culprit.  Despite his vitriol, the High 
Commissioner highlighted some positive developments in the 
relationship, including plans to begin train service 
connecting Calcutta to India's Northeast, and the Tata 
Corporation's planned USD 2 billion investment in Bangladesh 
which will include the use of local gas supplies and might 
"smooth the way" for fuel sales to India. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) The GOI's official line that SAARC is an important 
aspect of India's foreign policy is contradicted by the 
meltdown over the Dhaka Summit.  This is unfortunate, not 
because of the organization's great potential to accomplish 
regional integration, but because India's commitment to SAARC 
would demonstrate New Delhi's willingness to sit down with 
its neighbors and generate some much-needed good will.  While 
the MEA harbors undisguised disdain for the Government of 
Bangladesh, there are other stakeholders in the relationship, 
in particular Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar, who has 
successfully moved the Indian Cabinet to give its blessing to 
his dialogue on a gas pipeline through Bangladesh. 
 
8.  (C) We will also engage with senior-level MEA SAARC 
experts on the Summit issue, and expect to hear a more 
nuanced line from that side of the Ministry.  Sandhu accepted 
PolCouns' suggestion that the US and India continue this 
discussion at higher levels, and post recommends that we find 
an early opportunity to revive our SA-led regional dialogue, 
with a special focus this time on the situation in Bangladesh. 
MULFORD