US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO326

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000326 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, IO, IO/T, INL/C/CJ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SNAR, AORC, IR, CE 
SUBJECT: COLOMBO PLAN:  CONSENSUS MINUS ONE TOWARD THAI 
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL IN WORKING GROUP 
 
REF: A. 04 BANGKOK 8118 (NOTAL) 
     B. 04 COLOMBO 1597 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.  Reasons 1.4(b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  During the February 15 Colombo Plan Working 
Group meeting, all other member states present expressed 
their support for the Thai constitutional amendment proposal 
to address arrears.  Among the several concerns voiced about 
the U.S. proposal, representatives from member states 
singularly focused on the U.S. language prohibiting a country 
from having a voice in decision-taking.  Despite 
clarifications and explanations from poloff, member countries 
remained supportive of the Thai proposal.  The meeting 
concluded with a request to the U.S. from the Working Group 
Chair to revisit the U.S. proposal in light of the comments 
expressed during the meeting.  Without a revamped U.S. 
proposal or consideration of a compromise (see Para 8), this 
issue will remain stalemated.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) On February 15, the Colombo Plan Working Group met 
for the second time to discuss proposals to amend the 
organization's constitution to address penalties for members 
states in arrears (see Ref B).  Maldivian High Commissioner 
Mohamed Asif, the current Colombo Plan Council President, 
chaired the Working Group meeting.  In addition to the U.S. 
presence, representatives from Indonesia, Iran, Japan, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand attended. 
 
Concerns regarding the U.S. proposed amendment 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (C) The Pakistani representative, who had earlier 
expressed his support for the U.S. proposal, reversed his 
support to the Thai proposal.  Notably, he agreed that 
barring citizens from training opportunities because their 
governments had not paid dues was not just, but felt that the 
U.S. proposal exceeded the limits of what an organization 
should be required to do toward the greater good of every 
member.  The Colombo Plan would quickly go bankrupt, he said, 
if other states stopped paying dues but were still allowed to 
send citizens to the organization's programs. 
 
4.  (C) Throughout the meeting, the representatives also 
focused on allowing consideration for the reasons a member 
country was in arrears.  The Secretary-General said the 
constitution permitted a member country to apply for a waiver 
of arrears and highlighted the back dues write-off that was 
granted to Cambodia.  (Note:  Chapter VI, Article 6 of the 
Constitution covers this provision.)  He added that 
Afghanistan was currently in arrears but anticipated that the 
Council would recognize the country's difficulties in paying 
dues and agree to writing off that debt.  He stressed, 
however, that Afghanistan had not applied to the Council for 
such a waiver as of yet.  Poloff assured representatives at 
the Working Group that the U.S. proposal did not supersede 
the organization's constitutional ability to address 
extenuating circumstances related to arrears. 
 
5.  (C) Representatives from almost every member country 
present remained fixated on the U.S. language that a country 
would "lose its right to participate in decision-taking" and 
felt that it violated the consensus spirit of the 
organization.  They also had difficulty deciding how and when 
a member would be barred from voicing an opinion, especially 
since the constitution does not allow a country any other 
status than "member" at Council meetings and there are no 
formal rules of procedure to reach consensus.  (Note:  The 
constitutional reference may be found in Chapter VI, Articles 
1 and 14.)  Poloff underscored the fact that the U.S. 
proposal did not intend to bar a member country's 
participation in Council meetings, but served to prohibit a 
delinquent member country's voice during moments of decision 
making as a penalty for arrears. 
6.  (C) Responding to the USG argument that a member country 
would not be able to sponsor its own citizens for programs if 
it could not pay its dues, the Secretary-General commented 
that a member country might only have to pay 1,000 USD for a 
citizen to attend a Colombo Plan program.  In an off-line 
discussion later recounted to poloff, the Secretary-General 
said he discussed the issue further with the Thai 
representative, underscoring that a member country in arrears 
would only have to pay the partial cost -- travel and per 
diem -- for one of its citizens to participate in a Colombo 
Plan program.  If the Thai arrears proposal was accepted by 
the Council, the Colombo Plan and the host country would 
still be accountable for the cost of program registration and 
tuition.  Coupled with his earlier comments during the 
Working Group meeting, the Secretary-General meant to 
emphasize to poloff that a member country could still afford 
to sponsor its citizens for a program. 
 
Consensus minus one 
------------------- 
 
7.  (C) At one point towards the end of the meeting, the 
Secretary-General asked if there was consensus that the Thai 
 
SIPDIS 
proposal could be adopted temporarily while the Secretariat 
continued to explore alternative ways to address the issue of 
arrears.  In response to poloff's question, the 
Secretary-General confirmed that, if temporarily adopted, the 
 
SIPDIS 
Thai-proposed amendment would go into effect.  Poloff replied 
that the USG could not agree to that.  When pressed if the 
U.S. would agree to let the consensus (every other member 
present agreed) proceed while noting the U.S.'s objection, 
poloff responded that, with the U.S. in disagreement, there 
was no consensus and the USG would not accept the approach 
put forward.  The discussion concluded with chair of the 
meeting requesting the U.S. to revisit its position in light 
of the comments expressed by the other member countries.  All 
other representatives present agreed with the 
Secretary-General's recommendation that the Thai proposal be 
 
SIPDIS 
adopted immediately -- without the need for another meeting 
-- should the U.S. change its view.  Poloff assured the 
Working Group that their comments would be conveyed to 
Washington, but underscored that the current U.S. position 
had already been the subject of much debate and consideration. 
 
A compromise? 
------------- 
 
8.  (C) After the meeting, the Pakistani representative 
suggested to poloff a possible compromise between the current 
U.S. and Thai proposals.  He proposed that member states in 
arrears could be allowed to pay for private citizens to 
attend Colombo Plan programs, but that civil servants would 
still be barred from participating while the country was in 
arrears without an amortization plan in effect.  In effect, 
this would address the U.S. concern towards continued citizen 
participation in Colombo Plan activities, while penalizing 
the government for its arrears. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) The member states had cogent arguments in support of 
the Thai proposal.  The representatives also felt that the 
U.S. and Thai proposals were very similar and many expressed 
their approval of the amortization option in both 
suggestions.  Moreover, the Secretary-General (a Thai 
national) has publicly supported the Thai proposal since 
September 2004 -- when it was introduced at the last Working 
Group meeting -- calling it "a compromise between the U.S. 
proposal and the prior proposed amendment."  It seems 
unlikely that he will reverse his personal opinion.  U.S. 
officials have had several lengthy discussions with other 
member states, many of which privately expressed their 
concern that the U.S. proposal -- which would not allow 
delinquent states a voice in decision-taking -- would be akin 
to "losing face," an unthinkable situation that trumps 
further consideration of the U.S. approach in this part of 
the world.  Given all these sentiments, suggesting 
alternatives to the Thai proposal -- see Para 8 --  or 
developing an entirely new U.S. approach -- not guaranteed of 
success either -- appear to be the only options for moving 
forward with this issue.  End Comment. 
 
LUNSTEAD